THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

Nos. 4, 5 & 6 JULY—SEPTEMBER Vol. XXXV

THE OXFORD CONFERENCE

By The Editor.

OUR Modern Churchmen's Conferences have been associated chronologically with the two World Wars. Our first Conference was held in Ripon just before the first World War. During our 28th Conference held at Oxford this year we celebrated with Thanksgiving Services the downfall of the last of the Axis Powers.

These coincidences are not without significance. Our Conferences have extended over an era of transition epoch-making in the history of mankind. We hope and believe that we are on the threshold of a new age which may prove to be a much better age than any which has preceded it. There is ground for sober optimism; but immense wisdom, courage and energy are demanded if our hopes are to be realized in a practical form. Here and now as Christians we are concerned with what is demanded from the Christian Church in this new era. 'A new earth demands new heavens.' We need supremely to-day a World Religion which shall weld mankind into a moral and spiritual unity. A World Civilization demands a World Religion, for 'Religion is the inner side of civilization.' The practical problem for the Christian Church is how to provide such a religion for mankind.

There is as yet no convincing evidence that the Christian Church is planning on a scale which gives any promise of success in the vast undertaking of uniting mankind in a moral and spiritual community. She is as disunited in policy as she is divided in membership.

Many attempts have been made during the last seventy years to achieve Christian unity by securing a united Christian front. Although as a result of these endeavours relations between Christian bodies are more cordial than they used to be, a practical Christian front has not yet come into existence: and the continuance of attempts on the lines at present adopted give little promise

of ultimate success. Is not this failure due to the Church's policy being concentrated far more on saving herself than on saving the world?

It was with this question in mind that the 28th Conference of Modern Churchmen selected as its theme: 'The Religion the World Needs.' The papers read cover a wide field of open-minded thinking and practical experience. All were agreed that only the Christian Religion possesses those qualities of universality and finality which give hope that it may become the Religion of Mankind: that in its present divided and conflicting state the Christian Church is not presenting the Christian Religion to-day in such a way as to secure for it the accomplishment of its ideal aim: that for the twofold purpose of uniting the Christian Church and of uniting mankind in the Christian Religion a great simplification in the Christian Religion is urgently needed and that simplification must take the form of going back to the Religion of Jesus Christ Himself. All may not have been agreed as to what in certain comparatively unimportant aspects the religion of Jesus was; but all were agreed upon the need to get back to that religion—'Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, yea, and for ever.' In the course of ages the Christian Religion has become so ecclesiasticized, sacramentalized, dogmatized that it needs to reverse the process by becoming far more moralized, spiritualized and rationalized, not to say harmonized, than is at present the case.

These terms may seem to be little more than cant phrases. By 'moralized' we mean a Christian Religion which stands firmly and increasingly for strengthening the sense of duty in our relations with our fellow human beings: by 'spiritualized' we mean the deepening of our sense of obligation to the invisible Divine Being and our sense of personal communion with that Being: by 'rationalized' we mean the consistent endeavour to think of and present our religion in such a way as to prohibit its conflicting with Reason and the assured results of our Biblical, historical and scientific studies: by 'harmonized' we mean the striving to secure fundamental unity in our rational, moral and spiritual life, while allowing the largest freedom for advance and expansion in any demanded direction—united at the roots but with absolute freedom to grow outwards and upwards as need demands.

These processes of moralization, spiritualization, rationalization have been operating for a considerable period, but their progress has been so slow that the Christian Church and the Christian Religion have been steadily losing ground for the last fifty years. There is therefore great need for this process to be accelerated. Yet when we survey Christianity to-day, the power of acceleration in the process of reform seems to be diminishing.

To convert Christians to an agreed basic form of the Christian Religion, and to unite them in promoting it, is indeed a task of profound difficulty. If we are to await the completion of this task before we attempt the conversion and unification of mankind in the practical acceptance of this agreed basic Christianity, we might well succumb in despair. But both these operations can be carried on side by side, or more correctly on two fronts, and every success on the one front will contribute to the success of the other. The essential simplification and harmonization of the Christian Religion will assist its propagation, and its propagation will demand its essential simplification and harmonization. Reformation at home will inspire propagation abroad, and the needs of propagation abroad will promote reformation at home.

We do not wish to be misunderstood. We are not insisting that the Christian Religion shall be everywhere the same. There should be freedom for an infinite number of developments, adaptations, applications of the Christian Religion, giving birth to various Christian institutions, organizations, practices according to the needs, temperament, culture, environment of different races. What we are maintaining is that the present situation demands agreement upon what constitutes basic Christianity and that, this being agreed upon, all who accept this and strive to promote it should consitute a single world-wide Christian fellowship. Membership in such a fellowship should not of necessity exclude him who enjoys it from fellowship in other religious societies. The individual in each case should be free to decide for himself whether his loyalty to basic Christianity sanctions and encourages such simultaneous membership of other religious societies. If he judges that it does, he should be free to act accordingly.

It may be contended that the various reunion attempts of recent years, whether at Edinburgh, Jerusalem, Lausanne, etc., have provided such a basic Christianity for purposes of reunion. We are compelled to reply that the basis secured has not been able to achieve the result intended, and that therefore it needs to be re-examined and reformulated and the result proclaimed from the Church's steeples. At present the cause of Christian reunion is either stagnant or retrogressing.

In this matter we have to think not only of the bodies of schismatic Christians in the Christian fold, but also of the vast multitudes of non-Christians outside it.

There is convincing evidence that the Religion of Jesus Christ Himself as expressed in the Lord's Prayer, the Two Great Commandments, the Seven Beatitudes, the Parable of the Prodigal Son and the Parable of the Good Samaritan, can make a profound appeal to adherents of the other great religions and to many who

profess no religion at all. Such a religion contains all the moral and spiritual values which mankind needs to-day for world peace and world progress. We are not asserting that without development it can meet all that is demanded either by the mystic on the one hand or by the metaphysician on the other; but mystics and metaphysicians are not prohibited from developing their experience and dialectic provided they do not demand that their conclusions shall be imposed upon their fellow-Christians either as necessary for salvation or as needful for fellowship in the Christian Church.

Why cannot the leaders of the Christian Churches, recognizing the urgent needs of the existing religious situation, agree to operate as one great fellowship in order to make this basic Christianity the religion of mankind? Their hesitation in adopting such a policy is due no doubt to their apprehension that it will give offence to conservative Catholics and conservative Evangelicals, who will be swift to declare that by such a policy the faith is being betrayed. Should this be the main motive of our leaders in hesitating to promote the policy we advocate, may we remind them of the motto of our English Reformers: 'Not so much to have respect how to please and satisfy either of these parties as how to please God and profit them both.'

This policy will demand no little resolution from our bishops, but less than was demanded from their predecessors who went to the Tower and to the stake. If our leaders are to receive the support from the clergy which such a tremendous undertaking demands, urgent reforms are needful in the education of the clergy. It was abundantly clear from the speeches made at the Oxford Conference of Modern Churchmen that the education of the clergy is too rigid and restricted for the influential exercise of their teaching office. No text-books are prescribed and no examination set for our ordinands in the fields of Comparative Religion, the History of Religion, the Psychology of Religion, the Philosophy of Religion. Yet without some acquaintance with these great fields of modern religious knowledge how inadequate is the Christian teacher's preparation for his task in the world of to-day. Too much time is spent on the minutiae of Old Testament studies, the fine points of dogmatic theology, the development and intricacies of liturgical worship, to the neglect of the more profound and spacious aspects of the Christian Religion.

Moreover, owing to the way in which Biblical criticism has discredited the old belief in the plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture, the authority of the Bible has been weakened for the English clergyman and the authority of the Church has as a consequence replaced it. The detrimental effect of this transfer of

authority from Bible to Church is increasingly apparent in our Church life to-day and needs to be counteracted. The laity are more irritated than impressed by the reiterated clerical appeal to Church authority.

Another matter which came up repeatedly at the Oxford Conference was the overwhelming need for reunion of the Christian denominations in this land. A vast amount of energy has been spent in trying to secure intercommunion with Christian Churches abroad, but intercommunion with our fellow Christians in this country is practically prohibited. Our National Church ought to invite all communicant members of all Christian denominations in this country to receive Holy Communion in our parish churches and cathedrals as most welcome guests and fellow-members in the Communion of Saints. This would create a most powerful impulse to Christian reunion. It could be done to-morrow if our English episcopate were resolved to do it. The beneficial results which would follow would pave the way for still greater advances.

We conclude with one further reflection. It was rightly stressed at the Conference that the Christian Religion is a religion both of illumination and of redemption. This of course is no new point. Other great religions possess this twofold quality. What is characteristic of the Christian Religion in this combination is the unique quality of the illumination which it offers to mankind and the unique quality of its redemption. The illumination given is primarily moral and spiritual and comes to Christians through the quality of Divine personality unveiled by and in Jesus Christ—the revelation of the Divine Father who is the highest form of Love, Light and Life.

The quality of the redemption offered in the Christian Religion is not a redemption procured by the offering of animal sacrifice or any other sacrifice of a propitiatory and expiatory kind. The offering demanded is that of the human personality itself, a holy reasonable and living sacrifice after the example of the sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ Himself: 'Lo, I come to do Thy Will, O God.' This offering redeems us, not from punishment, temporal and eternal, but from sin, the tyranny of the impulses of our animal nature over our moral and spiritual personality. This redemption, as St. Paul taught from the depths of his spiritual experience, is secured by the presence and power of the Holy Spirit operating in the human personality in response to the prayer of faith. It is in this unique manner and degree that the Christian Religion becomes both the religion of illumination and of redemption for the sons of men, who in the process of their experience are transformed into sons of God.

THE RELIGION THE WORLD NEEDS

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By Sir CYRIL NORWOOD, President of St. John's College, Oxford

IT is not likely that even the ablest of our lecturers at this conference will be able to offer a complete exposition of the vast subject which we have chosen: he will have done well enough if he can cast real light on one or more of the dimly-seen needs of that future world, or new order, into which we are moving. I do not pretend to offer you more than the thoughts of a layman who finds himself dissatisfied with the Churches, and not merely with the Church of England, who recognizes that this unrest, this disappointment, may possibly be due to his own failings, but who nevertheless cannot help feeling that the Churches offer to this generation something which it does not want because it finds it to be irrelevant or unsatisfying. I shall offer to you for your consideration not merely my own thoughts but a number of topics which have been under discussion among us in recent months, and my own reflections will constitute, as it were, but a small tributary to that general stream of criticism which flows steadily and indeed with mounting strength, as the years pass. To enter upon a discussion of the religion that the world needs suggests and implies to my mind that we are to discuss a religion that the world as yet has not got in the shape of any living presentation which can compel attention and attract disciples. Are all the Churches unsatisfactory in that they are failing to offer to the sore-tried world of to-day such a presentation of the Gospel as I have described? I believe that most of us would say so. But let us not rely upon our own observation merely. Let us start, if you will, from the proceedings in the Convocation of York in May of last year when the Bishop of Carlisle moved

> 'That Convocation, recognizing that there is a growing breach between the thought of the clergy and that of the people, records its twofold conviction that the Gospel is the divine answer to the fundamental problems of thought, and life, and that its effective proclamation requires of the Church a better understanding, not only of the Gospel itself, but also of the present situation.'

Some of you may remember that he spoke of the ever-weakening influence of the Church in social movements, and of the inadequacy of its modes of worship to the present day. His seconder, the Bishop of Southwell (*M.C.*, Sept. 1944, p. 116) spoke of the drift of the English-speaking world from religion, and spoke of a presentation of Christianity which was little more than Judaism, and

irrelevant to the need of to-day. The Archbishop of York spoke still more strongly of the danger in which we stand, when the great mass of people is totally ignorant of the most elementary facts of the Christian faith. Not only in this Conference, but in much wider circles without, there is agreement that there is a religion which the world needs, but that there is no sign as yet of its getting through to the world.

I do not think that we should be over-hasty in our judgments. For instance, if it is true that the great mass of people is totally ignorant of the most elementary facts of the Christian faith, yet it is also true that they often exhibit examples of Christian virtue, and single instances of conduct which deserve the title of noble. In the nights of destruction which befel our cities in the war so recently ended there were found some cowards and some knaves, but many more who earned the title of hero or of saint. Would the London crowd of the eighteenth century have behaved so well? Did the miners of Kingswood to whom Whitfield preached know any of the elementary facts of the Christian faith? Let us not make the present world out to be worse than it is: let us rather be thankful that in this country things are better than we might have expected. Consider the tremendous speed with which events have moved during the lifetime of many of us, the coming of the motor-car and the dormitory suburb, which have made it easy for people to live lives without roots, the coming of the cinema which gets all or most of the moral values wrong, the coming of the 'dogs' and the organized 'pool' which make gambling easy and much more universal, the coming of the aeroplane, the coming of broadcasting, whose results I cannot sum up in a sentence—all these have come about in the last forty years, and have made some kind of new approach necessary for those who would reach and guide the people. Add to all this change in the conditions of existence in Europe and America the moral shock involved in the coming of two world wars, which to simple-minded people seems often to prove beyond question that there can be no God in control in this Universe. Add again to all that the uprooting of whole generations of men from their homes and natural surroundings in order that they may serve overseas in the wars. We are often shocked by what we see and hear, but am I not right to say that when we contemplate the suddenness, the range and the depth of the changes to which humanity has had to adjust itself, things are certainly not worse than we might have expected?

In a matter in which you can only form opinions, and establish no proof, my impression remains firm that in spite of everything men and women in this country remain religious at bottom, and we must remember that what lies at the bottom of us is what controls

us. But the Churches — and the Church of England among them — being complicated organizations cannot move, change, and adjust themselves with the requisite speed. Of necessity they preserve in their services forms which are no longer living and language in some respect obsolete: they speak to the twentieth century in the manner of the sixteenth or the tenth or the fifth, seldom in that of the first: they are full of men and women who are ultra-conservative, or ignorant, and in both cases hostile to change. The Bishop of Carlisle was right in saying that there is a growing breach between the thought of the clergy and that of the people: the wonder is that the breach is not wider. If it goes on widening, the Churches as we know them are going to die: that is the danger of the position in which we stand to-day. But that in no way means that Christianity or religion will die: it may be the appointed and painful method by which rebirth will come, and man again come to feel that he stands before a living God.

It is impossible in this introductory address to cover all the ground, but perhaps after the general reflections in which I have indulged I may be permitted to indicate four directions in which modern thought is moving, or perhaps I should say, towards which the thoughts of young people are turned, without receiving any clear guidance from the Church. I will choose two which affect those who are already interested in Christianity, and two which affect mainly those whose attachment to the Church is very loose, if any tie exists at all.

I will take first the subject which is known as Comparative Religion, and with it the problems that arise in the mission field. It is a growing subject, in the sense that more and more young people are getting a smattering of it; ambitious and up-to-the-minute secondary schools take it as their religious syllabus for the Sixth Form, having apparently taught Christianity, and finished with it, in the Fifth. This new subject, even though it offers a favourable field for precocity and pretentiousness, at least teaches the young that there are other religions which deserve more respect than Bishop Heber, for instance, gave them. Perhaps I turn to this topic first because I have just come back from India, whither I went primarily to make contact with the Universities and the system of secondary secular education, but where I could not avoid coming into touch with Missions through their schools. Anglican Missions have been working in the South of India for a couple of centuries and in the North for a century or more: Roman Catholics have been busy for as long or longer. The Free Churches and America have contributed their full share. But apart from secular education, in which such standards as exist are largely due to the Mission schools, one cannot honestly say that the effect on the

swarming millions of Indians has been great. At one very good Jesuit school I was told that the number of converts that they had made in the last fifty-three years was three, and one of them was unsatisfactory. The attitude of India is tolerant. After all, they feel, there are so many religions and there is good in them all: indeed I was more than once reminded in India of a remark made to me in a religious discussion in Oxford by a Hindu undergraduate, 'Of course at the level at which you are conducting the argument there is no difference between any of the great religions.' This was but a crude way of putting what Dr. Radhakrishnan, once Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics in this University, maintained, that the time had come for dropping imperialism in the sphere of religion as well as in politics, that all religions were employed in a common quest for truth, and that it was for Christianity to share with Hinduism the best which each has to contribute. This is not only felt by Hindus. I confess that I was considerably impressed by the fervour and sincerity with which a Moslem graduate poured out to me a passionate statement of his belief that Mohammedanism was the highest and purest faith. In earlier times it was the custom to meet these high claims by pointing to what these religions tolerated at their lower level, to the filth of Hinduism, to the backwardness of Islam and its degradation of women, forgetting that we have some lower levels in Christianity of which we cannot be proud, both Catholic and Protestant.

It is not surprising that from the side of the Missions there have developed two schools of thought. One may be illustrated by the words of the late Archbishop Temple:

> 'By the Word of God — that is by Jesus Christ — Isaiah and Plato and Zoroaster and Buddha and Confucius conceived and uttered such truths as they declared. There is only one divine life: and every man in his measure is enlightened by it.'

The other is voiced by Karl Barth, and is quite untainted by compromise. I am not going to argue the question here. I have mentioned it only to point out that our Anglican Church does not seem to give a clear lead, and though in theory it may speak with the voice of Temple and for that matter of Athanasius and Aquinas, in practice its manners are inspired by Barth. And so lacking clear leadership the common man drifts to the position that all religions have good and evil in them, all are equally true and equally false. He is puzzled and disgusted by the record of events in S. India. And yet, if there could be but consistent and clear leading, how gladly would the generations of youth that are growing up welcome a teaching that does not try to limit 'the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.'

It may be that all religions culminate in Christ and His gospel. I think so myself, but they do not culminate in the Christianity which we have so far exhibited in India, nor in the Christianity to which we have so far attained at home. It is for us to recapture and re-interpret the first inspiration. We know too well the process which has gone on, the prophet's message—the followers that with the noblest zeal formed the institution that should carry it into effect — the growth of the official class and the official orthodoxy — and then decay and death, or re-inspiration. When I was in India, I had the good fortune to be able to visit the caves of Ajanta and saw the first temples hewn out of the rocks for the worship of Buddha in perhaps the first century B.C., or a little later. You enter from the blinding sunshine into a dim light, and passing across the rock floor you become aware of a shrine withdrawn, and there the seated Buddha : you become aware too that the walls on either side of you are covered with most beautiful paintings such as will bear comparison indeed with the great periods of Italian art. You know that here, perhaps at the time when Jesus was on earth, there was a living influence lifting men to the realms of the spirit. But in that valley there are many cave temples, for in each century they went on making new ones : in each century you can see the fading of the original inspiration. And so you come to the type of temple in which there is not one Buddha but many crowded into their niches in vain repetition, and then to the type where Hinduism is beginning to oust the whole Buddhist tradition, and finally to the types in which in the final triumph of the Hindu influences you descend to the grotesque and the phallic.

There inadequately treated I must leave the problem, which I have dealt with first because I believe that it is going to be of increasing importance. In days now not far off India and China will be not much more than a day's journey away from us, and the smug superiority with which the heathen in his blindness has in the past been contemplated will be more than ever out of date. The Church will not be able to leave the questions which I have roughly formulated unanswered for an indefinite period; if it does, those who might have been loyal members of a liberal Church will be finally driven away. This is a consideration which affords a natural transition to my second topic, which causes endless difficulty to the same type of Christian, and that is the weakening of the whole Christian effort throughout the world by the endless divisions of Christians among themselves. Here again I feel that India is not a bad place for the study of the problem, as you visit a succession of schools and colleges, here Roman Catholics, there Anglican High Church, there again Anglican Low Church, here American Presbyterian, and there American Baptist, and so on : it is borne

in on you with some force that the impression made on the heathen in his blindness is one of a certain oddity, and that he must feel that the missionaries have a lot to explain. When the Church in S. India worked out a scheme of confederation which was commended by common-sense and Christian charity, it was left in suspense for twenty-five years, and when it at last proceeded to inaugurate its union, it was with very polite words from official quarters of the Church of England, and very impolite words from certain other quarters, put out of communion gently but quite firmly. The effect of all this is, to say the least, unfortunate, in the minds of young people who can think for themselves, and these are the people with whom the future rests. All this is a much-worn theme, and there is no necessity to say much. It is again a problem which admits of two solutions, of which the one is unitary, and really totalitarian in temper and spirit, and the other is federal. There is no doubt which of the two will prove congenial to democracy, and offer scope for freedom. But here again the Anglican Church returns no definite answer, and continues to mark time. It is a policy which preserves an apparent unity at the cost of estranging very large numbers who are looking for world unity, and along federal lines. Moreover, the insistence on differences which originated far back in history and are not relevant to the present, and the importance attached to the unessential in belief or practice, drive away the great and increasing numbers whose approach to reality is by the path of science. To those who have grasped a little of what Kant meant by speaking of the wonder with which he was filled by the contemplation of the starry heavens above him and the moral law within him the doctrine of the Apostolic Succession will seem a trifling thing, and they will bother no more with the company of those whose minds are so narrow, and, as one must add in the present day, so odd.

There are of course various movements going on which are directed towards reunion. There is the movement, partly open and unashamed, but mainly underground and dangerous to the Church of England, which works for surrender to Rome on Rome's own terms. This is the one possible unitary solution, but as the nation has fought a war to preserve liberty of thought and against totalitarianism, it is not likely to be impressed by this movement, which can only injure the Church without moving in any way the people of this country. There are the movements, in part antiquarian, in part sentimental, which make for intercommunion with other orthodox Churches such as the Greek: their operations please some clerical minds, but they do not interest the average layman, much less the British public. For them the acid test of the sincerity and liberalism of the Church is to ask whether the bond

of fellowship is being offered to the Free Churches in any genuine way. After all, these are our brothers, much nearer to us than Christians from the Volga, or priests from Addis Ababa who have forgotten what the Greek words of their service-book mean. It makes for bitterness of comment when a young observer sees our Church going out of its way to extend fellowship to these while refusing intercommunion even on special occasions, and denying the hospitality of the pulpit to his neighbours in the same village, with whom he associates every day in all things save what is called religion. Here we have another instance of the so-called wisdom of the Anglican Church in leaving a question unanswered. In 1920 the Lambeth Conference took a generous view, and in set terms acknowledged the validity of the Free Church Ministries, and of the spiritual blessing which had attended that work. For twenty-five years men and women of open mind and generous heart have expected to see those brave words implemented by advance in the direction of federal union with intercommunion and interchange of pulpits as the mark of the new fellowship. Other elements in the Church of England have intervened, and we are further away from reunion than we were a quarter of a century ago. The Church continues to speak with two voices, and to offer at the same time both the democratic and the totalitarian answer. For how long it can continue to do this remains uncertain. What is not uncertain is that many of the best of our young people are being lost from membership.

So far we have been thinking of those who are religiously-minded, at any rate potentially, if not actually, and have chosen two instances in which I submit that the Church fails to take hold. Let us next consider two other instances, this time in connection with those who are worldly-minded, or shall we say this-worldly-minded. The first instance is summed up in one word, Communism, and all the castles for the future which the young are building in imagination on the foundation of Russia and its great achievement. It is not in this country only that Communism begins to make a strong appeal: it makes one still stronger in France, and in most of those European countries where the breakdown of the old society has been complete. In India the older folk and those possessed of varying degrees of wealth are very frightened of Bolshevism, and the students and the young are much enamoured of it. In China it is well-known that after the Japanese have been cast out, there are matters to be settled between Chang-kai-shek and the Communists. The attraction of this new faith — for so it deserves to be called — is that it seems to promise freedom from want and freedom from fear, and the young everywhere are willing to barter a good deal of old-fashioned political freedom, yes, and

religious freedom also if they can be assured of comfort and security. The supposed equality between man and man, the supposed abolition of the profit-motive, the conversion of the acquisitive into the co-operative society, have been in Russia the work not of Christians but of a minority of laymen, economists and politicians, directed by leaders of genius. Their work seems to be very much in line with some texts that can be quoted from the New Testament, and yet the Church has had nothing to do with the creation of the new order. On the contrary it has condemned it, the Greek Church not unnaturally, considering the treatment which it received from the hot gospellers of the new dispensation. The Roman Church has quite steadily and consistently condemned it as the work of the devil, again not unnaturally. Both systems are totalitarian, but the Bolshevist is of this world : the Roman builds on spiritual authority, and both meet each other with a blank denial.

I am always at a loss in speaking of Communism, for there is nothing which its adherents change so easily on the order of their general headquarters as a policy or a principle. It may be that they no longer meet the religious with a blank denial of all their claims. As a matter of fact there is nothing in those freedoms from want and from fear that they are engaged in building which is inconsistent with Christianity. Quite the contrary. The system might very well become a more Christian state-order than any which we have yet known. Only so far Bolshevism as a matter of hard fact has not been Christian, and I am quite certain of this, that the liquidation of opponents is not a Christian, nor even a democratic method, whether it is carried out by Stalin or merely advocated by the Bishop of Bradford. Increasing trouble will arise, however, if Christians have got no appeal, no programme of their own, with which they can enlist the enthusiasms of the young would-be builders of new worlds. I shall perhaps not carry you all with me when I say that I believe our late Archbishop was leading right, when he stressed the social gospel of Christianity. I know full well the danger of cheapening the religion of Christ on the political hustings, but I think that for the Church the danger of not giving a lead at all is much more serious. The Church could perhaps give spiritual depth to our thinking, and throw light on moral issues in which the Englishman with all his faults is always ready to respect the right, if he can be made to see it. One very grave development I have noticed throughout my life which I think to be not without real influence in turning young people away from the Church and from Christian solutions of social problems, and that is the steady decline in any effective belief in a future life. I can but touch on this, for it is a subject for a course of lectures in itself. Many

Christians whom I know among my own lay-friends no longer believe that human personality can continue to exist after the dissolution of the physical body, and of course to the scientist, within the limits of his science, such a proposition is absurd. The doctrine of life after death is seldom preached in the pulpit: perhaps it involves too many difficulties. Hence it is natural for young people to listen to teachings which deal with this life and this world only in which you are proceeding among apparent realities, and not to listen to a gospel which though based on resurrection and a life after death, is so preached that no reliance is placed on the survival of our personalities. I may have been unfortunate in my experiences, and you may have found things to be otherwise. But I am sure that it is for the Christian Church to preach a social order which shall take account of both this life and the next, which is what I really mean when I spoke of bringing spiritual depth to politics. The younger generations may be wrong, but it is no good merely to excommunicate and to anathematise: the Church must go down into the market-place itself with its own positive gospel, and lead — it will perish if it stands aloof. Communism has an emotional appeal even stronger than that of the reasoning faculty of man, which indeed in these days it slights and belittles; even more emotional is National Socialism in its various forms, in which men do not expect to be asked to think. So too, to come back once more to my recent Indian experience, an eager Moslem undergraduate said to me, 'Understand, Pakistan is no longer a political proposal to be argued about; it is an article of religious faith to be believed.' It is a sad thing for the liberal-minded to reflect that over large areas of the world there is neither use nor respect for reason. Nevertheless over other large areas, in the United States, in Britain and its Dominions, and let us hope, increasingly in Western Europe there are great numbers who try to reason, to think objectively, to honour truth. Of these few have maintained their loyalty to the Church. They are fairly well-read, and on the average they surpass the average clergyman in intellectual ability. They are offended by the Church in various ways, some because they do not like the Jewish old clothes, as Carlyle called them, in which the Church continues to wrap itself on occasions, some because they do not like the claims of the priesthood and overemphasized sacramentalism, some because orthodoxy and ignorance seem to go hand in hand together. There are others again who, having listened to the petty details over which Christians are squabbling, and compared them with things that really matter, are content to go by on the other side. There are others who in all sorts of ways just do not find popular Christianity credible, and after a time they just cease to bother their heads. It is a very much

wider parting of the people from the priests than that which was caused by the old but now unfashionable controversy between religion and science: there are so many ways in which the Church is not getting hold, though individuals are still listened to, and the laity is still not hostile, but usually ready to listen and to follow a leader of knowledge — and broad sympathies.

Of course I know the answer that is being confidently made both inside the Church of England and on the Continent, that religion is not a field in which you can safely follow reason, that the Church has been failing because it has surrendered one position after another following the false light of rationalism and liberalism, that all would have been well if it had held fast to its original tenets, and that now the right course is to teach dogma, to get back to orthodoxy, and to banish all compromise. These are brave words, but they only conceal the true position, that the Christian Church is a much smaller body than it was, and that in our own country the Church of England to a great degree consists of nominal adherents, because it no longer talks a language which the young laity understand and appreciate. This movement back to dogma and orthodoxy appears to me to be likely to prove a flash in the pan, and perhaps it will succeed only so far as to provide a minority, and a not very intelligent minority, with a path of escape from reality.

At the same time I do not wish it to be thought that I am arguing that all that is necessary is to go back to nineteenth-century liberalism, and that then the young and the estranged will come pouring back into the Church. Liberalism has lost grip, and not only in religion: but at any rate it has had the merit of believing in the Holy Spirit of God, which shall lead mankind into all truth. It has looked forward, and not back, and that is the direction in which this generation has got to look if civilization is to emerge from its present disasters. In an interesting and impressive little book the late Principal Selbie has left on record his view that the liberalism which has failed did so because it took progress for granted, and thought that man had but to fall in with the process. Hence, to quote his own words:

> 'To all intents and purposes it made man independent of God, and the potential author of his own salvation. It minimized sin, soft-pedalled the need for forgiveness, and advocated reform rather than regeneration.'

And again:

> 'It produced for a waiting world a picture of a humanitarian Christ, a teacher and reformer, rather than a Saviour and Lord.'

That is a criticism which it is expedient for us never to forget, while we proudly remember that it has never been true of our leaders from Rashdall onwards, nor true of our Union as a whole.

The need of the present and of the future is to bring the lives of individual men and women into relationship with God and thereby to make our civilization, and in course of time the world's civilization, an instrument for doing the Will of God and for working out His purpose. Such an instrument can never be constructed if it is in effect merely superimposed on a mass of very vague adherents, who are ignorant, or non-committal in their attitude. The mission of the Church of England is first to individuals, who differ from those of old days because the great majority dwell in urban conditions, and I stress this because it is not realized that things are different to-day from what they were in the past. Then a man working in a village community or upon the land felt that he had a place and a purpose, but now a man working in a factory in a great city feels that he is lonely in the midst of multitudes, and in himself insignificant, that he simply does not count or matter. It is only the sense of the reality and of the nearness of God that can change this.

Again, most of our fellow-countrymen would say, if they were questioned, that they accept the teaching of Jesus as an ideal, but they cannot accept the miraculous trappings that go with the Gospel story, nor believe in the Divinity of Christ. Sometimes this state of mind is elevated by conferring on it the title of Christian humanism, but it is also a very common state of mind among the ignorant, and those whom it is the fashion to describe to-day as the unprivileged, as I know after hearing the statements of some thousands of conscientious objectors. But to my mind Christianity, if it is only a system of ethics, is not enough, and this generation which is so largely relying on it is like a man who is living on his capital, and grows steadily poorer. Is not our whole civilization less stable, less healthy, and on the whole less enlightened as to the things which matter most, by which I mean the spiritual values of truth, goodness and beauty, than it was fifty years ago?

Some of you will have read Gilbert Murray's Conway Lecture, and will remember the passage:

> 'We who believe above all things in Humanity and Truth, and those Christians whose religion rests far more upon, say, the Sermon on the Mount, and the thirteenth chapter of *Corinthians* than on dogmas and miracles and magic claims, have exactly the same conception of our duty to mankind, the same vision of beauty to be pursued, and those, I venture to think, will pursue it best who, in the prophet's words, "Walk humbly with their God," and do not profess to know what is beyond man's knowledge.'

There is so much in this with which we can agree. Nevertheless this humanism is a dwindling power, because the sense of the Living God is not in it. It leaves His Nature very much to be a matter of opinion, eternal life to be a matter of opinion, prayer to be a matter

of opinion. Here at any rate are three matters upon which Jesus was dogmatic, and I believe that the religion of the future must be dogmatic.

If I have not said much about the content of the religion that the world needs, you must forgive me. This address of mine is introductory, and subsequent readers will fill in some of the many spaces that I have left vacant. But if you desire a simple and clear statement of what I believe this religion to be, you will find it in that excellent brief book *Basic Christianity — the World Religion*, in which the Editor of the *Modern Churchman* has rendered not the least of his many services to the cause of true religion : I hope that the book will circulate far and wide, and pass through many editions. In the spirit of that simple faith let us turn to the work of this conference, and thereafter face the difficult years that are before us, when men of good-will must strive to re-build our shattered civilization in loyalty to the ideals of the Kingdom of God.

PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

By William Brown, D.M., D.Sc., F.R.C.P., Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford.

IT is a great privilege and pleasure to me to be present at this Conference once more, and to speak on a subject of such exceptional importance as the relation of religion to psychology—a subject which is becoming more important as the years go by.

One of the greatest problems, both in science and philosophy, at the present day is the nature of mind and the extent to which the individual mind can be influenced and controlled by social organization, and develop contact with an all-inclusive spiritual system in its search for self-realization and happiness.

This brings us to the question of a natural science of the mind. Actually many sciences deal with the mind — the so-called mental sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) as the Germans call them. These are (1) the science of *ethics*, which deals with moral obligation and the criteria of right and wrong; (2) the science of *aesthetics*, which deals with the criteria of beauty, and the theory of beauty and ugliness; (3) the science of *logic*, which deals with the nature of thought and the conditions of the validity of thought and of knowledge; and, further (4), that greatest science of all, *Scientia scientiarum*, viz., *metaphyiscs*, which deals, or attempts to deal, with the ultimate nature of reality. Metaphysics is the consideration of 'the real as such.' It attempts to answer the questions :

What is the real? What is the ultimate nature of mind? What is the ultimate nature of matter? What are space, time and causality? What is knowledge? What does it all amount to? To what extent can we reduce everything to some fundamental source? It may be alternatively defined as 'the criticism of concepts' (the Kantian position), or as a statement of 'the absolute presuppositions and first principles' of the other sciences[1] — aims which are more modest and more capable of achievement.

Besides the above-mentioned subjects of study, which are really all parts of what is generally known as *philosophy*, there is (5) the science of *psychology*, a new science that is making rapid strides at the present day. How are we to distinguish psychology, which is also a science of the mind, from these other sciences? I have to be dogmatic here; in my opinion, an effective way of distinguishing psychology from these other sciences is to say that psychology is the science of the mind so far as it is *a sequence of mental processes in the individual*. The sciences of ethics, aesthetics and logic are sciences of the mind which deal with mental things from the point of view of *value*, or of a *standard* or *norm*, and are therefore called *normative* or *criteriological sciences*. Psychology is a positive or natural science. In psychology we are dealing with cause and effect, as we are in all the other natural sciences; we are considering the mind as an historical thing, something going on from moment to moment, one moment of mental experience, or mental event, bringing about a subsequent mental event, with the co-operation or correlative action of the brain, the nervous system and the rest of the body. That is psychology. Psychology is a natural science, whereas all these other mental sciences, about which I have spoken, are philosophical sciences. It will conduce to clear thought if one makes that distinction straightaway; otherwise there is some danger that, with psychology being so prominent at the present time, people will take the pronouncements of psychology as all that is known and can be said about the mind, and they may try to put psychology in the place of the other mental sciences. I should have mentioned among these other mental sciences as, to my mind, a part of metaphysics the science of *religion*, of our religious experiences or at least of the *validity* of our religious experiences — the extent to which we may rightly believe that we have objective awareness of spiritual existence, an awareness of some supreme and ultimate spiritual value which is objective[2] and relatively independent of the individual mind.

[1] See R. G. Collingwood, *Metaphysics*, p. 40 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940).

[2] A good definition of *the objective*, in a philosophical sense, is: 'What we are constrained to think in order to make our thought consistent with itself.' (B. Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 13.)

That is not psychology. Psychology is now an independent science, but it is also the indispensable background of the philosophical sciences. It has sometimes been looked upon as a competitior of them, by philosophers equally with psychologists. That need not be so and should not be so. If we avoid such misunderstanding, we can derive much benefit from an alliance between philosophy and psychology. It must now be obvious to all that psychology has its own contribution to make to the general problem of valuation and validity, without any infringement of the rights of philosophy in the matter.

II. The Structure of the Individual Mind.

Having cleared my philosophical conscience in this way, I will now deal more fully with the general nature of pyschology, which is the science of the mind as something that is essentially individual and that goes on in time, as a sequence of mental events, and may be studied in terms of historical causation, as well as in other more general ways. We find in modern psychology (following a lead first given by Leibniz) that, although we are aware of the mind only through our consciousness, and it is consciousness that gives us *awareness* of mental activity, we are forced to believe that a great deal of mental activity occurs, not indeed in complete independence of consciousness, but below the level of clear consciousness, or beyond its field of awareness. So we talk of the sub-conscious mind, beyond marginal consciousness, which is itself the verge beyond focal or clear consciousness. We have the focal or central part of consciousness, clear awareness, and around this the marginal part, which is vague awareness, which in its turn shades off into the part that is outside the field of consciousness altogether, *the sub-conscious*. This again, we find, if we employ special methods of investigation — especially those of medical psychology — shades into *the unconscious mind*. The unconscious mind is of the utmost importance if we are fully to understand the working of the human personality. The unconscious mind is partly in a state of repression (*Verdrängung*) and partly not. So far as it is in a state of repression, or held back from consciousness by some special censoring force, it is called the unconscious proper (*das Unbewusste*) or the 'Id' (*das Es*). So far as it is not held back from consciousness by any censoring force, so that it can pass into consciousness at any moment under appropriate conditions of attention, it is called pre-conscious (*das Vorbewusste*). Thus one has the pre-conscious, which one can identify with the sub-conscious; one has the unconscious proper, or Id, which is in a state of repression, and includes the repressed tendencies, the primitive tendencies of very early years—tendencies and memories,

phantasies and ideas associated with them, which are held away from clear consciousness and kept out of consciousness altogether by a repressing force — and finally this repressing force itself, which Freud formerly called the 'censorship' (*die Zensur*), and now partly identifies with the super-ego (*das Ueber-Ich*), which is also unconscious. So that the mind, as we see it now, consists of (1) the super-ego or repressing tendency; (2) the repressed tendencies themselves and their repressed memories; (3) the pre-conscious or sub-conscious — memories and tendencies which are on the verge between consciousness and the repressed unconscious, which can come into consciousness at any moment (just as the name 'Homer' might come into your mind at this moment if I called out, 'The author of the "Odyssey"'), and which is part of the sub-conscious or pre-conscious; and, finally, (4) consciousness itself and the organized *ego* supporting it. Although the unconscious mind is of the utmost importance — it contains an enormous amount of energy, it is the power of the mental engine — the directing power comes almost entirely from the conscious mind, or rather the organized ego. There is no consistent individual direction of the unconscious as a whole. The unconscious has its own direction, but it is not directed individually; and so the word 'Id' (*das Es*) has been used to express it, something neutral and impersonal. In Freud's important essay, '*The Ego and the Id*,' the 'Id' means the unconscious, mainly, if not exclusively, impersonal sexual energy (*libido*). The ego is partly conscious and is individual or persona, with an organization and integration of its own, and in direct touch with outside reality. The 'Id' is impersonal, below the level of personality; it comprises erotic or libidinal urges that are common to the race; it is the unconscious instinct and feeling that is common to all of us, although in different degrees in different people. Its activity is a blind urge or craving for direct satisfaction, and is out of time and dominated by the pleasure principle. In my opinion consciousness, too, is common to all of us. That applies not only to human beings, but also to animals. We see the same sort of consciousness wherever we look. We see it, for example, in a dog. As we get to understand a dog we realize that its consciousness is the same in kind as our own consciousness and responds readily to love and affection. There is one great consciousness running through all of us. That has this very important inference, namely, that if we are, deep down, all one, we should have deep sympathy with one another. So if I may be allowed to spring from the unconscious to the higher consciousness, what our ego or conscious mind should aim at is to be fully aware of that identity of all of us with one another and with the spirit of the universe. Schopenhauer, for whom the 'will to live'

(*Wille zum Leben*) constituted the fundamental nature of all reality, said that the essence of morality is sympathy or compassion (*Mitleid*). That is quite true. Genuine morality involves being able to sympathize with others and see things from other people's points of view, and in that frame of mind to fulfil Kant's maxim :

> 'Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a prineiple of universal legislation.' [3]

That is the way in which to overcome irrational strife and to rise above social conflict to a higher synthesis of co-operation instead of mere competition. What holds us back, apart from self-will and moral weakness, is our unconscious mind. It has its values and virtues; it is full of energy; it provides all the fundamental energies, like the spirited horse which carries the rider along, but the rider must direct the horse and know how to manage it. If there is a baulking or distorting of this unconscious activity; if, in early years of childhood, education is carried out wrongly, and unnecessary stresses are allowed, there are added to those unconscious, unavoidably repressed tendencies (not to mention the hereditary tendencies), unnecessary additional tendencies and strains.

III. Early Education and the Super-Ego.

The development of the super-ego begins in the first few months of childhood through the psychological processes of introjection and projection, and continues during the first few years in relation to the parents (Oedipus complex), and nurses and teachers.

The *locus classicus* on Freud's theory of the Super-Ego (*das Ueber-Ich*) is the following :

> 'The broad general outcome of the sexual phase governed by the Oedipus Complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two identifications [father-identification and mother-identification] in some way combined together. This modification of the ego retains its special position : it stands in contrast to the other constituents of the ego in the form of an ego-ideal or super-ego. The super-ego is, however, not merely a deposit left by the earliest object-choices of the id [the *libido*]; it also represents an energetic reaction-formation against those choices.' (S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 44; Hogarth Press, 1927.)

Hence intelligent education of the very young child is of the utmost importance in order to give it a healthy unconscious, for what was conscious then forms a part of the unconscious in later years, both *id* and *super-ego*, as the child passes from the first months and years on into boyhood and girlhood, and on again

[3] *'Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gestez gebung gelten könne.'* (Immanual Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, § 7.)

through adolescence. At adolescence there arises special sresses and strains, and tendencies to react spasmodically and even violently to past repressions and more recent restraints. The utmost care should be taken in education in piloting the young child through those critical years. Instead of eternally telling the child, 'You ought to do this,' and 'You ought not to do that,' and emphasizing the duty of obedience as if it were the chief duty of childhood, we should all the time be trying to understand the child, to see the world through the child's eyes and to help the child in that way, by understanding him. Full understanding involves love, of course, and it is through love and understanding that all education should be carried out, not through punishment. Punishment should be avoided as much as possible. I know there are theories on chastening according to which it is supposed to be good. Discipline is necessary, but we get quite enough punishment in life for our needs, if we face life in the right way. I do not mean intentional punishment, but the changes and chances of this mortal life. We should avoid punishment as far as possible. Even self-punishment is a luxury. Instead of self-punishment, let us have self-training, self-discipline, striving always forwards. Instead of looking back on our sins and groaning and moaning about them and clinging to the thought of them in a sentimental way, let us thrust them away after true repentance (*μετάνοια*) and pass on to something higher, determined to advance to the greater things which are possible. What holds us back is à mal-adjusted unconscious mind, and a mal-adjusted super-ego, and so when we have to deal with mal-adjusted people, people suffering from neurosis, from mental illnesses of one kind or another, we have to penetrate into their unconscious minds by using the method of deep mental analysis.

IV. Repression and Sublimation.

We find that these repressed tendencies, when released, are capable of sublimation. Those are two important words, 'repression' and 'sublimation.' Anything in the mind that is repressed cannot be fully sublimated, and so long as it remains in a state of repression it will disturb the working of the mind; it will show unconsciously in all sorts of distorted ways, in ways which the person himself cannot understand, in anxieties, compulsions or phobias, in moods, temperamental changes, explosive mental reactions, or more serious mental derangement. It is those repressed tendencies which are showing themselves and, as it were, knocking at the door, and that 'knocking at the door of consciousness,' metaphorically expressed, is what are called 'neurotic symptoms.'

Symptoms, like dreams, are disguised fulfilments of repressed wishes. The best way of dealing with such repressions is to release them and face them. One should, as it were, open the door and face them, parley with them, understand them and resolve the mental conflict. Then that energy, which is always of a primitive instinctive kind — self-preservation, self-assertion and sexual energy, of one kind or another—can be sublimated, that is, directed to higher social and cultural ends.

Repressed tendencies, which are very strong in all of us—more so in some individuals than in others—can give a lot of trouble if they continue in a repressed state. They can even produce suicide. In melancholia, suicide is due to the excessive harshness of the super-ego in ruling and condemning the ego. But some suicides are due to repressed self-assertion. The individual is very self-assertive and yet cannot assert himself. He has so much bottled-up or thwarted aggressiveness that he would like to kill the whole world, but this is impossible, and so he kills himself, destroying the mind which mirrors that world. Repressed self-assertion is bad. Undo the repression; recognize the self-assertion, but sublimate it, that is, direct it towards ends that are social and not essentially competitive. There are plenty of such ends. Civilization is only just beginning. In this twentieth century we are only just beginning to become civilized. All of us are uncivilized in all sorts of directions. Civilization up to now psychologically has been a compromise, a rough and tumble, a hand-to-mouth affair. Just as, under the regime of *laissez-faire*, struggling cities have produced slums and every kind of disfigurement with the advance of the industrial age, so the individual mind has developed irregularly and untidily, with compromises and unresolved conflicts instead of clear-cut solutions. We have to overhaul our civilization, look at the roots of it; all of us have to do that. It is our duty and our right — our birthright — to face things radically and plan intelligently for a more scientific and just social order. We had a chance of reconstructing the world, a chance that came immediately after the last war and was thrown aside. The chance is coming again and we must all contribute to that reconstruction. Psychology is going to be of great importance in enabling us to play our part. The physical sciences have long made their contribution and are doing so now at an ever accelerating rate. The engineers are pouring out inventions and practical devices with the utmost prodigality, making our lives more and more comfortable, more and more easy in every direction. What are we doing on the mental side? We are doing very little. We are re-stating and re-emphasizing old dogmas and affirmations of a pre-psychological age and belonging to an outworn philosophy.

V. Analysis and Synthesis.

The new psychology is going to be constructive as well as destructive. In using analysis we are also essentially bringing about mental synthesis. It is mere misunderstanding to think that analysts can analyze but not synthesize. All mental analysis means synthesis as well. The mind so far as it is being analyzed is being re-synthesized all the time. The mind does not fall asunder in analysis like the parts of a watch. It is an organic living thing, and as repressions are overcome, as selfish tendencies and self-centred tendencies, cowardly tendencies and cowering tendencies or whatever they may be, come up and are adequately faced, judged and corrected, the mind becomes more free. The result of analysis is an increase of freedom, partly, although not wholly, because it involves deepened self-knowledge—*autognosis*, as I have called it—and therefore increased self-control. We cannot be free so long as in the depths of our mind we are tied unconsciously to our early experiences and held in the rut of mere custom. In saying that I am not saying that we should throw aside everything of the past and start afresh from the beginning. That could not be done even if we tried to do it, but, of course, it should not be done. There is a great deal that is struggling and inadequate in the past history of the race and in the development of the individual mind, but there is also a great deal that is just the opposite; nobility of mind, depth of insight, courage, religious aspiration and the striving after the good, the beautiful and the true. Progress would be more rapid if we freed our minds from incubus and fetters of our own individual pasts. This can be done by analysis. In mental and in psycho-neurotic cases analysis is essential. Their symptoms are the disguised fulfilment of repressed tendencies. Our dreams, too, even the most normal, are the disguised fulfilment of repressed wishes, and to that extent quasi-neurotic symptoms, resolvable through analysis and allowing deeper insight into our mental make-up.

VI. Illusion and Religion.

We all of us have illusions due to strong wishes that we cannot get satisfied in the direct way. Sigmund Freud said that religion itself is an illusion. In one of his best-known books, *The Future of an Illusion*, he endeavours to show that religious belief is an illusion (not a delusion), the disguised fulfilment of a wish for security and mental comfort and rest, based upon the infantile part of our nature. I would dissociate myself completely from him there. On the basis of one's philosophical training and one's own individual experience of analyzing persons and analyzing oneself, one can say that this book, though clever, merely sets up a man of straw to knock him over again. If what Freud describes as religion

is religion, then indeed it should be destroyed. Freud seems to regard religion as just a compensation for the changes and chances of this mortal life, a sort of antidote to the terrors of life, and the certainty of death that awaits us all; as if religion were just that, just based upon selfishness and cowardice. True religion is not that. That is superstition. True religion means a rising above anything to do with cowardice or selfishness. It casts aside fear. It is love, and love casts out fear. It is just the opposite of selfishness. It is the decision to love our neighbours as ourselves, and rather to let ourselves be killed than to kill another person, rather to suffer injustice ourselves than to be unjust to anybody else. That is religion; it is not a negative thing; it is a positive thing—the most positive and all-inclusive thing there is, and if we look back upon the story of the race we find that all the great religious leaders have been creative personalities. They have entered into the progress of the world, made their contribution of a completely positive kind. The world has been richer for their presence and has been lifted forward. They have gone steadily in the direction of progress, not of regress. But the Freudian theory of religion is that it is a regress, that it is a stepping back to the attitude of the little child coming up against the problem of life and death—the problem and grim prospect of individual death. Before the certainty of death we are supposed to shudder, shrink back and regress to a state of our childhood when we were happy in the bosom of the family, trusting our parents, and feeling supported by them. Everybody who has been in mortal danger during this war knows that is not the feeling when faced with the imminent possibility of death. That is the only general explanation, the only psychological account, that Freud can give of religion, although he also ventures the further suggestion that religion is

> 'the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity. It, like the child's, originated in the Oedipus complex, the relation to the father.' (*The Future of an Illusion,* Hogarth Press, 1928, p. 76.)

It is true that no mere psychological account can be adequate to religion. To be intellectually adequate in one's analysis of religion one must be a philosopher as well as a psychologist. Moreover, this Freudian picture is a bad psychological account. It is invalidated by a fundamental fallacy, and a fundamental limitation of outlook. The fundamental fallacy is the limitation to the individual's environment, or the 'reality' to which he finds himself unequal and from which he retreats into religious illusion or phantasy, to the outside physical and social world. Reality, of course, means much more than that. The spiritual world remains after analysis has done its best, and worst, to purge the mind of all illusion. Everyone can decide for himself how much of his religion is selfishness and cowardice, mere self-seeking and self-

protection, and how much of it is something that is, or aims at being, completely fearless and determined to assert the highest, as he sees it, in the face of everything, independently of what may happen to himself. The latter is the true religious attitude. What do we mean by religious feeling? Religious feeling is, I believe, the feeling of relationship to, and ultimate union with, the Divine. What do we mean by the Divine? We mean the eternal or spiritual, with all its ultimate *value*, as distinct from the merely temporal.

VII. Time and Eternity.

That is not merely a word; the eternal is not a *totum simul*, an 'all at once.' The eternal takes time up into itself. We are all capable of experiencing the eternal or super-temporal. Physical changes occur one after another, events follow one another without overlap. But we as conscious individuals are conscious not only of the immediate present — that is, of a point of time — but also of the immediate past and the immediate future, in the same moment of experience; we are conscious of what is called the *specious present*, and the specious present is, to quote William James,

> 'no knife-edge, but a saddle-back with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time.' (*Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 609.)

That saddle-back is due to the power of the mind to rise above mere temporal sequence. Our span of attention varies at different times. We live our lives at different tensions, sometimes at the merely animal level, sometimes at the more strictly intellectual and aesthetic levels; and sometimes, under great stress and strain, when great bereavement befalls us, when we see deep down into existence, we are on a higher level still, on the truly religious level. That is why there is a certain amount of sadness accompanying most truly religious feeling. The kind of religious feeling that is 'slap you on the back' happy feeling is not adequate to religion. Religion must take account of all the suffering of the world, of the pain and suffering of others as well as our own. We are all of us too ready to be resigned to other people's suffering. We should not be. We should enter into it, appreciate it, and realize it, love them as we love ourselves. It is evidently a part of our training in this life. What happens afterwards we do not know from science. Psychical Research gives but a doubtful answer; I have tried it. That need not disturb us, because we can and should lead the immortal life here and now, as Aristotle said. We should live as far as possible immortally (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίξειν) now. Instead of having to wait for immortality at the end of this mortal life, we do live it now, so far as we partake of the eternal values of the good, the beautiful and the true; so far as we live our lives

courageously, kindly and justly; so far as we take an interest in truth for its own sake, so far as we take an interest in art for its own sake, and pass beyond to the super-temporal, to the eternal. All these activities lead us on to the eternal and enable us to partake of the eternal, and if we can partake of the eternal here and now, why, apart from mourning for those dear ones we have lost, should we worry about what happens after death? Death is a mere physical event preceded by a certain amount of pain and suffering, no doubt, but we never really meet it; we are unconscious when it comes, and as Nettleship, a great don of Balliol, said: 'Death does not count.' We should face the prospect of it early in our lives and then not give it another thought. Life is what concerns us, not death. Living courageously and unselfishly, with ever-deepening insight into the implications of life and human companionship, we shall learn what the truly spiritual life may be.

VIII. Appearance and Reality.

Metaphysically, we can be certain that the real world is beyond this shadow-show of space and time. This physical world is a façade, although at times almost trembling with meaning. We feel at times that the veil may be pierced and that we can see what is behind it. Schopenhauer, the philosopher, although a pessimist, said his creed was: 'I believe in a metaphysic.' My creed is that, too; I believe in something that is beyond the physical, beyond phenomena or appearances. The physical is the manifestation of something other than itself, something that is not merely temporal and spatial. If one keeps to mere science one will, sooner or later, run into a dead end; one will not get any further in one's thinking; one becomes an agnostic inevitably if one keeps on the level of space, time and causality, the level of mere phenomena. Anybody who has read Immanuel Kant will appreciate that, for knowledge, like space, is a form of the mind and we cannot escape it. What Immanuel Kant did not realize was that we do transcend time in our own individual experience; if we bring in psychology we find that in direct experience we transcend time and are doing so always. As a psychologist, I think the probabilities of individual survival are high. That it has been scientifically demonstrated I refuse to admit, but this is not important. What is important to us is to be able to live our lives here and now to the full in a constructive way and in a corporate way, and to partake adequately of the totality of existence which, in theological terms, in religious terms, is 'to know God and to enjoy him for ever,' and in philosophical terms is to enjoy the good, the beautiful and the true at their highest and fullest. That is living the eternal life here and now.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

By Professor Stanley Cook, Litt.D., F.B.A.

BY the Science of Religion I mean the objective, but sympathetic and reverent study of the data of Religion, that is, the study of the way in which men all the world over have satisfied their deepest needs, and acted in accordance with what they evidently believed to be most real and true. The subject is as vast as it is difficult and delicate. I am profoundly convinced that the future of civilization or culture depends wholly upon the future of Christianity; but although I am convinced of the objective truth of Christian fundamentals, we face the fact that the varying contexts or backgrounds of our several religious beliefs divide us. Religious, psychic and cosmic experiences are natural, but everything turns upon their expression, for they have been effective forces for evil as well as for good. The more I study religion the more am I impressed by the interpenetration of the spiritual and the material; but I am no less impressed by the vital difference between progressive and unprogressive religion. If, as is sometimes said, religion is illusory, our knowledge of the world itself is illusory; but religion undergoes change and development, and it is the content and quality of a religion that makes the essential difference between its growth and its stagnation or decay.

In the great historical religions there is much that we can appreciate. Even among rudimentary peoples writers like Marett and Malinowski have pointed to spiritual ideas akin to those of Christianity. Biblical study unites the lowest and the highest religions; for while the New Testament leads us on to modern thought, in the Old Testament are many traces of ancient and rude types of belief and practice such as are familiar among primitive tribes. In fact, we cannot at the outset draw a rigid line between Christian and non-Christian religions.

Moreover, when we survey the data of the history of religion we ask ourselves, How are our ideas of God affected? We cannot avoid being impressed by the measure of spontaneity and freedom He has given men. Evidently we can, within limits, make our lives and history; and we can frame our conception of this universe according to our ideas and ideals. But typical of religion is the conviction of some sort of co-operation between the known and the unknown, between the seen and the unseen: man is not alone.

The world's religions imply sweeping notions of the nature of man and of the Universe; and, if justified, they affect the whole life and thought, our positive knowledge of this world, and the source of that knowledge. What was at first implicit becomes explicit in the great historical religions. It realistically unites God, man and the universe; and what it implies of man's destiny reaches its highest expression in Christianity. But I do not propose to make Christianity my starting-point; I propose rather to frame my remarks along the lines on which I conceive the Science of Religion to be moving.

Religion pivots upon *a priori* intuitions of the triangular relationship between God, man and the world or universe. And, first of all, What is man, what are we? Mankind is one species and, writes a biologist, the individual body is 'a mortal whole made of immortal parts.'[1] The individual begins to exist as an integral part of a larger unit, and, like his parents before him, is wholly dependent upon his physical and social environment. Among primitive peoples a man's personality might extend to his possessions; any part of his person could be considered vital, and an enemy could harm him by 'magical' practices upon a lock of hair or his nail parings, or by the erasure of his name. But conversely, he could be vitally protected by associating himself with what was more permanent, *e.g.* by placing a shred of his clothing in the custody of a sacred object or by writing his name in a sacred place.[2]

As an integral part of a social group or region he was part of a more enduring unit — Who dies if his country lives? Its past was his past and its great figures and gods were a living reality. His convictions did not necessarily depend upon blood-relationship with the group: a body of ideas can disunite kinsmen and unite strangers. In general, we distinguish between the *a priori* readiness to be an integral part of a group, body or system and the precise nature and function of the latter; and this readiness to be one with something not oneself culminates in the ideal of the brotherhood of men, of all men children of a Divine Creator Father, or as united in the Body of Christ.

As individuals men have their several frames of reference. But within limits they understand one another, share much in common, and the world is the same for all. They need unifying institutions:

[1] H. Munro Fox, *Biology* (1942), p. 261. *cf.* W. R. Sorley, *The Interpretation of Evolution* (British Academy papers, 1909), p. 27: 'The cells which compose an organism live for it as well as for themselves; and the reproductive function of the organism shows that it lives not only for itself but for the race.'

[2] See Sir J. G. Frazer on the 'external soul,' *Balder the Beautiful* (*Golden Bough*, part vii), pp. 95-278.

school, trade union, Church, State, or a supra-national bond. They aim at agreement upon essential ideas and ideals, and would convert — or coerce — others to their way of thinking. Deeper experiences unite men with other men, or with the reality of the Universe, or with its God. The more inward religion becomes, the more universal is its appeal. Men speak of a 'basal community,' of 'one common humanity,' or, going further, of an 'earth-soul.' With Heraclitus we cannot discover 'the boundaries of soul; it hath so deep a meaning.'[3] Just as every cell of our body is an integral part of the whole, so men seem to be individual representatives of a single life process, and man is

> 'a particular organism in which the universal self thinks, or he is this universal subject thinking in a particular organism.'[4]

Men do not naturally apprehend the notion of personal annihilation, especially where deep personal relationships are involved. Indeed, science suggests that there are no absolute beginnings and endings, but a change from one phase to another. Thus, the life of the individual, like that of a government, a campaign, or a reign, would be but an isolable period of history. Among primitive peoples the dead are commonly feared and kept at a distance; but outstanding ancestors and other figures can still be beneficent, and sacred beings are often regarded as ancestors. Moreover, the dead can reappear in human or animal form. The Indian doctrine of reincarnation does not admit any continuance of memory: it is as though the Old Year dies and the New Year inherits its *karma*. But without any recollection of a prior existence there can be no life after death or rebirth. In general, we are ignorant of the nature of existence after death; the supreme reality of God is the central conviction of theism, and what *we* are for Him and for His purposes, and the relationship between Him and us — *these* are surely essential.

The belief in the kinship of gods and men is very familiar, though the terms of relationship have not always the meaning we give them. The conviction of an indispensable supernatural factor in birth is widespread, and in the case of outstanding figures or in unusual circumstances it is often believed to be the sole factor. Among primitive peoples a woman is sometimes supposed to have a 'spiritual' as well as a fleshly husband; but in Central Australia there is a common belief that neither father nor mother con-

[3] Aubrey Johnson remarks that this conception is Hebrew, no less than Greek: see *The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God* (Cardiff. 1942), pp. 17, 41.

[4] A. C. Bradley, *Ideals of Religion* (1940), p. 237: cf. J. A. Leighton, *The Field of Philosophy* (1918), p. 612.

tributes to the birth of the child, but a totem-spirit in the locality where she had her first premonitions of maternity. Whether there is ignorance, or only indifference to physiological facts, we have to deal with predominating social customs or doctrines of the priority of the spiritual idea.[5]

Furthermore, often it is not enough for the child to be born into the community; its relationship with the sacred beings of the tribe must be made specific. In Israel the rite of circumcision was once, as elsewhere, performed at puberty; and the Jewish practice of formally recognizing that a child reaches its religious majority at the age of thirteen illustrates the tendency to recognize both the religious legitimacy of the babe at a very early date and his relative maturity some years later.

Among primitive peoples renaming and rites suggestive of rebirth — sometimes after a mimic death — inaugurate a new stage in a man's life. There are also initiation rites before a child can share the responsibilities and privileges of the tribe. These rites are often excessively severe, sometimes amounting virtually to a death and resurrection or rebirth. The rites commonly take place at adolescence, when, as recent studies of conversion show, the child is biologically entering upon a new stage of life.

Psychologically, it is difficult, if not impossible, to sever conversion from all the profounder changes — emotional, aesthetic and intellectual — which inaugurate new stages, varying greatly though such changes do in intensity, scope or content, and value.[6] Throughout there is a qualitative change, but no absolute break between the before and the after. The supreme subjective significance of the occasion, on its psychological side, is not necessarily any proof of the objective, intellectual or social value of the change; and the process is an illuminating, fertilizing one rather than a revelation or dictation of truths from outside.

There are typical experiences, arising within ourselves or evoked by external events, which take us away from the here and now and convince us that the world of space-time is not the ultimate reality. The relative unreality of this world and its transitoriness characterize mysticism and the Indian doctrine of *maya*, and have sometimes been over-stressed in Christianity. The current irrationalism, like the doctrine that reason and the intellect mutilate reality, will even claim support from physics. Scientific

[5] The latter seems the more probable explanation; the 'spirit' origin of the child determines its place in the tribe. See G. Róheim, 'The Nescience of the *Aranda*,' in the *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, xvii (1938), 343 *ff*.

[6] *cf*. R. H. Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (1923), chs. xiii *ff*.; Wm. Jones, *A Psychological Study of Conversion* (1937), ch, viii.

research leads to processes that cannot be expressed in terms of space-time; we reach the limits of our knowledge, and the final mystery lies beyond.

> 'Physical reality is reduced to a set of Hamiltonian equations'; 'the mathematical laws of nature are the nexus between ourselves and external reality'; 'something unknown is doing we don't know what.'[7]

There are, then, two opposing trends, the ordinary common-sense view of the reality of *this* world; and the other, towards which mysticism, religion and physics converge, the view that reality lies outside or beyond us. We can readily consider and pass judgment upon our deeds, our thoughts, our life; but it is also possible to become conscious, emotionally or intellectually, that the world of space-time is not the ultimate reality. In the old Greek formula *sōma-sēma* the body is a tomb imprisoning our spirit: Who shall deliver us from this mortal body of ours?[8] Such a conviction could encourage the notion that, as spirit alone counted, the body could sin with impunity. On the other hand, the body could be fitted for a higher existence by good works or by asceticism. The difference, which is a vital one, turns upon the question of the interaction between spirit and body.

The mathematical physicist reaches the limits of the known universe. Irrationalism and super-realism go beyond, and, like every effort to go outside the here-and-now, they by no means necessarily point to a higher truth in the way that religion claims to do. We are then confronted by individualistic universes; they are what we may call 'private' and not 'public' universes that can be shared by others. And the point I wish to make is this: it is the function of a living, progressive and realistic religion to aim at a reasonable harmony between our deepest experiences and the positive knowledge which starts from this world of space-time.

I wish to emphasize the priority of spirit over its embodiments. In religion we find innumerable unseen beings, beneficent or harmful. Obviously they do not all exist. They represent the intuitions and beliefs of those who accept them, and the attitudes towards them are shaped by the powers and attributes ascribed to them. The stress is laid sometimes upon the personal experiences which confirm their reality, at other times upon the rites, deeds and beliefs which are thought to be necessary. As religion advances we reach the stage where we can say that for men to act in harmony

[7] So, respectively, Sir W. C. Dampier, *History of Science* (3rd ed., 1942), p. 470; E. T. Whittaker, *The Beginning and End of the World* (1942), p. 25; and the late Sir Arthur Eddington (see Miss Susan Stebbing, *Philosophy and the Physicists*, ch. vi).

[8] cf. *Rom.* vii, 24, and, for the formula, the *Cambridge Ancient History*, xii, 467 f.

with the highest demands of their God is to manifest, however unconsciously, His attributes. And at length we can observe, as in the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel, the varying stress upon ethical righteousness in the one case and upon ritual purity in the other.

The study of religion, in fact, leads to the conviction that by acts of truth, justice and love a man may, in human fashion, be even unconsciously manifesting God's attributes; and if we believe that God is a God of righteousness, of order and of law, men can, even unconsciously, be acting in accord with the fundamental principles of His universe.[9] In religion we find much that we cannot call spiritual, ethical or rational; while in ordinary human life there is certainly much that is not contrary to our highest ideals. Surely the chequered history of man and his slow advance would, on religious grounds, be unintelligible unless, despite all, he was even unconsciously in some degree in harmony with God's universe, and unless conscious obstinate repudiation of what was right met its due reward.

Spirit has priority. We speak of the 'prevenience' of God. He takes the first step, and we love Him because He first loved us (I *John* iv. 10*f*, 19). Religious experience is a change within ourselves, a growth in our consciousness, though we speak in terms of space-time and say that God 'comes' to us.[10] Religion 'localizes' in places, objects, special individuals, rites and doctrines. These unite men and their god, though from time to time they are found to be, not helps, but hindrances to further spiritual growth. God is where men find Him; and though we speak of the omnipresence of God it would be better, with Coleridge, to speak of 'the presence of all things to God.'[11] Throughout religion the relationship between man and his gods has typically been conditional; it has to be actualized and realized. Men needed the help of the unseen beings; but precisely what men required of them and what they required of men, and precisely what men were to sacrifice or surrender in order to maintain the vital relationship — *here* are the steps in the progress from the most rudimentary forms of religion to the highest.

It is *we* who become conscious of the reality of this world

[9] cf. *Is.* lvii, 15, lxvi, 2; *Matt.* xxv, 40, 45.

[10] In the Old Testament David, when driven out of Canaan, must serve other gods (*I Sam.* xxvi, 19). But Jacob, who finds God at Bethel, is protected when with Laban; and, though he worships God at Beersheba, is not forgotten when he and his people are in Egypt (*Gen.* xxxi, 3, 5, 7, xlvi, 1). Nor did the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B.C. destroy the faith of the men who were sent into exile away from their sacred city and its ruined temple.

[11] See *'Truth' of the Bible*, p. 193.

and of a beyond; we exist on different levels, and live on different planes. Hence there must always be a lack of finality in our account of this world, of the universe. The famous Indian formula '*That* art thou' identifies the ultimate reality of man with that of the universe, and we are on the road to pantheism; whereas Christian theism points to a wonderful conditional union of man through Christ with the God of the universe. Each of us is at the centre of his universe, that is, as he construes it; but such relativism would lead to solipsism and to intellectual nihilism unless we realized that we are not isolated independent selves.

Our account of the universe is of course vastly superior to that of primitive man and the child. It is not gained merely from what we see round about us; we had first to learn to interpret sense-data. We have to rely upon our previous knowledge, and must utilize indispensable presuppositions and mental processes of the nature of which most of us are ignorant. Mind has to deal with what mind had previously acquired. The alleged dualism of Mind and Body treats Mind as an entity; whereas our conception of Mind is based upon man 'thinking,' and where, pray, does 'thinking' begin? The true dichotomy is not Mind and Body, but the Self and its object; and one and the same Self lives on a variety of levels, whether unconscious, asleep, dreaming, idling, acting, thinking or engaged in worship.[12]

On retrospect we readily perceive the incompleteness of our earlier knowledge. I may be confident that there is an ultimate reality of vital *personal* significance for me, something beyond all I feel and know. But it does not follow that behind this world of space-time there is a shadow world, or that there are things in themselves of which we have only the appearance; although such notions may prove a valuable stimulus to our further thinking. For my part I cannot see that there is any ultimate reality other than the God of the universe and the relationship between Him and His creations. Our account of the universe may unite us closer with God or sever us from Him; and our ideal of God's Universe, of the Kingdom of God, unites us one with another. Our account of the universe, that is, of how we have come to think about it, answers to our whole personal outlook; and our limits are our positive intellectual knowledge of the constitution of matter and the possibilities of deeper personal experience and thought.

God is in and over nature and man. But there have been diverse and even wrong conceptions of God, religious fanaticism and false ideals, so that we can even speak of a 'demonic'

[12] 'Spirit,' like Mind, is used ambiguously, (*a*) in contrast to its embodiment, and (*b*) as the Self in its higher manifestations.

spirituality.[13] The 'spiritual' is 'psychic,' but not all that is 'psychic' can be called 'spiritual.' God was in and over the universe before man appeared; and in both nature and man His Spirit is limited in its operations by the stage reached by His creations. Throughout there are processes of selection and rejection, of preservation, repair and growth; they are common to both the religious and the scientific view of the universe. Energy, a more general term than Spirit, is the logical basic concept, and we see the variety of its forms, even as we find that oxygen enters into compounds that are life-giving, destructive or neutral. Energy in nature, energy in man's bodily and mental activities: here in my judgment one can synthesize religion and science.[14] And just as one must reject the conception of an external force, whether we speak of Vitalism or of an external *Entelechy*, so God is not external as in Deism, but is immanent in His universe. But unless we acknowledge the transcendence of the power or energy immanent in nature and man I cannot see how religious and scientific thought can progress.

When we go down into our depths or pursue our positive knowledge to its limits, what do we find? With Bertrand Russell do we find all spots and jumps without unity or continuity? Or, with Eddington, 'do we undo the work of creation and present the world as we might conceive it to have been before the Spirit moved on the face of the waters'? In either case we are going behind the order and the patternizing, regulating presuppositions and processes that alone make life and thought possible.

There is a rudimentary but effective physiological co-ordination in living things from the embryo onwards, and the most rudimentary instincts are constructive no less than destructive. Recent research into the unconscious or subconscious has admittedly thrown light upon those primitive urges of ours which we repudiate. But it is essential to remember that everywhere we find the fear or horror of what was deemed to be an offence against the sacred. Even the Freudian myth of the Oedipus Complex presupposes a primary association of men and not a promiscuous horde, and a conscience that could be awakened. Indeed, psycho-analysts themselves agree that whatever uplifts and integrates the neurotic is beneficial, and that an integrating religion has pragmatic value, even though it be a subjective 'useful illusion.'

[13] A striking example from *Midnight Hour* by Nicodemus is quoted in *The Balance of Truth*, by E. I. Watkin (1943, p. 134 f).

[14] cf. Principal Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion* (1902), pp. 59, 171, 293; E. I. Watkin, *A Philosophy of Form* (1935), p. 14 f.; F. E. England, *The Validity of Religious Experience* (1937), p. 273.

It is not out of place here to observe that the evidence for ritual chastity is not less striking than that for ritual licentiousness;[15] but while the latter is bound up with the social and cultural ideas that prevailed, the former is definitely to establish a needed relationship with the unseen and gain its support. The fundamental urge or instinct of life is, in my judgment, to satisfy a feeling of incompleteness. It runs through all life in innumerable forms. The Amoeba divides and each half grows into a complete Amoeba; it is immortal. The cell is destroyed and replaced by two complete ones; though, as the process continues, the cells in the different organs gradually contribute to different functions. Sexual differentiation is not absolutely primitive, and some primitive languages do not distinguish gender but divide into the animate and inanimate, or apply what *we* call masculine to valuable things, such as the cow. Jung and other psycho-analysts suggest that men and women have, respectively, their feminine and masculine aspects, the *anima* for the man and the *animus* for the woman.

Besides nature's processes of repairing and completing the maimed and therefore incomplete organism, we have our own intellectual completing and integrating processes. But we are spiritually incomplete, and there is no health or 'wholeness' in us. 'Thou hast made us for Thyself,' says St. Augustine, 'and our heart is restless till it finds rest in Thee.' There is a covenant between God and man, and from time to time it is renewed. God created the world, but in the fulness of time 'God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.' 'Trailing clouds of glory do we come from God who is our home,' says our poet; and in the most rudimentary of religions the member of the totem-clan, the embodiment of a totem-spirit, returns on death to its unseen spirit existence. This intuitive urge for unity, for re-establishing a relationship, is fundamental; but it is a neutral process, in that the means and ends and the aims and results vary so enormously.

How this bears upon our ideas of sin and guilt, of forgiveness, redemption and at-one-ment! Sin is positive offence; it is also missing the mark, and we lack the feeling of guilt because there is no clear and common conception of the nature of our incompleteness and of the mark at which to aim. But there are widespread feelings of *malaise* and frustration; and the mutilated personality realizes itself in grossly physical manner, in social, intellectual and other pursuits, or in various quasi-religious forms. But the Self is no isolated entity, and true conceptions of human personality depend upon conceptions of divine personality. False or demonic

[15] 'Contrary to what one would expect, in savagery sexual cults play an insignificant rôle' (Malinowski, in Needham, *Science, Religion and Reality* [1925], p. 41).

spirituality, fanaticism and other quasi-religiousisms are an indication that our incomplete Selves seek *some* satisfaction and integration. But a mutilated organism may achieve no healthy repair, and the last state of a mutilated Self may be worse than the first. Still this tremendous energy of the universe sweeps on, and, it may be, with fatal results; and if we go back to Biblical times God Himself is represented as grieving for His people and still loving them, even though the inevitable law of universal righteousness has doomed them.

Finally, although certain specific ideas of another existence — in heaven or hell — have lost their force we cannot ignore the intuitions that gave rise to them. Shall men perchance know as they are known; shall they reign with Christ for ever and judge the world?[16] We all know men and women to whom we apply Tennyson's couplet:

> 'We doubt not that for one so true
> There must be other nobler work to do.'

We are in God's hands, and as Christians we cherish the hope that we may one day be reunited with those we have loved and lost. But the implications of religion allow the possibility that the dead are not necessarily severed from this world or ignorant of the extent and consequences of their deeds and misdeeds here on earth. And that might mean a hell.[17]

I am no spiritualist, but my study of the varieties of experience — mystical, religious, cosmic, aesthetic, etc. — that go outside this world of space-time does enforce one conclusion. To-day we suffer from the absence of that background which would make the fundamentals of religion true for us; but the more realistic religion becomes the greater is the possibility of a higher spirituality and of a lower and grosser superstition. The more necessary does it then become — in the words of the old Rabbis — 'to make a fence for the Torah,' that is, to formulate and safeguard the fundamentals. And this involves, in my judgment, not only a restatement of religion and theology, but also an entire reconsideration of our philosophy and metaphysics.[18]

[16] I *Cor.* xiii, 12, vi, 2 f.; I *Tim.* ii, 12; *Rev.* xxii, 5.

[17] cf. *Rebirth of Christianity*, pp. 138, 178.

[18] This necessarily brief paper supplements the two Pelican books *Rebirth of Christianity* and *Introduction to the Bible*, ch. ix *f.* A more extensive sketch of the *Science and Theory of Religion* will, I hope, appear later.

RELIGION AND WORLD UNITY

By the Rev. Canon E. C. Dewick, M.A., B.D., of Nagpur, India.

I. Introduction.

ONE of the 'great alternatives' which face the world of to-day is that of 'World-Unity, or World-War?' 'World-Unity' need not, of course, mean 'World-Uniformity,' nor even a unified World-Government such as H. G. Wells has advocated. But it does involve a sufficient unity of spirit and outlook, among nations, communities and classes, to enable them to understand and appreciate one another, and to seek co-operation rather than conflict.

Some will perhaps say that World-Unity and World-War are not the only two alternatives; for there is the further possibility of world-wide peace *imposed* by one strong nation or group of nations, after the model of the 'Pax Romana' of ancient days, or the 'Pax Britannica' envisaged by Rudyard Kipling and Cecil Rhodes, or the 'New Orders' planned by the Axis Powers in East and West. But history seems to show that an 'imposed peace' of this kind is always precarious, and offers no permanent stability. So we come back to the alternative with which we began — World-Unity, or World-War?

Therefore, for all those who desire (and who does *not*?) to avoid another world-war, 'World-Unity' is a theme of vital interest. And for us here, I take it that 'Religion' is also a theme of vital interest; otherwise we should not be attending this conference. So the title of my paper links together two vitally interesting themes, 'Religion' and 'World-Unity,' and invites us to consider what is the relation between them.

II. Religion as the Enemy of World-Unity.

There are many to-day who maintain that Religion is one of the chief causes of World-Strife, and is therefore an enemy of World-Unity and World-Peace. This is the contention brought forward by (for example) many of the writers in the popular 'Thinkers' Library,' sponsored by the Rationalist Press Association, who urge us to discard Religion in the interests of peace. It is also the view of one of the most influential leaders of modern India — Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. He contends that, in India at any rate, it is Religion, more than any other factor, that prevents the nation from becoming united and strong; so that all who have at heart the welfare of India must seek to lessen the influence of Religion in India in the days to come.

Now this contention is not without some reason. No one can deny that in the past, Religion has aroused passions which have led to war; and 'Wars of Religion' figure largely in our history-books. Nor is this true only of the past. To-day, in many lands (Palestine and Ireland, for example), those who seek to establish peace find that Religion is their greatest obstacle. Moreover, in the world of international relations. we see how the great religion of Islam, while transcending the divisions between nations, at the same time sets up new barriers in the name of Religion, and confronts the non-Muslim world with a latent, smouldering hostility than can quickly be fanned into a flame of fanatical hatred. Again, Hinduism, though not aggressive in its attitude to the non-Hindu world, has within its own domain created bitterness and strife by perpetuating its caste-system long after this has become an anachronism; till in many parts of India to-day the struggle between Brahmin and non-Brahmin overshadows all other storm-clouds of controversy. Even Christianity is not entirely blameless in this matter; for not only has it in the past sponsored crusades and persecutions, but even to-day, in non-Christian lands especially, 'Christian Associations' often display a self-conscious communal spirit, emphasizing the barriers between the Christian community and the non-Christian world, in such a way as to create a spirit of suspicion rather than of good-will.

In view of all this, it is not surprising that there are many to-day who cry, 'Happy is the people that has no religion!' and who call upon all true lovers of peace to help the world to discard this divisive factor in human life.

III. The Inevitability of Religion.

But when we are thus invited to abolish Religion in the interests of World-Peace, the question arises whether this programme is really practicable. A study of history suggests that it is certainly likely to be exceedingly difficult to achieve. For again and again, after the enemies of Religion have announced its final defeat, it has come back, even if in a somewhat changed form. After the materialistic scepticism of Lucretius came the outburst of fervid devotion generated by the Mystery-Cults; after the cynicism of Voltaire came the enthusiasm of Wesley; and (most striking of all) in our own day, after the victories of Atheistic Communism in Soviet Russia and the triumphant successes of the League of the Godless, we are witnessing the *entente cordiale* between Marshal Stalin and Archbishop Sergius. So far, every large-scale attempt to abolish Religion has failed; and Religion, phoenix-like, has risen again from what appeared to be its ashes. It would seem that Benjamin Kidd was right when he maintained that the evolution

of Religion is an integral part in the evolution of mankind as a whole; so that it is no more possible to eradicate Religion from human society than to eradicate a vital organ from the body of a growing child without arresting the growth of the child as a whole. If this be so, then those who seek to abolish religion from human life are attempting a task which is impossible.

IV. The Cause of Religious Strife is not really 'Religion.'

Another question which needs consideration, when we are invited to abolish Religion in the interest of World-Unity, is this: 'Are we sure that it *is* really 'Religion' which is the cause of strife and war?' To answer this, we must first agree upon a definition of 'Religion.' These are legion, but for myself I have always found satisfaction in a definition of personal religion that Prof. H. M. Gwatkin of Cambridge used to give to us who were his students:

> *'Religion is the sense of trustful relationship with, and dependence upon, an Unseen Power.'*

If we accept this definition of Religion as indicating its root (even though it may not fully describe its fruits), we may certainly question whether it is 'Religion' that creates disunity and strife in the world?

Some years ago, I was talking, in one of the Indian Universities, with a young Muslim professor whom I knew to be regarded as a leading protagonist of his religion. In the course of our conversation he remarked: 'Yes, I'd gladly *die*, any day, for the cause of Islam; but of course we younger Muslims don't care a damn for the *Q'uran*!' That is an attitude typical of neo-Islam to-day. It prevails widely in the Middle East—in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. It was the attitude of perhaps the greatest Muslim statesman of our age, Kemal Pasha. Now Kemal, as the creator of modern Turkey, insisted that Turkey must be a Muslim State, in which Muslim citizens are given preferential treatment and non-Muslims are subjected to civil and military disabilities. But for the *religious* side of Islam he cared absolutely nothing. In Stambul, a few years ago, I noticed a blank space in one of the main streets where on a previous visit I remembered seeing a mosque. On inquiry, I was told that the gap had been created, not by a bomb, but by the orders of Kemal Pasha, who had been irritated by the 'muezzin' call to prayer, chanted from the minarets while he was enjoying himself with some of his numerous lady friends in a cabaret hard by. 'Pull the thing down!' he shouted. And pulled down it was. Hardly an act of religion? Yet, if Turkey is involved in war in the near future, it is more that probable that this will be, in the eyes of the world, and in its own eyes, a 'religious' war, waged 'in defence of the sacred rights of Islam.'

Even in Christendom, the deeper source of 'religious' strife is not to be found in true Religion, but in the communal or sectarian antagonisms associated with religious organizations. Church Defence Leagues, Catholic and Protestant 'Truth' Societies, may arouse violent passions; Orangemen and Romanists may rush up and down the streets of Londonderry or Birkenhead on the 12th of July, yelling for each others blood; but is their motive one that can properly be called 'religious'? Genuinely religious souls, at their best, shew a different spirit. A Baron von Hügel and a Vernon Bartlett could meet as friends, though poles apart in their theologies, because they had both built their lives on real Religion.

It is more than doubtful, then, whether the abolition of Religion would really promote the cause of world-unity. We must look elsewhere for the fundamental causes of strife, and seek another policy.

V. The Policy of 'Live and Let Live' in the World of Religion.

There are some who, while quite agreeing that Religion cannot be, and ought not to be, abolished, would adopt a policy of *laisser-faire*, leaving the many religions of the world to continue and develop side by side. They believe that the whole truth needs to be expressed in a variety of ways, and that our understanding of it would be impaired if any one of these were suppressed. Just as human thought can be expressed in an infinite variety of languages—none of them perfect, but most of them containing something of distinctive value—so (they say) it is with Religion. Each of its varied forms contributes something to our knowledge of God. What we should endeavour to do, then, is not to suppress Religion as a whole, or any one of its forms, but to check the aggressiveness of certain religions which claim to possess the whole truth and try to bring all other religions under their dominion.

This view has been ably expressed by many leading thinkers of our day, notably by Sir Sarvapalli Radakrishnan, and in an extreme form, by Mr. Gandhi. Obviously it contains a sharp challenge to the 'missionary' religions—Christianity, Islam and Buddhism—and, by contrast, it commends Hinduism for its tolerance and passivity.

There is much that is attractive in this solution of the problem. It appeals to all who dislike 'totalitarian' claims, whether in State or Church; it frankly recognizes the important truth (often ignored in practice by those who admit it in theory) that no expression of Absolute Truth in human language *can* ever be perfect, or more than relatively true; and it is a spontaneous protest against all claims to possess infallibility or to exercise world-dominion in the sphere of religion. It is not surprising that in lands such as

India, struggling against Imperialism in the sphere of politics, this policy of all-round religious toleration should be very popular, and that the saying: 'All religions are equally good and equally true' should be constantly repeated as a catchword, especially by young persons who know very little of their own religion, and still less of the religions of other people.

Nevertheless, it is a policy which is open to serious objections. It easily leads to careless thinking, and encourages a culpable indifference to truth. By all means let us recognize that every human statement about God and things infinite is bound to be only relatively true. But it is another thing to conclude that between these various statements there is no important difference in the degree of truthfulness, so that it is a matter of indifference which we adopt.

It is unquestionable that the comparative study of religions has shewn that the resemblances between them are often far closer than their unlearned adherents imagine. But further study often shews that these resemblances are superficial, and may conceal profound differences of thought below the surface. For example, the external resemblances between the legends and worship of Buddhism and those of Catholic Christianity are startling; yet at bottom, Buddhist agnosticism about God and pessimism about life remain completely irreconcilable with any interpretation, Catholic or Protestant, of the Gospel of Christ.

No less irreconcilable are the differences between other great religious systems. Modern Hinduism may assure us that it has no quarrel with Christianity or Islam, and that it is willing to admit Jesus and Muhammad into its Pantheon; but can *they* return the compliment? What Christian or Muslim could assent to the moral neutrality implied in Krishna's words in the Gita: 'All beings I regard alike; none is hateful to me, or beloved. . . . Even an evil liver, if he adheres to me with devotion (*bhakti*), must be held devout' (*Bhagavad-Gita*, ix, 29, 30). Or again, as between Islam and Christianity, Islam firmly refuses to allow any place for the idea of the Incarnation as an act of God, expressing his self-sacrificing love for man; and without this, the Gospel of Christ is deprived of its vital essence.

To leave such antitheses standing permanently side by side, with the plea that they are 'just complementary aspects of Truth,' is surely to abandon all effort towards clear and consistent thought, and to surrender ourselves to muddle-headedness and sentimentality. For however many may be the aspects of Truth, and however imperfect our expressions of it (so that some of these may even appear to be mutually contradictory), Truth itself, whether scientific or religious, must ultimately be one. If so, and if mankind is fundamentally one family, possessed of a common faculty of reason, then we cannot rest permanently satisfied with a collec-

ion of contradictory statements, but we must try to press on, in ne field of Religion, towards a harmony of faith and life within the nity of a World-Religion.

VI. An Eclectic World-Religion?

If then mankind ultimately needs unity in Religion, of what ind will the World-Religion of the future be? Some are attracted y the idea that it will consist of a selection of the best elements rom all the great historic religions, welding these into a rich unity.

We all remember how the Lambeth Conference of Bishops in 920 stirred the imagination of Christendom by its vision of the Great Church' of the future:

> 'A Church loyal to all truth, and within whose visible unity all the treasures of faith and order, bequeathed as a heritage by the past to the present, shall be possessed in common' (Lambeth *Appeal*, 1920, § 4).

This vision of the Lambeth Fathers did not extend beyond the nion of the various denominations of Christendom. But many re asking, why not extend it to cover the union of the many eligions of the world, and visualize a great World-Religion which vill find room within its borders for the austere monotheism of slam, the gentleness of Buddhism, the tolerance of Hinduism, nd the active love of Christianity; fusing all these into a nobler eligion than the world has yet seen?

Few, surely, can fail to be stirred by such an ideal. And for ny part, I would not wish to rule out, on *a priori* dogmatic rounds, the possibility that God has truly 'spoken' to mankind hrough the non-Christian religions; and that some of them may onsequently have a distinctive contribution of their own to make owards a fuller understanding of God, and towards the World-Religion of the future.

But it seems to me that we must recognize the fact that (as Dr. Major has pointed out in his *Basic Christianity*[1]) all efforts to *build up* a religion by an eclectic process of selection from various ources have hitherto led to an artificial product, lacking in spon-aneity and life. It has been the same in the sphere of language, where, as far as I know, no artificially-constructed language has ver proved itself capable of becoming a living vehicle of human hought. And in the sphere of Religion, artificiality is even more atal; for true Religion must be, in part at least, the product of the ree working of the Spirit of God; and a purely man-made religion s a contradiction in terms. That is perhaps why movements such s Theosophy, Bahaism, and other eclectic efforts seem to become o quickly entangled with complex and irrational dogmas, and to e lacking in two authentic notes of true Religion: first, that of given-ness' ('The Word of the Lord *came to me, saying* . . .'), nd also that of personal experience ('Come hither, and hearken,

[1] *Basic Christianity*, pp. 12-14.

. . . and I will tell you what God has done for my soul'). We conclude, then, that an artificially-constructed eclectic religion is not likely to become the future religion of the whole world.

VII. Can a World-Religion be based on any of the Non-Christian Religions?

In considering this question we can, I think, confine ourselves to the major historic religions of the world. For the primitive types of religion — Animism, Polytheism, or Idol-worship in its cruder forms — are surely not permanently satisfactory abiding-places for the human soul, but at best only stepping-stones to higher things. (I remember once hearing Mr. Gandhi, in an argument with C. F. Andrews, urge passionately that even in the case of Animists, no attempt should be made to *convert* the Animist to a higher religion, such as Islam or Christianity, but only to make him a better Animist. But I image few of us would follow the Mahatma on this point!)

Let us then consider the three major religions in the world today — Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. Of these, Hinduism does not even appear to wish to be a claimant for the rôle of World-Religion. It has never been a missionary-religion; indeed it is generally unwilling even to *accept* converts from other fields, unless they are of Indian race, and hence originally of Hindu stock.[2] Hinduism is essentially national, rather than international; and further, it is a social system, rather than a religious faith; for a Hindu is free to hold any religious *beliefs* that he likes (theistic, atheistic, polytheistic, or pantheistic) so long as he observes the social customs of the Hindu community. In such a system it is surely impossible to find the basis for a world-religion that can unite mankind in a common loyalty of mind and heart.

Buddhism, though historically a reformed type of Hinduism, differs from its parent in being a missionary religion, which has made millions of converts from other faiths in the lands of the East. But it is difficult to anticipate that Buddhism, with its placid and pessimistic attitude to life, should ever win the allegiance of the virile Western peoples, with their confident faith that, somehow, life must have a meaning and a goal, and that activity is a good thing, rather than a sin. Western converts to Buddhism, though fairly numerous, seem to be, as a rule, rather abnormal Westerners; and see few signs that Buddhism is ever likely to become the general religion of the Western world.

Still less likely is it that Islam will ever qualify for the rôle of World-Religion; although some enthusiastic Muslims (mostly

[2] The cases of a few Westerners, such as Mr. Stokes, who have been formally admitted to the Hindu Society, are quite exceptional, and are disapproved of by the majority of Hindus.

of 'modernist' tendencies) profess to find in the *Q'uran* the One Faith that the world needs. That there is much in the *Q'uran*, and in the life and teaching of its great Prophet, that is noble and inspiring, may be readily admitted. But for myself, I find it hard to understand how any intelligent person, after comparing the *Q'uran* with the Bible, and the Prophet of Arabia with the Prophet of Galilee, should deliberately place Islam on a higher level than Christianity, or imagine that Islam has better claims than Christianity to become the World-Religion of the future.

We conclude, then, that none of the great non-Christian religions, as they stand, offer a satisfactory foundation for a World-Religion? What then of Christianity?

VIII. Can Christianity become the World-Religion of the Future?

Before proceeding to discuss this question, one important fact has to be noted. The original Christian Gospel, as proclaimed by our Lord, did not attract everyone alike. Some were definitely repelled by it; they 'saw and hated both Jesus and his Father' (*John* xv, 24). The result was that the Gospel of Peace paradoxically 'brought a sword,' dividing those who responded to it from those who rejected it. Now if this was so with the original Gospel, we have no reason to suppose that it will be otherwise with any presentation of Christianity that is true to its archetype. In other words, we need not expect that the Christian message, however truly and effectively preached, will ever unite *all* men in allegiance to itself and its Lord. The utmost that we can expect is that the message should draw to itself *some* among those that hear it;—maybe men and women of goodwill who have the *anima naturaliter Christiana*, or maybe some in whose hearts the message awakens for the first time a conviction of sin and a desire for a new life. Others will be 'offended' by the Gospel; and the more clearly it is preached, the more decisive will be their refusal of it. It is important to bear this in mind when we consider the question, 'Can Christianity become the World-Religion of the future?' For if by a 'World-Religion' we mean a religion which wins the allegiance of *everyone* in the world, then there is no likelihood that a Christianity which is true to New Testament standards will ever achieve this.

To-day, however, what troubles many of us is, not that so many reject the Church's message, but that it is rejected by so many who appear to be, at heart, really 'Christian-minded people,' or genuine seekers after truth and life. Our problem is, in other words, Studdert Kennedy's: 'Why aren't all the *nice* people Christians?' So often, 'good Church people' seem *less* nice, less loving, less Christ-like, than those outside the Church. Often these latter are

not materialists; they have a genuine reverence for 'things not seen and eternal.' But they do not find that the Church, with its creeds and sacraments, meets the needs of their souls. From the replies given to *Questionnaires* on the subject of Religion which have been recently circulated among the public, it seems certain that in England people of this type form a much larger element than the small minority (at most 10 per cent. of the population) who are still attached to some branch of the organized Church and attend Christian worship. In non-Christian lands, too, every missionary knows that among those who decisively refuse to join the Church are some of the most sincere and high-minded souls that he has met.

So when we ask, 'Can Christianity become the World-Religion of the future?' we mean, 'Can it become the centre of loyalty for those who, in every land, do at heart "love the Lord Jesus Christ," or are prepared to welcome his message, but many of whom at present stand aside from the Church that bears his name?'

Probably all Christians — Catholic and Protestant, Modernist and Fundamentalist alike—will agree that in order to achieve this, the Church of to-day, in all its branches, needs purification and inspiration by the Spirit of God, so that it may rise above its present mediocre level. But our friends who hold to the traditional orthodoxy of Catholicism insist that there can be no modification of the Faith as expressed in the Creeds, or in the Divinely-appointed order of the Church's organization, to which she has been guided 'not only in general, but in detail, by the Holy Spirit.'[3] And our friends who have adopted the neo-orthodoxy of Barthianism insist that since the true 'Word of God' and 'Acts of God' are to be found nowhere except in the Bible, we must not look anywhere outside the Biblical tradition for any genuine revelation of God's truth.

I imagine, however, that for many of us at this Conference this method of reasoning *a priori*, from dogmas accepted *en bloc*, is not wholly satisfying. We prefer to draw our conclusions from 'things as they are' in the world around us, as far as we can observe them; and from 'things as they have been,' as far as we can study them in history. If we approach the problem in this way, we cannot simply ignore the challenge which comes to us from serious-minded men and women who stand outside the Church, even when this does appear to question some of the dogmas of Christian orthodoxy.

We find, for instance, many who sincerely love and worship God as 'Our Father,' but who find the doctrine of 'Three Persons in One God' a meaningless abstraction, or at best an unnecessary complication. Many, again, who whole-heartedly believe that

[3] Canon N. P. Williams, in *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition.*

'God was in Christ,' and who have learnt to 'see the glory and love of God in the face of Jesus Christ,' are entirely unmoved by the orthodox doctrine of the Person of Christ as embodied in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. A still larger number, who earnestly seek to receive from God strength for their life's work, fail to find in the Church service of Holy Communion any real help towards this, and are often definitely repelled by the metaphors of 'eating the Body' and 'drinking the Blood,' which they regard as outworn survivals of primitive religious phraseology.

I am quite sure that for many of us, the Creeds do express truths that are real, and the Sacraments have proved to be genuine means of grace. But I think we ought to recognize frankly that this is not the case with many who are no less sincere than ourselves in their desire to be true disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ. I am not suggesting that the Church should hasily jettison her ancient beliefs and practices in deference to 'modern ideas.' Indeed, I think it probable that the greater part of the Church's tradition will survive long after many 'modern ideas' have passed away.

But I do believe that the Church is called upon to reconsider her teaching and practice to-day, in the light of the New Testament and the teaching of our Lord, as well as in the light of the growth of human knowledge and experience; and to see how far she is justified in insisting upon what the *Church Times* calls 'the Faith in its Fulness' as the only possible basis for a World-Religion. At present it often seems as if the Church, while insisting rigidly on dogmas which the plain man finds largely unintelligible or unimportant, were quietly 'by-passing' the tremendous challenge of our Lord's clear teaching about riches, war, marriage, patriotism, and so forth. So the plain man, finding that the Church has nothing distinctive so say on these matters, which seem to him to be of vital importance, turns away from the Church, in despair of hearing from her a message which is really relevant to the world's greatest needs.

For myself, I believe that a Christianity based upon the great principles laid down by our Lord in the New Testament does offer an adequate basis for a World-Religion which would be the rallying-ground for all who are prepared to respond to the challenge of Christ, and that such a religion is one which the world is not likely to outgrow or surpass. But I think that such a religion would have to be on a doctrinal basis a good deal simpler than the 'Lambeth Quadrilateral,' or the Constitution of the new South India United Church, or the 'Credo' of Karl Barth; perhaps even simpler than the Nicene or Apostles' Creed. It would, I think, be more like that 'Modern Churchman's Creed in the words of an Ancient Churchman,' which is probably well known to most of you

here, which begins :

'We believe that God is Spirit, . . .'

and continues :

'We believe that Jesus is the Son of God, . . .'

and ends :

'We believe that he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever.'

At the same time, the message of a world-uniting Church would have to be more challenging and decisive than it is to-day, in relation to vital issues, such as War, Marriage, Internationalism, Communism, and so forth. At present, the Church either maintains a non-committal silence on such matters, or if her leaders do speak, their voices agree not together. Even among recognized leaders of the Modernist movement, we find that their expositions of the Christian attitude to (say) War, or Socialism, are often so divergent as to be mutually contradictory.

Yet, if we believe in the reality of God's guidance, and his power to grant us 'a right judgment in all things,' we cannot simply rest content with divided counsels from Christian leaders on such vital issues, but we must continue to speak further, till we find 'a common Christian mind,' which would be, in fact, a reflection of the mind of Christ.

If the Church could manifest such a 'common mind' in her attitude to those vital issues, on which the whole future of humanity depends, and at the same time relegate to the background those minutiae of ritual and doctrine which at present loom so large in her programme — then I believe she would be able to enlist the loyalty of a far larger number of Christian-hearted people than those who can at present identify themselves with the Church; and a Christianity on such a basis would be a factor making for World-Union in the days to come.

IX. Conclusion.

One more word needs to be said. In all plans for the future, let us not forget that real religion cannot be *manufactured* by human brains. Religion is a partnership between man and God; and in that partnership, none can doubt which must be the senior partner. As we, then, consider this problem of the World-Religion of the future, let us not make up our minds in advance too rigidly as to its basis or characteristics, but rather seek to keep our minds open towards God, so that his spirit may give us 'a right judgment in all things.' Then what we plan and do will be not merely our human effort to build the City of God on the earth, but it will be also a gift from God to man, a 'New Jerusalem, coming down to earth out of heaven,' and indwelt by the Presence of God.

RELIGION AND ETHICS

By the Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, D.D., K.C.V.O., Dean of St. Paul's.

IF we were asked to name two books which have had a profound influence on the thought and civilization of the West, I suppose that the first which would come into our minds would be Plato's *Republic* among the writings of philosophers, and from those which represent religion we should choose, after the Gospels, St. Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*. It is almost impossible to imagine the difference which would have been made to our heritage of culture, theology and devotion had either of these writings failed to survive. But these two books are not only the sources of much that has become a part of our intellectual and religious tradition; they are the masterpieces of two of the most remarkable men who have appeared in history. Among all those who have given themselves to reflection on the problems of being, of human life and society, none is greater than Plato, and of all the men of religion none has experienced more deeply or described more eloquently and passionately than Paul the conflicts and the triumphs of the spirit of man athirst for God. If we sought for two representatives of philosophy and religion we could find no better than Paul and Plato.

We might read the *Republic* and *Romans* side by side for a long time before we became aware that they had anything in common; indeed a great many students have done this without ever becoming aware of the fact. And yet the two books have to a large extent the same subject. They are both concerned with *dikaisunē*, with justice or righteousness. Both ask how men may become righteous. And yet, though the subject is the same, our sense of the profound difference between the two books is undeniably well-founded. Perhaps a consideration of this difference may throw some light upon the relation between religion and ethics.

Though there are of course other and very important elements in the *Republic*, the primary purpose of the book is ethical inquiry —to discover the nature of justice or righteousness, not however with a purely theoretical purpose, but in order that men may become more just and that they may have a just city. As we all remember, the solution of the problem is found in the principle of harmony and proportion. In a just city the various types or classes of men will perform willingly their own proper functions, each keeping to his own business, so that those whose natural abilities fit them for government will direct the community and the executive, and labouring classes will contentedly contribute their

appropriate service to the well-being of the whole. This ideal aristocracy in the state is the reflection of the personality of the just man. The order and harmony of classes which constitute the justice of the city appears in the individual as the order and harmony of the elements in his nature. The righteous man is one in whom reason rules, and the other elements, the will and passions, are in consenting subordination. We may note that for Plato the good for man depends upon the nature of man. But that is not all. The nature of man cannot be isolated from his setting in the world and the nature of Reality, so that this first great ethical enquiry leads on to metaphysics, to the Idea of the Good and the contemplation of the Eternal realm of Forms. We may note, further, that Plato assumes that ethical failure is always due to error. The knowledge of the good is all that is needed to make men good.

When we turn to the *Epistle to the Romans* we are indeed in a different realm. The Apostle begins with two conceptions which find no place in the *Republic* — sin and the wrath of God. So far from holding that the enlightened reason can produce righteousness, he asserts that the corruption of the will has vitiated the intelligence. 'All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God.' Jew and Gentile alike are sinful and the objects of divine wrath. Still more startling is St. Paul's approach to the question of righteousness. We find that his primary concern is not to show how men may become righteous. There is a preliminary step. The first question is how men, who are in fact unrighteous, shall be accounted righteous — shall be justified by God. How they may be forgiven though unworthy of forgiveness. And the answer is that the just shall live by faith. It would, of course, be very far from the truth to say that St. Paul had no interest in the question how men may become righteous; on the contrary, he has much to say about the sanctification of those who by faith have been justified and walk in the Spirit. Nor, again, would it be true to say that he has no concern with the meaning of the good life. Just as Plato has his list of cardinal virtues, so St. Paul can write that the fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, long suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance.

But this comparison between St. Paul and Plato, which is intended only as an illustration, cannot be pursued now. There are other theories of ethics beside Plato's, and doubtless versions of the Christian religion which would not emphasize the central ideas of St. Paul. Perhaps, however, we may deduce from the comparison that those who would seek to identify the moral experience and its interpretation with religion have some obstinate facts in the history of thought to explain. A definition of religion such as that suggested by Matthew Arnold, that it is 'morality tinged with emotion,' seems to be very far from the truth. I suggest, on

the contrary, that the moral life and religion are two distinct modes of human experience — they are different forms of the spirit. This truth is obscured for us because it is very rarely that the purely moral or the purely religious experience is found in human beings. They mingle and interact. We cannot easily imagine ourselves as thinking and feeling as moral beings with no thought of God, and conversely we can scarcely think of our relation with God apart from some reflection on our duties to men. This obvious fact is not due to merely psychological causes, but to something deeper. There is a real connexion between the moral and the religious attitudes, of a dialectical character, so that they tend to pass into one another. Nevertheless they are really distinct and in some sense even opposed to one another. I mean that, when for example we pass from a state of mind which is exclusively or predominantly moral, we have to abandon certain concepts which are vital in the moral context and adopt others which have no place in it.

If we seek for a concept which seems fundamental in the moral life we should probably agree that the idea of responsibility has good claims for such a position. We cannot properly speak of moral good or of right and wrong in the ethical meaning of the terms unless we are concerned with a developed person, capable of self-direction and of forming general judgements. Where there is no conscious will there can be no morality, but at most the preliminary stages of the evolution of the self which precede the moral consciousness. The goodness of a dog, or of a very young child, is not in any intelligible sense moral goodness. Further, the moral experience implies the concept of freedom, freedom at least to do the duty which reason presents to the will as the right conduct in any given circumstances; 'I ought, therefore I can.' There is no sense in saying that it is my duty to do that which I am incapable of doing. I think we must add another characteristic of the purely moral experience — it is relevant to life in the society in which we find ourselves. Our duties arise out of the relation in which we stand to our fellow human beings and to the community as a whole. I do not feel completely certain about this, because it might be suggested that we have purely self-regarding duties. Robinson Crusoe, for example, was not exempt from the moral law on his desert island — nor indeed, if Defoe is to be believed, did he imagine that he was — but Crusoe remained a moral being because he had come out of human society and might be restored to it; the society was, as it were, ideally present on the island, so that, when man Friday appeared, he was ready to take up again the complete exercise of moral activity. Morality, as such, envisages no life beyond the present life, nor does it allow the consideration of reward or penalty as relevant to its judgements. The right and good are right and good, and no consideration of possible conse-

quences to myself must be permitted to deflect my will. I have fulfilled my function as a moral being when I have done what is right and pursued to the utmost of my power the good as I see it. Of course, the fact of moral failure must be recognised as a constant occurrence, and any interpretation of the moral consciousness must have something to say about moral evil. Evidently such emotions as remorse, regret and even self-disgust have some part in the moral experience and, therefore, in ethical theory. The opinions of moralists on this subject have been very various, both on the nature of moral failure and on the proper reaction of the erring individual to it. Some have held that the cause of moral evil in the individual is intellectual, that it is due to a permanent or temporary ignorance or mistake about the nature of the good; while others have held that the source is a weak or perverted will which fails to aim at the duty or the good which the intellect perceives. With regard to the feeling of remorse and allied sentiments, some have thought they were salutary, if not indulged in to excess, while others have agreed with Spinoza that regret for past misdeeds is weakening and to be discouraged. The latter opinion seems to be gaining ground to-day, for, as it happens, I have recently read in the works of two intellectuals the statement that neither of these eminent persons has ever understood the meaning of a sense of sin.

When we turn to the religious consciousness we find that several of the practical concepts which we have met with in the moral consciousness reappear, but in a changed form, and that other experiences and their corresponding concepts emerge. No religion is unrelated to conduct. Even the lowest, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, specially the lowest, impose a pattern of behaviour. In the higher religions, and pre-eminently in Christianity, morals and faith are indissolubly connected. Nevertheless morality, when taken up into religion, undergoes a profound transformation. The fundamental idea of responsibility is, of course, no less important in religion than in morality, but it is changed. In the purely moral experience we are responsible to ourselves, to the conscience which presents to us the law or the ideal, and perhaps also to the society of which we form a part. In religion, however, our responsibility becomes more definite and more overwhelming. It is to God, so that the acquittal of our fellows, or the approval of our own conscience, is not the final word. What religion asks is, not how a man shall be right with the moral standard of his society, nor how he shall be right with his own conscience, but how shall he be right with God. The experience and conception of moral failure and evil, again, undergo a profound transformation. The idea of sin and the sense of sin do not belong to morality, but they are of central importance in the religious experience. Rudolf

Otto has shown, I think, conclusively that the historical roots of the concept of sin lie in emotions and ideas which have nothing to do with ethics. In its primitive form, the sense of sin consists in the feeling that something has been done or omitted which places the group or individual in a wrong relation with some 'numinous object.' The idea of sin becomes fused with the idea of moral evil by precisely the same process as that by which holiness becomes associated with supreme goodness. But sin as an idea and as a conscious condition never loses the original meaning. In its essence, it is always wrong relation with a numinous object. When the numinous object is the Holy One of the Hebrew Prophets and of Jesus, the wrong relation consists, not in ritual errors or negligences, but in moral transgression; but always the essence of the matter is alienation from God, the inharmonious relation between the creature and the Creator.

For this reason the conceptions of redemption and forgiveness have a place in religion which they cannot have in the strictly moral consciousness. Indeed, it seems very doubtful if forgiveness can have any meaning from the standpoint of mere morality. The evil deed remains and, though I may issue an indemnity to myself for it or persuade those whom I have injured to forget it, the situation is not radically altered. Only when we pass from morality to religion does the forgiveness of sins begin to have meaning and to become possible. If the real situation is that I have, by my own deeds, become alienated from God, then the possibility exists that, by an initiative of God, by His holy love, the alienation may be abolished. Surely it is significant that the doctrine of justification by faith, which as Bradley said lies at the very heart of the Christian religion, appears to many who approach it from the point of view of pure ethics to be a thoroughly immoral doctrine. And so it would be, if sin were simply equivalent to moral failure.

We must observe that this religious notion of sin is associated with a paradox which arises in connexion with responsibility. I do not say that the idea of responsibility and freedom are free from difficulty when they appear in the sphere of morality, but they are at least not paradoxical. When, however, we translate them into the sphere of religion they give rise to one of those problems which are the despair of those who insist on having clear and distinct ideas about the life of the spirit. For the religious consciousness holds together two apparently contradictory beliefs. On the one hand, it is sure that my sin is really my sin and that I am answerable for it; but, on the other hand, it holds that by myself I cannot avoid sin. Whereas morality asserts, 'I ought, therefore I can,' religion asserts, 'I ought, but by myself apart from the grace of God I cannot.'

Finally, the passage from morality to religion implies a transformation of the conception of the highest good. What happens might be described as the opening up of the horizon to infinity. Ethical theory has not reached agreement on the nature of the good. As we know, the descriptions of it have been quite embarrassing in their number and their discrepancy. They range from the greatest possible pleasure of the individual to the greatest good of the greatest number and the development of harmonious personality. I suppose, too, that all the theories of the good represent aims which people have actually set before themselves, for it is unlikely that philosophers would suggest a theory which centered upon some object which no one actually regarded as desirable. From the standpoint of religion, however, all these goods, though they may be relatively good, are not the supreme good, for that must consist in a relation with God, a 'vision of God,' an experience which transcends the power of the mind to conceive, and which cannot be attained in any completeness in the conditions of this life. 'Blessed are the pure in heart'—but why? There are many possible answers. Because they will, on the whole, lead a more tranquil and therefore happier life; because they will, generally speaking, act in ways which conduce to the well-being of society; because they will probably have a more balanced personality than those who are under the sway of unregulated passions and imaginations. All these are more or less valid reasons, and they are all the reasons of morality. 'Because they shall see God'—that is the answer of religion.

It is only too obvious that I have embarked upon a subject which is far too wide for treatment in a short address, but I cannot omit all reference to one aspect of it which is, in my opinion, of the highest importance. Morality and Religion, I suggest, stand in a dialectic relation with one another. When I use the word 'dialectic' I mean it to be taken in a sense which is not purely intellectual. We might perhaps speak of a 'dialectic of thought' and a 'dialectical experience,' if we are careful to remember that there are not two dialectics but one—there are two aspects of one movement of the life of the spirit. To put the matter in the simplest terms, there is a tendency of the moral consciousness (or more precisely a *nisus*) to pass over into the religious consciousness, and this tendency manifests itself in two ways, in the conceptual form, when ethical theory raises the problems of religion and passes beyond its own proper ideas to those of theology, and in the concrete form of actual lived existence, when the moral experience itself passes over into the religious experience. It must, however, be observed that this dialectical movement does not occur unless the moral experience, and the concepts which arise in it, are taken in deadly earnest. That, after all, is what we should expect, for

we do not discover the limits of anything until we have explored it to the fullest possible extent.

The conceptual aspect of this dialectic is, in principle, familiar enough. It lies behind every version of the moral argument for Theism which, since Kant, has occupied the central place in Christian thought. I said the condition of this dialectic is that morality should be taken in deadly earnest, and this applies to the theoretical interpretation of the moral consciousness. We may attempt to explain moral obligation and the absolute claim on us of the moral law and of the good by analyzing them in terms of something else; we may be satisfied with a psychological account or an evolutionary description. The ultimate consequence of such theories, if they are taken as finally adequate, must be to explain the ideas of the moral life away. When we resolve duty and obligation into something lower than themselves we have really undermined them. If, however, we take the other line and accept the moral consciousness as a real and distinctive form of the experience of the human spirit, that is as something given to thought to be understood in its real nature, something as much a part of the world to be interpreted as the experience of the external world, certain other problems arise. Fundamentally, I suppose, they are one problem, namely, given the fact that I am under obligation, that duty and the good have an absolute claim upon me, so that I ought to die rather than do or consent to some actions or some thoughts, what kind of universe must this be? On what hypothesis about Reality would this experience and this attitude of mind and will be rational? As we know, Kant himself answered that reflection on the moral life, and specially on the categorical imperative of duty, gives rise to three postulates, God, freedom and immortality. We need not subscribe to Kant's method or conclusions in detail. There are other ways of presenting the same essential thought. I am not arguing for or against the Kantian philosophy. He comes before us as the thinker who showed the way which many have since pursued in their own fashion. I use him as an illustration of the thesis that, if you take morality in deadly earnest as something given for thought, you will find that you cannot stay within the circle of the concepts which are proper to morality, but are pushed on to others — to the idea of the world as a moral order, to the idea of God and immortality; in short, that a theory of ethics passes over into a theory of religion.

This dialectic, which is clear enough in the realm of thought, is also to be observed in the concrete experience of moral living. If we abstract from the *Epistle to the Romans* those elements which represent St. Paul's special theological beliefs, we find that it is the record of an experience which is typical. It is the expression of the life-history of one who had taken morality in deadly earnest,

who had sought righteousness, as he says, through the law, that is, by the attempt to conform to a standard or ideal which he recognised as 'holy and just and good.' But the outcome of that attempt was failure and despair, from which the only escape was, not more law or higher ideals, but into a life of faith — that is, into truly spiritual religion. This is not an exceptional phenomenon, to be explained by the peculiar character of the Apostle; in outline it is the pattern of all completed moral life. If you take the moral imperative in deadly earnest, sooner or later you come to the position in which you realize that the fulfilment of morality's demands is impossible. The claims which you recognize cannot be met. There are two ways out of this. You may take the way back and decide not to be righteous overmuch, consenting to failure as the lot of man, or you may go forward and find the practical solution in the central experience of religion.

I can do no more than allude to an aspect of my subject which deserves a paper to itself — the reaction of religion on the content of the moral imperative. It is plain enough that, in practice, religion and morality are often so intertwined, or even fused together, that they can be seen to be distinct forms of the life of the spirit only by intellectual analysis. We are speaking in simplified terms when we talk of the influence of morality on religion. If we recognize, however, that our thought, with its need for clear concepts, is inadequate to describe the infinite complexity of life, we may think in a summary way of the influence of morality on religion and of religion on morals. That moral criticism of the idea of God and of religious doctrine and practice has been one of the main causes of religious progress is so familiar to us all that I will not dwell upon it. We may be content to admit the fact, and to observe that the process continues. I suppose it is one of our purposes as Modern Churchmen to insist that the Christian Church must be ready to hear the criticisms and protests and doubts which arise from the enlightened conscience of contemporaries — not necessarily to agree, but at least to listen and to ponder. But I suggest that to-day it is even more important to ask whether, from the standpoint of religion, there does not necessarily come a criticism of the content of the moral imperative — I mean will the moral judgements of the Christian always coincide with those of the highest non-religious conscience? I believe that they will not. The conceptions of the nature of man and of his place in reality, of his destiny and of his ultimate good, which are implied in Christian experience cannot be without their effect on our judgement of what men ought to do now. It would be strange if our vision of man as immortal and made for the vision of God did not have some relevance to the question of what his duty is in this present world. You cannot introduce the infinite without altering

he meaning of all the factors in the problem. Religion cannot nean, as Kant thought, simply 'seeing all our duties as divine commands'; it means seeing all our duties in a new light. What night be perfectly rational conduct in beings limited to their pre-ent existence may appear irrational in beings whose fulfilment is beyond. I must not pursue this topic, but I cannot refrain from emarking that I believe we make a mistake when we argue about noral problems, particularly about problems related to sex, on purely secular assumptions.

RELIGION AND TRUTH

By the Rev. T. J. Wood, M.A., Vicar of Charlbury, Oxon.

I AM the Way, the Truth, and the Life.' In this great 'I am' the writer of the Fourth Gospel asserts the claim of the Christian faith to be the final and true religion, a claim which the Church has boldly made at all times, and which she must maintain if she is to survive. Yet to-day her influence is declining mainly because her system of orthodoxy has lost its authority as an intellectual answer to the problems of life. The increase in knowledge, due to the adoption of methods of research of modern science, makes antiquated any philosophy of life which does not take account of this knowledge; and the resistance of religious people to the process and the results of modern research has inevitably created the impression that religious people are more concerned with the maintenance of their system of orthodoxy than they are with the search for truth. This loss of intellectual respect must be reversed if the Church is to hope for the conversion of the modern world. Educated people are aware that there are serious problems which modern knowledge has raised for religion, and which the Church appears to be evading.

The first set of problems are those raised by modern Biblical criticism, which makes the retention of the theory of Verbal Inspiration quite impossible. It also necessitates the revision of the doctrinal system which was based upon this theory. A doctrine which was derived from texts regarded as literally inspired by God must needs be re-examined in the light of the new interpretation of the Bible. Great use has been made, for example, in the development of Christology of the two texts from the Fourth Gospel, 'I and my Father are one,' and 'My Father is greater than I,' and they have been regarded as authoritative for the purpose. But in the view of modern scholarship the Fourth Gospel was not written by an immediate disciple of Jesus, and most of the utterances attributed in it to Jesus cannot be regarded as the

authentic words of Jesus. The evidence of the texts cannot therefore be taken as final; they must be explained in some other way. How difficult it is for theologians to adapt their methods to the results of modern criticism can be seen by the quotation of Canon Hodgson, Regius Professor of Theology in the University of Oxford, of *St. John* xvi, 7, as the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus because they prove the point he is making.[1]

Secondly, the study of history and comparative religion has set Christianity against a wider background.

Thirdly, the discoveries of science have opened men's minds to truth which is in many respects inconsistent with that view of the universe in which the Christian faith developed. The determined opposition by Christians to the results of scientific investigation estranged educated people from the Church and led to the unfortunate association of religious dogmatism with ignorance and prejudice.

There is a general acceptance of the ethical standards of Christ as supreme, but a feeling that the dogmas of the Church rest upon insufficient foundation in both history and reason. The facing of the challenge of modern knowledge is therefore necessary to prove the Church's sincere devotion to truth and its claim to possess the ultimate truth about God and man. The Church cannot now claim for its documents and formularies an authority which withdraws them from critical examination, and where its data overlap the data of any science the claim of that science to apply its own criteria and methods cannot be resisted.

Thus, where religion involves scientific statements they must accord with the knowledge derived by science from other sources; where it involves historical statements these must be consistent with historical criticism. If the Christian claim to be an historic religion — *i.e.* that it depends upon certain events in history — is to be still regarded as true, the history upon which it depends must be shown to be *true* history. There is something to be said for the view that the ultimate truth of the Christian view of God is true, whether the historical facts are true or not, but the Christian claim is that its view of God is derived from certain historical facts; that God did actually reveal himself in certain historical events. The essential events must therefore have happened; but it is not necessary, as some pious people seem to believe, that *all* the events narrated in the Bible shall have taken place exactly as described.

To-day the Church needs to explain not only which events it regards as essential to its teaching (and to defend the historicity of such events), but also to explain and defend the interpretation placed upon them by Christian doctrine as it developed. At the same time the Church must realize that the defence of the Bible

[1] Hodgson, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, p. 44.

is not identical with the defence of religion. The subject-matter of religion includes experiences which are not subject to the criticism of either history or science, such as our intuitions, or sense of values, our emotions, and those experiences called mystical. These, the Christian believes, give him an access to truth and must take their part in any synthesis which professes to interpret life. But, on the other hand, the Church owes it to truth to take into its account also all the knowledge which God has given to man of recent years. Science without religion will lead civilization into the abyss; religion without science will lead man into ignorance and superstition. The world needs a religion which will bring all truth into its sanctuary and consecrate it to the glory of God and the well-being of man.

The problem of the correlation of ancient orthodoxy and modern knowledge is so great that there is an inevitable tendency (enhanced by the war) for Christians to avoid the task and boldly assert: 'This is the Christian faith, which except a man keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.' In the face of the confident, lying propaganda of totalitarianism, it was tempting to assert the authority of God and to sweep aside perplexities of thought by loyalty to the Church's authority and doctrine. It looked a sure stronghold in time of trouble. So there has come about a return to authoritarian religion. Barthianism and forms of Catholicism win adherents; they give their adherents a satisfying confidence that God is on their side. Liberalism is under a cloud; such a constructive effort to face the intellectual problems of religion as the Doctrinal Report is dismissed as the last effort of a decadent humanism. Christians are turning to a re-vitalized Catholicism, which is one of the most important features of religion to-day. Barthianism is so anti-rational that it is likely to be self-destructive, though of course it must be remembered that people are not guided by their reason in matters of religion, but by their emotions, and forms of irrationalism have a long life if they satisfy some need or emotion.

The new school of Anglo-Catholicism (which has parallel movements among the Free Churches) accepts the results of Biblical criticism and modern knowledge; indeed it includes people whose critical views would have been denounced as destructive modernism had they been put forward by liberals. This school finds its authority not in any precise texts of the Bible or utterances of the Church, but in the claim that the transcendent God has acted within the historical process. This action is not any particular isolated event, but the whole series of events which culminated in Jesus Christ, and was interpreted by the mind of the Church in her system and formularies. The Christian faith is thus a whole, one coherent apprehension of the transcendent in action.

This way of presenting the Christian faith has the advantage that it is not committed to the historicity of any detail of Biblical narrative, or to authority of any words attributed to Jesus, or to any precise texts of the New Testament. It takes the Bible as a whole, ignoring difficulties, and assumes the legitimacy and the finality of the subsequent development of Christian dogma, without being bound to the literal interpretation of formula. Its strength lies in its ability to use all the ancient trappings of Catholicism and orthodoxy, and above all in its profound interest in the soteriological aspects of Christianity. It is a religion of redemption (a side of religion which liberalism is too apt to overlook), and offers that redemption through the sacraments in which the whole drama of God's activity in Christ is re-enacted. It silences criticism by not insisting literally upon any particular detail, while it offers mystery, emotional satisfaction, and the religious experience of redemption. We have been led back unconsciously to the Catholic Church with its divine revelation and its creeds; the tyranny of dogma, from which we sought to escape, has been re-imposed in another guise, less menacing and less objectionable, but equally remote from modern thought. Has Christian thought gone completely in a circle?

The tests by which this new orthodoxy must be judged are two:

(1) Is it consistent with the facts? and

(2) Is it *the* true interpretation of those facts?

To apply the test it is best to take the central affirmation of the Christian faith, the deity or divinity of Christ, since on this the whole system of orthodoxy depends. The doctrine of the Trinity, of the Atonement, the question of miracles, the authority of the Church, all hang upon the meaning of this doctrine.

First of all it is necessary to emphasize that this doctrine is not a revealed truth which must be accepted or rejected as it stands. Although there are still some theologians who maintain the distinction between revealed truth and truth of reason, the distinction must be firmly resisted. It rests upon assumptions which cannot be granted. When men were ignorant they liked to think that truth had been revealed to someone in the past and was contained in some document. The popular argument is familiar: if God wanted us to know anything he must have revealed it to someone; therefore he did so. Where is the revelation? In Christianity, obviously in the Bible and the Church. Therefore the words of the Bible and the decrees of the Church are of divine authority. Some truths may be discovered by reason, but the divinely revealed truths are above reason, though not contrary to it. What can be proved by Scripture is authoritative (*Article* VIII). Upon these assumptions the Christian faith has been built, but the whole

method breaks down as the result of modern Biblical criticism. Revelation does not consist of doctrines or statements but of experience; this is the present position, and it is one of the great debts the Church owes to William Temple that he made it clear in his Gifford Lectures, *Nature, Man and God*:

> *'He guides the process; He guides the minds of men; the interaction of the process and the minds which are alike guided by Him is the essence of revelation'* (p. 312). (Italics Temple's.)
>
> *'From all this it follows that there is no such thing as revealed truth. There are truths of revelation, that is to say, propositions which express the results of correct thinking concerning revelation; but they are not themselves directly revealed'* (p. 317). (Italics Temple's.)

The claim that propositions are truths of revelation seems to open the door to the old-fashioned view, since naturally the Church asserts that her doctrines are '*the results of correct thinking*,' but the distinction is firmly drawn: '*they are not themselves directly revealed.*'

Revelation therefore does not consist of documents or dogmas, but of experience. Revelation is not denied; on the contrary, it is expanded to include all forms of experience instead of being limited to a particular series of events. The awarenses of revelation may, however, be stronger with reference to some experiences than to others. But recognition of an act of revelation cannot confer divine authority upon the formula in which the experience is interpreted. The Bible and the Creeds must accordingly be approached with these questions in mind:

(1) What are the actual historical events which lie behind the Biblical record?
(2) How far is the Biblical interpretation of these events to be regarded as true?
(3) What authority attaches to the dogmas of the Church in the light of modern Biblical and historical criticism?

For the discussion of the doctrine of the Incarnation these questions become:

(1) What do we know of the historic Jesus?
(2) What is the New Testament estimate of him, and how far was it justified?
(3) What is the authority of the Church's subsequent doctrine?

The quest of the historic Jesus (to use the title of Schweitzer's book) has been the theme of New Testament criticism for a century. The popular view that the Gospels are literal accounts of the deeds and words of Jesus fails to survive a critical examination of the documents. So far from being simple literal accounts, they are propaganda, fact plus interpretation, and critics have sought to distinguish between the two. Liberal Protestantism assumed that behind the Gospels stood a human figure, an ethical teacher, but

Schweitzer put the eschatological element back into the original history. To-day it is asserted that it is impossible to draw a distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of the Church; that the so-called Jesus of history has no existence outside the minds of those who create him; and that the only figure offered for our acceptance is the Christ of the Early Church and the Creeds. The Christology of the Evangelists is an ineradicable factor in the earliest tradition.[2] It is, in this view, impossible to discover the historical Jesus,[3] and the *datum* of the Christian faith is the Christ of the Early Church. This looks dangerously like surrendering the historical element in the Gospels (whatever that may be) while retaining the interpretative element, and leaves the theological interest hanging in the air. The plain question asked in the classroom or the street, 'Is this really true?' will not so easily be avoided.

Further, the New Testament interpretation of Christ is not the ultimate irreducible *datum*, for recent research has done much to enable us to see the material out of which that interpretation was built up and the method by which it was done.

Considerable light has recently been thrown upon the relation between the language and ideas of the New Testament and those of the time, from which it becomes clear that the interpretation of the Person of Jesus in the New Testament has been built up out of two distinct elements in the current ideas of the time, namely, the Messianic and the Wisdom-Logos idea. The selection of these two methods of interpretation was the inevitable outcome of the necessity of propaganda in terms which would carry weight with actual hearers, while it is clear that the form of propaganda has had a determinative effect upon the content of the preaching itself. The two elements in the interpretation are related to the two spheres of missionary work, Jewish and Gentile. These had different thought-forms and backgrounds, and the proclamation of the Gospel had to vary accordingly.

Christianity arose in Judaism. Jesus was a Jew, and so were his first disciples, and it was inevitable that the Gospel should be expressed in terms of Judaism first of all. Christianity is unintelligible except against the background of the Old Testament and current Judaism, in which the idea of the activity of God was central. In Jesus it must be taken for granted (otherwise the whole Gospel is meaningless) that the disciples found someone who continued and renewed the revelation of the Living God who had spoken through Moses and the prophets. With their association of ideas they leaped to the conclusion that Jesus was the Messiah.

[2] *cf.* Hoskyns and Davey, *The Riddle of the New Testament*, pp. 159-161.

[3] R. H. Lightfoot, *History and Interpretation in the Gospels*, p. 225.

This identification provided them with a complete set of prophecies, imagery and proof-texts, relating to the Messiah. A popular collection of proof-texts probably existed already, but, whether of Jewish or Christian compilation, such a collection certainly lies behind the New Testament and was the first literature of the Christian Church.[4] The argument from prophecy may seem to us unconvincing, but it was regarded as decisive in Jewish circles of the time, and its influence is powerful in many circles to-day. The *Testimonies* can be identified from later editions of them, and traced back right into the New Testament. The Christian collection was used in controversy with the Jews, and it most likely determined the form and the content of the teaching of the Church. How far it did so is a matter for further investigation. It is, however, clear that the Church's propaganda differed from the conventional ideas of the Jewish Messiah in two respects.

The idea of a crucified Messiah was incredible, and means had to be found of reconciling this fact with prophecy. It was done, we know, through *Isaiah* liii, to which *Psalm* xxii could be added for further proof. *St. Luke* (xxiv, 26, 27) implies that this method was used by Jesus to convince the disciples first of all; these verses clearly imply the Testimony method.

The other modification was the distinction between the Messianic coming in humiliation and the second coming in glory; the fulfilment of the latter was thrown forward to a future date.

The Testimony method set the whole life of Jesus against the background of Old Testament prophecy, and texts were applied without reference to their original significance or their applicability; from them were deduced not only interpretations of Jesus but the necessity of many supposed events in his life. Among the *Testimonies* which affected Christology were the following:

The Virgin-Birth (*Is.* vii, 14).
'Son of God' (*Ps.* ii, 7).
Descent into Hell and the Resurrection (*Ps.* xvi, 8-11).
Ascension (*Ps.* lxvii, 18).
Sitting on the right hand of God (*Ps.* cx, 1).

The expression which became most popular in Christology was 'Son of God.' Jesus never called himself by this title; he apparently used 'Son of Man,' sometimes in the general Jewish sense of any man or mankind, sometimes in the eschatological sense of *Daniel* vii, 13. This term would have been meaningless to a Gentile, and it dropped out of use very early. Its place was taken by 'Son of God.' What was the significance of this term 'Son of God'? In the Old Testament the term was used of angels (*Job* xxxviii, 7), the whole nation (*Ex.* iv, 22; *Hosea* xi, 1); the kings of

[4] See Rendle Harris, *Testimonies*, 2 vols.

Israel (*Ps.* lxxxix, 26; *II Sam.* vii, 14). It thus had no theological significance, and was merely equivalent to 'a superior being.' The Emperor was called 'Son of God,' and even 'God from God.' 'God' was used very loosely in the hellenistic world.[5] Professor Dodd thinks that the title was first applied to Jesus by St. Paul (*Acts* ix, 20), and in a Messianic sense rather than the metaphysical. It is a term which would at once commend itself in the hellenistic world and quickly lead to deification.

It was a most dangerous metaphor because so simple. In Jewish circles it could not have had the interpretation which was later given to it in its hellenistic environment. There it became the most popular title of the Christ and the basis of a metaphysical doctrine of the Person of Christ which could not possibly have been read into its Jewish connotation. When to a term capable of such great misunderstanding and width of interpretation were added all the ideas associated with the divine Wisdom-Logos the direction of the development of Christology was set inevitably.

How did this come about? The statement that Jesus was the Messiah was perfectly intelligible to a Jewish audience, and the arguments in support of it were such as they were accustomed to. Its relevance to the conditions of modern thought is another question. Without some knowledge of the background of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha the Jewish presentation was meaningless, and the first missionaries were therefore faced with the problem of finding a new point of contact with their audiences when they turned to the Gentiles.

But here, again, the ground had already been prepared. There was a wide area of common ideas between Jew and Gentile due to the mixture of the two cultures through the Jewish communities dispersed throughout most of the large cities of the Empire. This common Jewish-hellenistic culture provided the sphere for missionary enterprise and determined the form in which the Gospel was presented. How profound its influence is only just beginning to be seen.[6] There were already training schools in Jerusalem in which future missionaries were taught how to commend the Jewish faith to Gentile audiences. They had manuals of Greek philosophy,

> 'composed of real or alleged extracts from the great writers of antiquity, designed to prove that the wisdom of the Greeks really taught an ethical monotheism, derived by unacknowledged borrowing from Moses.'[7]

St. Paul was brought up in Jerusalem in this atmosphere. The equation of the Greek Logos, or Divine Word, with the *Mem-ra*

[5] *cf.* Rawlinson, *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*, pp. 42, 70-72.
[6] *cf.* W. L. Knox, *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity.*
[7] Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

of the Jewish Targums (the medium of God's contact with the world) had already produced a conflation of Jewish and Greek thought, which was carried further by the identification of the Wisdom of *Proverbs* viii and the Wisdom literature with the *Mem-ra* of Jewish thought and the *Logos* of Greek philosophy. It was in this atmosphere that St. Paul had been trained, and he was probably the first to use this scheme of ideas as a means of commending the Gospel to hellenistic congregations.

The Jewish idea of divine revelation was bound up with the *Mem-ra* and with Wisdom as the divine agent in creation and revelation. Wisdom had almost become personified as a separate entity from the divine Being, sitting beside Him on his throne (*Wisdom* ix, 4). It was only a step, therefore, to identify the revelation in Christ with the tabernacling of Wisdom with men, and this step was taken, not by the author of the Fourth Gospel, but before him by Paul. Thus the whole set of language and ideas associated with the divine Wisdom in Jewish literature became transferred to Jesus. Why? That is an unsolvable problem; it bears witness to that mysterious experience which came to the early Christians through Jesus, the Christ-mysticism of St. Paul. It is impossible for us to analyze the nature or content of this experience, or to say how far it justifies the conceptual interpretation placed upon it; what is certain is that the source of St. Paul's interpretation of Christ, contained in his epistles and taken over by the Church, was the language applied to Wisdom. This is the source of all the great Christological passages in his writings; they are not miraculously inspired statements of truths beyond human reason, they are the words applied to Wisdom and transferred to Jesus because Jesus was identified with Wisdom.

The great Christological passage, for example in *Colossians* i has only to be compared with the 7th chapter of the *Wisdom of Solomon* for it to be seen that St. Paul is not inventing new terms in which to describe Jesus: he is only using of Jesus the language used to describe Wisdom. If the Bible had always been printed with the Apocrypha and the marginal references to cover the books of it these facts would have been clear to all. Wisdom is described as

> '. . . a breath of the power of God,
> and a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty;
> . . . For she is an effulgence from everlasting light,
> And an unspotted mirror of the working of God,
> And an image of his goodness.'
>
> —*Wisdom of Solomon*, vii, 25, 26.

She was with God before the world was made, and is with him for ever; she sitteth with him upon the throne. She is the inspirer of men, and was God's agent in creation. She is unique (*monogenes*).

It is sometimes said that the highest Christological doctrine in the New Testament is the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel, which is used on Christmas Day for that reason. But the author was only continuing the method of St. Paul. The language of the Prologue is pure Wisdom language, and every sentence of it can be paralleled in Wisdom literature.[8] True, St. Paul does not use the actual word *Logos*, but there is no difference of method in the use of Wisdom terms. The identity of Wisdom and the *Logos* had already been maintained by Philo, and although the absence of the term in St. Paul may mean that he was not acquainted with Philo, yet he was clearly influenced by this wave of Judaic-hellenism, and interpreted the Person of Christ in its terms.[9]

These two streams of interpretation then provided the material out of which subsequent Christian thought had to develop. They account for the language of the New Testament, and there is no Christological idea which does not derive from one or the other. From the time of Justin Martyr (who first asserted the doctrine of verbal inspiration) onwards the words of the Bible were accepted as authoritative on the subject, interpreted according to the *Testimonies* and in the light of Greek philosopy. It is remarkable that the Arian controversy largely ranged about the text *Proverbs* viii, 22, in an incorrect translation, the relevance of which to the controversy no one questioned. When therefore the Council of Nicea condemned Arius it was not dealing with the problem of the divinity of Jesus, it was endeavouring to reconcile the Jewish idea of the revelation of God through his Wisdom-*Logos* with the Greek idea of the impassibility of God. It decided that, in the interests of a real revelation, the Wisdom-*Logos*, or the Son, must be '*homo-ousios*' with the Father. It had to use another metaphor to explain the relationship.

But this did not answer the question, 'How, then, could this Son become man?' For a century and a half the controversy swayed until it was settled by the Council of Chalcedon, 451 A.D. Neither the Nicene formula nor the Chalcedonian Definition can be claimed as divinely revealed truths; they were attempts to solve the problems which were set by the Biblical language on the one hand and the current philosophy on the other. Indeed, it is wrong to call the Definition a definition at all; as has been said, it states the problem, it does not solve it. It leaves the human and the divine in an unresolvable dualism, and despite all efforts to interpret it the Definition remains the crowning failure of the Church to express precisely what it means by Incarnation. This has been

[8] See Rendle Harris, *The Prologue of St. John.*

[9] W. L. Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

interpreted to mean that the *Logos* assumed 'impersonal human nature,' and did not become 'a man.' Such an interpretation is unintelligible. 'Person,' when used of God or of the three 'Persons' of the Trinity, does not mean what we mean by 'person,' and it is merely a juggling with words therefore to assert that the 'Person' of the *Logos* was the 'person' of Jesus. What content can be given to this term 'Person' to distinguish it from the 'natures' in which it can exist?

The Definition lent countenance to that view of Jesus which, denying his human personality, ends in making his humanity either an illusion or a psychological monstrosity: The doctrine of the '*communicatio idiomatum*,' by which the experiences of one of the 'natures' can be predicated to the other,[10] gave philosophical support to the popular conception that Jesus was God the Son walking about on earth. The human nature was practically eliminated, and it is only in recent years that critics have begun to readjust the balance. The Church needs to assert to the full the historical fact that Jesus was *a* man, yet popular theologians are very apt, in their desire to assert that in Jesus we are in contact with God, to speak as though his humanity were only a semblance. This is our complaint against such writers as Mr. C. S. Lewis and Miss Dorothy Sayers. It leads to such lamentable expressions as that given in such large letters in the *Radio Times*, 'The Execution of God.'

There is grave danger in such popular Christology; it has such journalistic propaganda value, but it is utterly inconsistent with true orthodoxy. The orthodox creeds of the Church do not mean what the unskilled layman takes them to mean. It is not that the creeds are not telling the truth; the point is that the problem of the divine revelation in Jesus was set first of all in terms of current thought of the first century, and the orthodox interpretation is expressed in terms of the fourth. But those terms were transitory; they were part of the historical environment of the revelation, but they are not the revelation. The truth they seek to express is that in Jesus Christ man was brought (and is brought) into touch with God. But such religious experience cannot be expressed in conceptual terms except in analogies and metaphors. The Early Church used such analogies and metaphors as were current at the time, those of Jewish Messianism and the Wisdom-*Logos* philosophy. But they were symbols of a truth, and that truth is still the kernel of the Christian faith, experience of God through Christ. Symbols are good so long as it is remembered that they are but symbols. When the symbols are regarded as the realities they are meant to express, and used as dogmas to be accepted literally, they only obscure the truth.

[10] Bethune-Baker, *Early History of Christian Doctrine*, p. 293.

To-day, therefore, the Christian faith must be presented not as a system of creeds, but as a living relationship with the God of Truth and Love which has been brought about through Jesus Christ. We need not jettison the Creed; we need only allow the fullest freedom of interpretation, for its statements are symbols of the truth, and not the truth itself. This is the view which is adopted in the *Doctrinal Report* (pp. 79-80), and in the resolution of the Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order (1927):

> '. . . we are united in a common Christian Faith which is proclaimed in the Holy Scriptures and is witnessed to and safeguarded in the Ecumenical Creed . . .'

That resolution went on:

> 'We believe that the Holy Spirit in leading the Church into all truth may enable it, while firmly adhering to the witness of these Creeds (our common heritage from the ancient Church), to express the truths of revelation in such other forms as new problems may from time to time demand.'

Such new problems have arisen and demand new expressions of the essential Christian Faith. All truth must be brought within its orbit; a new Christian synthesis is needed by which ancient truth, freed from error and its symbolism re-interpreted in terms intelligible to the mind of to-day, will lead men into the way of Life. The Christian claims that the world and human life is only intelligible if it is part of the purpose of God, Supreme Mind and Truth, and that purpose is the redemption of mankind from evil to serve God. This purpose, the Christian believes, is 'symbolized,' has been and is being effected in and through Jesus of Nazareth, in His Spirit. Jesus is therefore the Way, the Truth and the Life, and no Creed can exceed in simplicity and adequacy the unadorned words of St. Paul: 'God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself.'

But the world needs a religion which is not only a revelation of God but also of man. Hitherto the Church has laid exclusive emphasis upon Jesus as the revealer of God, obscuring the fact that He was also the revealer of man, of what man was intended to be and by God's grace could become. Men need not only a divine saviour; they need a human brother to be the Way and the Life, as well as the Truth. That is why they still seek the historical Jesus, for only the human Person who inspired the disciples can say to us to-day, 'Come, follow me!' It was the human Jesus of Nazareth in whom the disciples saw the face of God, and behind the figures of the Jewish Messiah or the hellenistic Wisdom-*Logos* there can be seen that same Jesus, drawing us by His love and courage and inspiring us with His ideals, and if the Church is to hold the future it must represent Him to men and interpret Him in terms of human life to-day.

CHRISTIANITY: ITS UNIVERSALITY AND FINALITY

By Prof. S. H. Hooke, M.A., B.D., F.S.A.

IF it be agreed that Paul's letters are the earliest authentic documents produced by the primitive Christian community, then the first explicit claim to universality is made very confidently in Paul's letter to the Romans. In c. I, v. 6 of the letter he says: 'For I am not ashamed of the Good News, since it is God's saving power to every one who believes.' We have to ask what it was for which Paul made this confident claim, and, having determined what it was, we have next to ask whether that is to be accepted to-day as the Christianity for which we are prepared to make the claim of universality.

Here we come up against the inevitable question of the relation of Paul to Jesus. Jesus began his activity with the preaching of the Good News of the Kingdom of God. What is the difference between Paul's gospel and that which Jesus announced, and, in order to discover what is essential Christianity must we set aside Paul's Gospel and return to that Good News of the Kingdom whose content is to be found in the teaching of Jesus as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels?

The answer to this question cannot be obtained by examining the content of the teaching of Jesus apart from the pattern of his activity and its outcome. At the risk of a tedious repetition of an oft-told tale something must here be said about the pattern of the life of Jesus as a whole and its significance if we are to reach any kind of answer to this vital question.

The pattern of the life of Jesus, most clearly indicated in the Gospel of Matthew, falls into two stages separated by a short period of suspense. During the first, from the baptism of Jesus up to the sending out of the Twelve in *Mt.* x, Jesus was engaged in 'heralding' the near approach of the Kingdom, in performing acts of power which were intended to show the character of the Kingdom and prepare men to receive it, and in teaching of such a kind as is exemplified by parts of what is usually called the Sermon on the Mount. In this period of teaching Jesus laid down in plain language the nature of the Kingdom and its standards of conduct. Nothing less was expected of the sons of the Kingdom than a perfection which was the perfection of the Father Himself. While, undoubtedly, it is clear from his utterances that Jesus regarded the

Kingdom of God as, in a sense, already present and to be recognized by his own exercise of the powers of the Kingdom, it is equally clear that he was expecting in the very near future that his activities would have prepared the way for the decisive action of God and the bringing in of the Kingdom in power, as the result of which he himself would be manifested as the Messiah. His experience at his baptism had brought him to the belief that this was the task to which he had been appointed by God, though the same experience had convinced him that it was for God to make this clear in his own way and time to his people. At the end of this first period of activity, feeling that the time was running out, he sent out the Twelve to cover the ground which he did not expect to be able to cover himself. The highly significant utterance in *Mt.* x, 23, shows that he believed that before the Twelve had returned from this mission the decisive act of God for which he was looking would have taken place. No other really satisfactory explanation of this utterance has been offered, and it may be remembered that this passage was one of Schmiedel's well-known 'pillar passages.' This period may have occupied eight or nine months. During the interim period, which was probably very brief, certain important incidents and significant utterances occurred. John the Baptist had heard in prison of someone who was proclaiming his own message of the near coming of the Kingdom and was performing works of power, and sent messengers to ask if he was the expected Messiah. To this question Jesus returned an intentionally cryptic reply. Following on this incident Matthew records some utterances of Jesus about John the Baptist which show that Jesus considered John to be the Elijah of current apocalyptic expectation, the immediate forerunner of the Messiah. The recorded saying of Jesus about Elijah after the Transfiguration, and the passage between Jesus and the priests after his cleansing of the Temple, show that he remained of this opinion to the end. Then came the return of the Twelve, forcing Jesus to recognize that the expected act of God had not taken place, while at the same time he had to recognize that his preaching and works of power had left the cities which were the scene of them unmoved. Finally the period of suspense is ended by the news of John the Baptist's execution in prison. This brought Jesus to the conviction that it was God's will that he, as Messiah, should go the way of the Forerunner, and that only by his acceptance of this destiny could the coming of the Kingdom be made possible and the way opened for that act of God which he still expected. From this point the character of his teaching about the Kingdom changes, a change observed and commented on by his disciples, and we have as examples the series of parables of the Kingdom collected by

Matthew. It must also be recalled that on each of the three recorded occasions on which Jesus repeated his announcement of his coming death at the hand of the Jerusalem authorities, he repeats his conviction that death cannot be the end, but that God who has sent His Messiah to this terrible and undreamed-of fate must raise him to accomplish his own purposes. A Kingdom without a Messiah was unthinkable. There was nothing else for God to do. The utterance is not a prediction proceeding from divine foreknowledge but a supreme act of faith.

This second stage of Jesus' activity, beginning from Peter's confession, was only of brief duration, comprising the incidents of the journey up to Jerusalem, and those of the final week, related with great fulness by the three Synoptists. Near the end Jesus gave to his disciples his own view of the meaning of his approaching death in the unforgettable words, 'the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many.' In the story of the Last Supper again we find Jesus expressing his conviction that his death was to have decisive consequences for his disciples, and his expectation of being reunited with them shortly in the Kingdom. The closing scenes follow in quick succession. We see the last conflict of flesh and spirit in the garden, the steadfast spirit triumphing over the shrinking flesh; then comes the confident acknowledgment of his Messiahship before the high priest and the outraged cry of 'Blasphemy.' He is handed over to the reluctant Roman authority, and the final darkness descends upon the dying anguish of the lonely man, from whose lips an agony infinitely more bitter than death wrings the last cry of abandonment. A handful of defeated and disillusioned men steal back to Galilee. When the darkness lifts again we find these defeated and disillusioned men back in Jerusalem confidently declaring that the one whom they had known to be dead and buried was alive again and displaying new powers and activities.

This is the total picture which the Synoptic Gospels give us; in it the message which Jesus brings of an approaching Kingdom, the Good News of God already in action, cannot be separated from the living and growing experience of Jesus, an experience which finally brings him to realize that the human situation is such that his own death has become an essential part of God's action, and that without his total surrender to what he accepts as the will of God, the purpose of God for the bringing in of the Kingdom cannot be made effective. Hence, while Jesus began by continuing John's message, he ended by being completely involved in an action which he regarded as God's action, but whose full consequences could never form part of his message because they were

known only to God, and there he was content to leave them and pass into the darkness.

Thus whatever judgment we may form about the action of Jesus or about Paul's interpretation of the consequences of that action, we may not set up an antinomy between Paul and Jesus. Paul's Good News is the announcement of the consequences of an act of God, 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself.' Jesus died in the belief that his death was that divine act, whose consequences it was for God to make clear. It is possible to regard both Jesus and Paul as mistaken, but it is not possible to deny that the act of Jesus and Paul's proclamation of the consequences of that act are inseparable, and that together they are the heart of the primitive Christian Gospel for which Paul so confidently claims universality.

This is the answer to the first of the two questions raised at the beginning of our enquiry. The second question, whether this Gospel for which Paul claimed universality can be accepted to-day as that Christianity for which we are prepared to make the same claim, may be set aside for the present while we turn to the question of what is implied by universality.

It will probably be admitted that the word universality has the same meaning as the ancient word catholicity, now somewhat under a cloud. The old notes of catholicity, *quod semper*, *quod ubique*, *quod ab omnibus*, may serve as a starting-point for our discussion. While it is impossible for the first note to be literally and historically true, yet it implies the first essential of universality, namely, that any religion or Good News which claims universality must possess an element of timelessness; it must be able to transcend Time. Time is part of the pattern of human experience; it implies development and unceasing change; the growth and decay of civilizations; the slow but inevitable change in beliefs, customs, and institutions. A religion which claims universality must be able to enter into and become part of this process of change, must be capable of adapting itself to change, and at the same time retain that element of timelessness, of the eternal, which preserves its essential unity and identity in the midst of change.

The second note introduces the space-factor in experience, inseparable from the time-factor. At any given point in time the spatial, *i.e.* the geographical distribution of the human species over the face of the globe, giving rise to an infinite diversity of environment, climate, and so forth, produces a corresponding diversity in the human species. We learn from anthropology of the differences in skin-pigmentation, hair, skeletal structure, cranial measurement, of speech and social customs influenced by variations in climate and habitat. These differences involve also

ifferences in mentality, and a well-known school of French an-
ropologists has gone so far as to assume a pre-logical mentality
r certain primitive peoples. A religion which claims universality
ust be able to transcend these differences; it must be capable of
eeting the needs of Eskimo and Melanesian, Mongol and Celt.
n this connection it is interesting to note that those most con-
nced of the universal potentiality of Christianity are the mis-
onaries at work in the foreign field.

The third note of universality, *quod ab omnibus*, presents the
rofoundest challenge of all. The Russian philosopher, Berdyaev,
as said:

> 'Man is not a fragmentary part of the world but contains the whole riddle of the universe and the solution to it' (*The Destiny of Man*, p. 59).

s an individual, man belongs to the biological history of the race;
e is but a moment in the long development of the species; a link
the chain of life: but as a person, or perhaps more accurately,
possessing personality, he is unique. To quote again from
erdyaev:

> 'Personality is the image and likeness of God in man and that is why it rises above the natural life. Personality is not a part of something, a function of the genus or of society: it is a whole comparable to the whole of the world. It is not a product of the biological process or of social organization; it cannot be conceived in biological or sociological terms. Personality is spiritual and presupposes the existence of a spiritual world. The value of personality is the highest hierarchical value in the world, a value of the spiritual order' (*Ib.*, p. 72).

ence we are confronted by the paradox that where the problem
ems to be narrowed down to a single point the challenge to uni-
rsality is stretched to its utmost limit. Nothing less than a reli-
on which offers all the fulness of God can meet the need of man
hose personality is an epitome of the universe.

From this brief summary of the implications of universality we
ay now turn back to the question already raised, whether that
ood News for which Paul claimed universality, and which, his-
rically, represents the essence of primitive Christianity, satisfies
e conditions outlined above.

At the risk of being painfully obvious, it must be pointed out
st of all that there is an element in human experience which is
niversal and which no advance of mental or physical science has
en able to eliminate or sublimate. It is that experience of moral
ilure, of inability to attain to those standards which man's moral
dgment approves; an experience which, in theological terms, is
lled the sense of sin. No satisfactory explanation of this pheno-
enon can be offered on biological grounds; it belongs wholly to
e realm of the spirit. This is why, although the standards of the

Kingdom presented in the teaching of Jesus offer the highest summit of attainment possible to the human spirit and possess the timeless note of universality, yet they cannot by themselves form the basis of that universal religion which we seek, because they only deepen man's sense of inability to reach them. No proclamation of standards, however lofty, can give the power to attain to them. Jesus himself came to the realization that preaching and teaching were not enough, and that nothing less than a divine act in which he as man co-operated by willing acceptance of death, could set free that power by which the Kingdom could be translated into terms of actuality among men. This is where the challenge of the third note of universality comes in. A religion is not something to be looked at and admired; it has to be lived, and therefore it must meet the total need of the human personality; it must offer some solution to the personal and spiritual problem of sin.

It may be relevant here to refer to a classification of religions which has long been familiar to students of the history of religion. It is the division of religions into religions of redemption and religions of illumination. The significance of this classification is that it indicates two different attitudes towards man's spiritual need. The former accepts as a fact of religious experience man's inability to deliver himself from the evil which he finds in himself and in his environment, and looks to a divine act for this deliverance, an act of redemption. The latter recognizes the presence of evil in man and the world, but regards illumination as the way of escape from it. These two attitudes are not necessarily opposed, and may, indeed, be found to be complementary; but they represent, in a sense, the two poles of our enquiry. A religion which rests exclusively upon one or other of these alternatives must fail of that universality which we seek. In Christianity, in that Gospel proclaimed by Paul and developed so profoundly by the author of the Fourth Gospel, life and light, redemption and illumination are inseparable; the Life is the Light of men.

We come then at last to the heart of the matter. The primitive Gospel, by which is meant both the Petrine and the Pauline preaching, together with the picture given in the Synoptic Gospels, burns with the conviction that in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus a new, divine, creative act had taken place; an act that was central and decisive for the destiny of the universe, of things in heaven and things on earth. To use the great phase of Ignatius, 'a mystery of crying wrought in the silence of God.' The external display, the unrolling of the divine act, had one small spot of earth for its stage, one brief moment of time for the uttering of the word. But its meaning lay wholly in the spiritual realm, beyond time and space, infinite and eternal in its reach, and only to be apprehended

y the spirit, or in Paul's word, only manifested 'in demonstration f the spirit and in power.' Where Jew and Greek only saw an in- ignificant criminal dying a shameful death, the illumined heart f one who shared the heritage of both Jew and Greek saw the eakness of God stronger than men, and the foolishness of God iser than men. In the death of Jesus there was neither the sole ct of Jesus in giving himself, nor the sole act of God in giving esus, but one total divine act; Jesus, by complete surrender to the ivine Spirit, in the act of death made it possible for the love of od in all its fulness and all the divine forgiveness to be 'forced hrough the channels of a single heart.' With senses undulled by he anodyne offered to him, Jesus experienced the most terrible nguish possible to man, namely, what it is to be alone in the dark ight of the soul without God; and through his experience God, s spirit, passed to the other side of the gulf between man and God, nd took up into Himself the utmost suffering of which spirit is apable. The gulf was bridged, the breach was healed, in the per- on of Jesus. But even so, more remained to be done. When the essel in which the will of God had been perfectly done was broken n death, the great creative act of resurrection followed. Here is no uestion of the mere survival of the spirit of Jesus: a new thing appens, a new creation. In resurrection Jesus becomes the Lord he Spirit; he takes over into that timeless life of the spirit all the ulness and depth of his human experience, freed from the limita- ions of time and space. Paul's conception of a 'spiritual body' as his attempt to express the uniqueness and newness of the life, he life of the spirit, upon which Jesus entered by resurrection. hus, to use a contemporary metaphor, the bridgehead is secured n the other side, the divine side. As the Lord the Spirit, Jesus ecomes the source of life, freedom, love, and power, for those ho accept the Good News of this divine creative act.

One is conscious of the limitations of human language to ex- ress what is beyond expression. But, if this is the primitive Gospel, and nothing has been said here which does not rest either n Paul's statements or on the picture given in the Synoptic Gos- els, then it becomes clear that all the marks of universality are resent. One cannot help quoting that striking stanza from uden's *Christmas Oratorio*:

> 'We who must die demand a miracle.
> How could the Eternal do a temporal act,
> The Infinite become a finite fact
> Nothing can save us that is possible:
> We who must die demand a miracle.'

Here is the realm of spirit breaking into human experience with reative force; the timeless enters into time, the Eternal does a

temporal act. Hence it remains for ever new, for ever living and creative: Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and to-day, yes, and for ever. Of such a Gospel *quod semper* can be truly predicated. By the same token, the pattern of the new life, of which the risen Christ is the archetype, the head of a new race, transcends all the diversity produced by geographical distribution. Again, in Paul's words, 'For, in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all and in all.' There is our second note of universality, *quod ubique*.

But above all it is in the sphere of personality, man's personality in its uniqueness, so sedulously preserved inviolate by God who is its creative source, that this new life of the spirit displays its universality, its capacity to meet all the infinitely diverse needs of man. 'Unto all,' was Paul's words, 'and upon all that believe.' 'Christ all, and in all.'

It is unnecessary, even if space permitted, to pass in review the various great religions which have arisen in the course of man's long search for God. None are without some gleams of the divine, but none offer anything comparable to that which this Good News, this primitive Christian Gospel, offered to the disillusioned Greco-Roman world two thousand years ago. In its early form one of the great religions of the East, Buddhism, presents striking parallels to some details in the life of Jesus. It is also, in a sense, a religion of redemption; but, whereas the early Christian Gospel offered fulness of life and renewal of personality in the full and conscious enjoyment of God who is its source, early Buddhism offered a redemption which consisted in the total extinction of personality.

A word must be said about the question of finality before bringing this discussion to a close. From the point of view of the timeless creative activity of God the word is irrelevant, since God is for ever making all things new, and in the realm of personality for ever finding fresh occasions for the exercise of His nature, Love. But it is equally true that a great creative act cannot be repeated, and in that sense has finality. What took place at the Cross, though infinite in its consequence, was an act in time, the complete outpouring of the love of God, and, being complete, need not and cannot be done again.

Finally, we are left with the question whether the primitive Christian Gospel for which the early Christian Church claimed universality and finality may still be God's last word about Himself, and still the only possible Gospel for mankind. The answer can never be a logical demonstration, but only a confession of faith, to which I here and now subscribe.

'Now and for ever we are not alone' (Auden, *Christmas Oratorio*).

CHRISTIANITY AND GOODNESS

By the Rt. Rev. J. W. Hunkin, D.D., M.C., O.B.E., Bishop of Truro.

CHRISTIANITY is through and through an ethical religion. Not that the Christian Religion entirely consists of moral conduct and nothing more: but the true Christian Religion by its very nature brings forth the fruit of good living. If Christians are not bringing forth good fruit in their lives, however devoted they may be to the rites and ceremonies and observances of their Church, something is dreadfully wrong: and this is universally recognized among Christians themselves. In this the Christian Religion is following the best tradition of the Religion of the Hebrews. The high light of Hebrew Religion shines from the prophets, and in the beautiful interpretation of the Christian Religion which is given in the Lukan writings twice *Deut.* xviii, 15, is applied to Christ: 'A prophet will the Lord God raise up to you from your brethren as he did me' (*Acts* iii, 22, and vii, 37). In the Gospel which bears the name of St. Matthew, the favourite Gospel in the early Church, on two separate occasions Christ is reported as quoting the great saying of *Hosea* (vi, 6), 'I desire mercy, and not sacrifice,' alongside of which may be placed another prophetic saying from the same high level of ethical thought: 'He hath showed thee, O man, what is good: and what doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God' (*Mic.* vi, 8). The same moral elevation appears in some of the *Psalms*: 'I delight to do thy will, O my God: yea, thy law is within my heart' (*Ps.* xl, 8). In that latest and most spiritual of the Gospels, the Johannine Gospel, this very attitude is twice attributed to Christ Himself — iv, 34: 'My meat is to do the will of him that sent me'; vi, 38: 'I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.'

How did he do it? Again we turn to the Lukan writings: 'Who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil' (*Acts* x, 38). And what Christ taught by example He taught also by word of mouth: 'Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven.' 'By their fruits ye shall know them' (*Mat.* vii, 21, 20).

Fruits: St. Paul gives a list in *Gal.* v, 22 — not an exhaustive systematic list, but items which occur to him as he thoughtfully

writes his letter: love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, fidelity, meekness, self-control. These virtues indicate rather than define a moral ideal: I would say, *the* moral ideal which appeals universally to the moral consciousness. The Christian religion holds that ideal constantly without wavering before the eyes of its followers, and unceasingly encourages them to aspire after its attainment, such aspiration being an essential element in all its worship.

I think it was Dr. Streeter who used to tell the story of an English bishop newly arrived in the East who, seeing a Buddhist at prayer went to him and said, 'Tell me, Sir, to whom are you praying and for what?' And the Buddhist replied at once, 'To nobody for nothing.' Christian prayer is never so negative: it always has the element of aspiration in it, implicitly if not explicitly.

For the Christian Religion has always faced the fact that human nature in itself, as it actually occurs, is not good enough. The doctrine of *Original Sin*, though often expressed in misleading and exaggerated terms, always has been an essential part of the teaching of the Great Church. The facile humanism of some of our modern writers is not Christian, though there is, I believe, a true Christian humanism. Human nature does not come right automatically. How is a man to advance towards the moral ideal? The New Testament gives a plain unmistakeable answer. It is by God's help and by his own effort: 'Work out your own salvation . . . It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure' (*Phil.* ii, 12, 13). 'Seek ye the kingdom of God . . . Fear not, little flock, it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom' (*Lk.* xii, 31, 32).

Christians then are committed to this paradox: on the one hand they are to trust in God as utterly as if they can do nothing of themselves, and on the other they are to do their best as if all depended on their own effort. To this double activity of faith and works all Christians are called; for all, as St. Paul indicates in more than one of the introductory passages to his epistles, are called to be saints, that is called to lead the dedicated life. Of this no better brief description can be found than the prophet's words already quoted: 'To do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God.'

The ἀγαθωσύνη of *Gal.* v, 22, is, Lightfoot says, goodness 'as an energetic principle.' It implies effort, and we must go further. For the Christian the symbol of that effort is the Cross, 'If any man will come after me, let him take up his cross daily and follow me.' Such a saying is found in all the three Synoptic Gospels,

hough the word 'daily' occurs only in St. Luke's (*Lk.* ix, 23). St. Luke's interpretation is right: *daily* it is.

What does that mean? I think it means three things at least. t means first a resolute shouldering of the burdens, not of our own hoosing, that are laid upon us; a courageous endurance, without esentment or complaint, of the pains and privations, the austeri- ies and frustrations, that come to us in the ordinary course of hings. Like the happy warrior described by Wordsworth:

> 'Who doomed to go in company with pain,
> And fear, and bloodshed, miserable train,
> Turns his necessity to glorious gain.'

Over and above this, the taking up of the cross means deliber- te abstinence from natural enjoyment if it clashes with the higher nd better standard of Christ. Not only on the animal level, but n a pretty good human level, a certain course of action may open ut: it would be natural to do such and such. But for the sake of preserving higher values the Christian may have to rise above these atural inclinations, to a super-natural level. I call it super- atural, *i.e.* above the natural, and I believe that that is the best se of that somewhat ambiguous word.

The third thing that the taking up of the cross involves is the etting of ourselves tasks, exacting tasks it may be, not thrust upon s, but voluntarily undertaken in order to be of service. 'The Son f Man came not to have servants but to be a servant, and to give His life a ransom for many' (*Mk.* x, 45, Basic English). If we are o follow Him it must be along this path of self-forgetting service: here is no other way.

In war numbers of men follow that path in countless acts of evotion and self-sacrifice. What amazing achievements are re- orded whenever we hear of the award of a V.C.? No one who nows what actual war is can listen to these brief statements on the ireless without being deeply moved. And how many other prodi- ies of valour find no mention in our war reports!

But it is important to remember that courage and devotion to uty do not in themselves comprise the whole moral ideal. St. aul, who was so very much higher up the stream of Christian radition than we are, was deeply impressed by the ἐπιεικία, the *weet reasonableness*, of Christ. Some at least of the stories illus- rating this lovable quality current in St. Paul's day must long ince have been lost. That fine story of the rescue of the woman aken in adultery found in the Authorized Version of *John* viii, 1- 1, does not appear in any of the great Uncials except *Codex ezae*—'Neither do I condemn thee. Go and sin no more.' But

there is plenty of evidence that Christ hated the attitude of the unforgiving. Shakespeare was a truer Christian in that respect than perhaps in any other. Some of Christ's sayings are sharp and paradoxical—'If any man come to me, and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple (*Lk.* xiv, 26). 'Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil: but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go with him one mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow from thee, turn not thou away' (St. *Matthew* v, 38-42).

These forcible aphorisms which have come down to us detached from their original context have an element of hyperbole or even humour in them, and are not to be taken solemnly *au pied de la lettre*. Christ was in no sense promulgating a code of literal non-resistance or indiscriminate charity. There is no sign whatever of His ever having formulated any code of precepts. Instead He pointed to the great Principle of Love as the Principle that should inform the conscience of mankind. 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets' (*Mt.* xxiii, 37-40). In this great Principle Christ saw everyman's surest guide to right conduct. 'Why even of yourselves,' He asked on one occasion, 'judge ye not what is right?' (*Lk.* xii, 57). In the last resort every man must be his own casuist. He may seek and take advice, but he cannot ultimately divest himself of the responsibility of judgment.

The conditions of life to-day are very different from those in Palestine in the first century. The New Testament makes it plain that what Christians have to do is to look at their Lord and Master and observe His attitude to the whole business of life, and then, catching His spirit and adopting that attitude, bend all their powers of thought and action upon the immediate problems of the present. The letter killeth; the spirit giveth life. The everliving Spirit of Christ is to lead His followers into all the truth and to abide with them for ever. Christians are to look ahead even more than they look back. New light keeps breaking upon them. 'Let us throw ourselves into the greatness of Christ and so go forward,' Clement of Alexandria says somewhere.

Which brings us to the searching question, 'With what success has the Religion of Christ promulgated and propagated goodness?' In approaching that question I think we should bear in mind what I believe to be a fact, *viz.* that even to-day the concept of personality is not reckoned at its true value in any country that has not come under Christian influence. The goodness with which this paper is concerned is personal goodness. But let us come more closely to grips with the question.

Mr. Charles Williams in his striking book, *The Descent of the Dove*, says of the Church, 'her spectacles and her geniuses are marvellous, but her unknown saints are her power.' I have always been glad that my own Consecration as Bishop took place on June 11th. June 11th is St. Barnabas day—'He was a good man and full of the Holy Ghost and of faith'—a good kind man, the *Acts* says (xi, 24). June 11th is also the Saint's Day nearest my Mother's birthday (June 10th); and my Mother was, in a Puritan kind of way, one of the greatest saints I have ever known. I confess that I find many of the famous saints, the copy-book saints, disappointing. In the history of the Church the people who appeal to me most are men like Synesius of Cyrene, Brother Lawrence, Benjamin Whichcote, who would be but minor characters in a Church pageant. I have a fellow-feeling with Benjamin Jowett who in August, 1893, wrote to a friend, 'I rather like, when I have the opportunity of preaching in Westminster Abbey, to take the liberty of saying a word in favour of some great Dissenter or saintly Infidel, whose praise is *not* heard in all the churches.'

Goodness is caught, rather than taught, and, if I might suggest an exercise arising out of our brief study this morning, it would be that each of us should pause and deliberately call to mind one or two of the finest characters we can remember. Two or three came into my mind as I was preparing this paper. The first was the Principal of a Theological College just before the last war. He had done fine service as a Missionary in India. He was a member of one of the most distinguished of the great families of England, and, as a young man, taken notice of on that account by Benjamin Jowett. When I knew him he was crippled with rheumatoid arthritis, and very frequently in pain. But he was unruffled, with a keen mind and a ready wit, full of kindness and courage and wisdom and humility, and appreciation of all that was good.

Another example which I recalled was originally given me by a Labour Member of Parliament whom I met in the canteen after a night on fire-watching duty. He told me the story of his own mother, a north-country miner's wife with a large family. Her labours were unceasing from early dawn to late at night, and all

done with such cheerfulness and thought for everybody except herself, day by day, week by week, year by year. She was much too busy to go to chapel regularly (she was, I think, a Methodist), but thoroughly devout, and unconsciously full of the love of God. In parenthesis perhaps I may be allowed to record my opinion that of the unknown saints a rather large proportion are mothers. I should like to see one of the Festivals of Our Lady kept as the Feast of St. Mary and All Mothers.

The third example to which my mind turned was a young flying officer from overseas. He would be very much surprised if he knew that I thought of him in this connexion and context: but his courage and efficiency and unselfishness were so unconscious of themselves, and he was so sound, I felt, in soul and mind and body that *Acts* iii, 16, came to me as I thought of him, 'the faith . . . hath given him this perfect soundness in the presence of you all.'

My three examples were all Christians but they did not all belong to one branch of Christ's Church. They did not all use exactly the same prescribed means of grace. To hear some people talk you would think that the graph of holiness would follow the graph of ecclesiastical sacraments: but experience shows that this is not the fact. To name but one example: some of our best men in the army have come back from Southern Italy with a most unfavourable impression of Roman Catholicism as they have seen it in practice there: with gross money-grubbing clergy, and degraded and squalid people. Holy food and holy water are not in themselves reliable prophylactics against corruption.

From one point of view the Reformation of the sixteenth century represents a reformation in morals. And we forget that at our peril. The General Confession at the beginning of Morning and Evening Prayer, and the recital of the Commandments at the beginning of the Communion Service remind us that the reformers aimed at a sturdier morality. It is right that the Confession should be in the plural, for many of the worst sins are corporate rather than individual. The late Bishop Pollock used to tell the story of a lady who once complained to Bishop Westcott that she thought the phrase in the Holy Communion about the burden of our sins being intolerable was exaggerated; he gave the reply, 'Can you walk along a London street on a Saturday night and not say "the burden of our sins is intolerable."' 'Ah, but I was thinking of *myself* and *my* sins.' 'If you come to the Holy Communion to think of yourself you miss its meaning.'

And as we involve one another in sin, so we can help one another to keep up to the mark. 'Let us consider one another to provoke unto love and to good works: not forsaking the assemb-

ing of ourselves together, as the manner of some is; but exhorting one another: and so much the more, as ye see the day approaching' (*Hebrews* x, 24, 25).

It is extraordinary how the dangers attendant upon *ex opere operato* doctrines crop up again and again. Almost unconsciously some people seem to drift into the notion of a kind of mechanical, automatic, operation of the sacraments. The recent report on Confirmation seems to imply some such view lurking behind some of its suggestions. 'Confirmation,' Bishop Pollock wrote, 'is not a magical protection, and requires a concurrent purpose.' Our relationship with God is a personal relationship, and all personal relationships are mutual. If there is a giving there is also a receiving, if there is an influence of grace there is also a response to that influence. There is no failure on God's part, but we also have a part to play. This is common-sense: and I believe it is Christian.

CHRISTIANITY AND BEAUTY

MUSIC IN CHRISTIAN WORSHIP

By Dr. H. K. Andrews, Organist of New College, Oxford.

BEAUTY is one of the attributes of the Divinity: it is therefore by its nature an essential part of Christianity. That the Christian Church throughout the ages recognized this is shown by the way in which the arts grew up and flourished under the Church's protection, and, drawing their inspiration from religion, gave her in return a rich heritage of beauty of the highest order in masterpieces of music, painting, architecture and craftsmanship.

Artistic achievement is one of the ways in which man can best express his spiritual aspirations. In art at its highest the creative artist is not giving expression to his own ideals exclusively, but is expressing to some extent the universal aspirations of mankind, within the limitations of his own time and circumstances. The creative impulse of an artist must have behind it the full force of his emotional and spiritual life, and since religion is one of the strongest as well as the highest emotions of which man is capable, it is not surprising that religious art has within its bounds many of the world's greatest masterpieces in nearly all the spheres of artistic achievement.

None of the Arts owes more to the Church than Music, and it is with the place of music in religion to-day that this paper is pri-

marily concerned. For this purpose it is not necessary to trace the history and development of Church Music. The problem is, how can music best be used in worship?

First of all, what are the real functions of music in worship? Some people might say that it should be a means by which worshippers can join actively in praising God, and some would even confine it to this purpose. Others might add that suitable music can be used to create an atmosphere for worship, and so help the congregation in its devotions. Only a few would admit the most important part which music can play in worship; namely, that fine and fitting music can be in itself an act of worship and a real offering to God.

All these three functions are part of the contribution which music can ideally make to religious worship. Before looking at them in more detail a few words must be said about two most unfortunate errors into which some people fall. The first is the idea that the singing of hymns, psalms, and other parts of the service is primarily for the active enjoyment of the congregation. Those who desire community singing in church of the kind which used to be prevalent at football matches before the war — and there are many who do — are approaching the matter from a completely wrong view-point. The second error is to regard music at a service as a kind of sacred concert for the passive enjoyment of the congregation. With this may be coupled the attitude of some organists and choirs who use the opportunities of music in the service to show off their prowess (or more often the reverse) as executants.

The three chief ways in which music can play a vital part in worship are: First, *as in itself an offering to God.* For this purpose a really high standard both of the actual music and of its performance is essential. The cathedral type of service at its best is an example of this. Equally good as an example is a performance of Bach's Matthew Passion or the B minor Mass, say, in York Minster. This calls for a high degree of skill and much careful preparation on the part of the performers. It must be remembered that as the great artist incorporates in his work the aspirations of his less gifted fellow-men, so in the performance of great music as an offering to God, the trained musicians have a like privilege and responsibility.

Secondly, *as an act of praise (or prayer) in which all can and must join with the best skill they have.* This applies to the part of a service which is congregational in character; hymns, and in some places responses and psalms, come under this heading. The important point is in the words 'with the best skill they have'; this

implies real effort. If congregational singing is to be an offering of praise to God, the singers must take seriously the responsibility which that implies and be ready to give time and energy to making their efforts as good as they can be made. Many members of congregations seem to think that by lifting up their voices at all, more especially if their voices happen to be loud and penetrating, they are doing something magnificent for the worship of God, and that it matters little what sort of noises result. If congregational practices are suggested they are generally the first people to object violently, whereas surely some form of preparation for worship is essential, and reasonable.

Thirdly, *as a help to worship*. Fine music well performed can be both an offering to God in itself, and at the same time an inspiration to the hearer. A fine performance of the St. Matthew Passion, for example, may give the hearers more of an insight into the Passion story, and its meaning, than all the sermons which have ever been preached on the subject. In a relative degree all fine musical settings of words should bring home their lesson to the hearers.

How are these purposes of music to be achieved? In most places where music is used at present, it falls lamentably short of the aims which have been set out. For the fulfilment of these aims three things are essential. (1) The music itself must be good as music, and (if vocal) as a setting of the words. (2) The music and words must be really 'fitting.' (3) The music must be adequately performed.

(1) As to the choice of music. Only those with a more or less expert knowledge of music in general and church music in particular can judge the quality of a work. The greatest care and discrimination are necessary in choosing music for worship, and it must first of all pass a rigorous test as music, the primary essentials being inspiration, sincerity, and good workmanship. Fortunately there is a vast corpus of English church music of the highest excellence ranging from the sixteenth century to the present day, which is one of our most priceless national heritages; there is also a rich store of music, both instrumental and vocal, suitable for use in worship, by great continental composers from Palestrina through Bach and Handel down to modern times. There is also a vast amount of thoroughly bad and unworthy music in both sources, some of which attained widespread popularity in the last century, and has gained a sort of 'halo' from association.

(2) The second necessity is even more difficult than the first. The music and words must be really 'fitting' for their purpose.

This means that the person who chooses music and words must have not only musical and literary taste of a high order, but also a general sense of what is fitting and, most important of all, a real religious sense.

These two requirements may now be discussed together in rather more detail, keeping in view the three primary objects of music in worship. The first was 'Music as in itself an offering to God.' Narrowing the scope to music in the actual service, this may be taken to imply the performance of Anthems and settings of the Canticles, Psalms, and Versicles and Responses by a skilled choir and organist, in which the congregation is not necessarily expected to take a vocal part—in fact, the traditional English cathedral service. Here the fittingness of the music is of primary importance, for the words of the liturgy are the chief thing. The music must be wed to the words in such a way as to reinforce and interpret them, without obscuring their meaning or becoming the dominant factor, and at the same time it must be good music in itself. The question of Anthems requires the same care. The words must be good and suitable and the music must fulfil its proper purpose and never dominate the scene for its own sake.

The worship of God at its best in England has in its long history assumed a definite form of its own, which is in part the product of our national characteristics—a reserve and absence of demonstrativeness combined with really deep feeling. For example, nobody who heard Byrd's 'Short Service' setting of the Communion Office at the Coronation could doubt that the music was perfectly fitting to those words and the service of which they were part. Magnificently sung as the music was on that occasion, it was surely a noble offering to God, as well as an inspiration to all who heard it. It was, moreover, completely in accordance with our best traditions.

The second object of Music in Worship is to be an act of praise or prayer or meditation in which all can join. There are good hymns and hymn tunes almost without number—and unhappily even more utterly unworthy ones. Here is one of the most controversial topics of church music. This is mainly due to a wrong approach, for hymn-singing has come to be regarded by some people rather as a recreation than as an act of worship. Associations of early years, too, often blind all critical faculties in people when faced with this subject. A good hymn tune and a good hymn must have the three essential qualities: inspiration, sincerity and good workmanship. A good hymn tune must also be 'singable.' Such a tune as 'The Old Hundredth' in its proper rhythmical version is good, because it has real inspiration in its melodic line

and rhythm, fine construction, and complete fitness for its purpose. Such a tune as the familiar A. & M. tune for 'Fight the good fight' is bad, because it has no inspiration, is weak in melody ('nearly all on one note') and in rhythm, and is poor in shape and technique. The whole problem of hymns and hymn-singing is too big to treat here. All that can be said is that some improvement has taken place in this century, but that in most places the situation is still deplorable.

The third purpose of music is that it should help the congregation in its worship. All the music incidental to a service can be, and must be, an integral part of that service. Far too little thought is given by organists to 'voluntaries,' which are too generally regarded as 'playing in' or 'playing out' the congregation. John Sebastian Bach realized what the need was when he planned (but unfortunately did not complete) 'The Little Organ Book,' a set of Preludes for organ on Chorales associated with all the Church's seasons. Such works make a perfect musical offering in themselves, and at the same time by their beauty and fitness must assist the congregation in its worship by creating the right frame of mind for the service and summing up its aspirations. It has already been shown how anthems and service settings can help the congregation as well as be in themselves acts of worship, by bringing home to the hearers the full meaning of the words sung.

The last of the conditions necessary for music in worship is that it should be adequately performed. Music, in contrast to the graphic and static arts such as painting and architecture, has to rely on performance for its realization. A lot has been required of the music itself — inspiration, sincerity, and good workmanship. An equal amount must be required of the performance. The average standard of performance of music in churches to-day, in this country at any rate, is very poor indeed. The worst feature is lack of preparation and effort to make the performances as good as they can be made. No one expects to find a cathedral type of service in a village church. The point is that within much narrower limits the music in a village church can, in a very simple form, be a worthy offering to God, if those who make it are ready to put real work into it. Far better to have no music at all than half-hearted and careless attempts at singing. The difficulties which face those who want to make music a real, living, and worthy part of religion, even in small villages, are very great, but not unsurmountable. In a small village not far from Birmingham there is a church where, with purely local material of a very average kind, the singing is a worthy offering to God, thanks to the care and love expended upon it by the organist and choir. It must be admitted

that the organist in question is a skilled musician, but the real reason for his success is that he has the true motive at heart, and has been able to communicate it to his choir.

What is needed for the raising of church music to-day to its proper place in our religious life is the finding and training of Christian men and women with the highest ideals who will look upon the making of music in churches as a real calling and service. The problem of finance comes in here. A skilled musician needs training and constant time for practice, and if he is to devote all his time and energies to his art, he must be able to make his living out of it. The necessity for having highly trained professional musicians for places where elaborate musical services are established (cathedrals and collegiate churches and the like) is already recognized. The problem of smaller churches is somewhat different, and the system of part-time semi-professional musicians is probably an economic necessity. But the question is, does the Church really appreciate the value of the part music can play in worship, and is it doing all it can to provide for the financial side of that service? Some time ago a large London church was seeking a new organist. The salary offered was £60 a year. The Vicar, in showing one of the candidates round the church, pointed with pride to a rug which the church had just bought for one of the side chapels at a cost of £300. The candidate in question could not afford to give up his other work which the appointment would have entailed for the remuneration offered. The point of the story is this : Was the rug of as much value for the worship of God as five years' service of a skilled musician?

This paper has tried to show an approach to the contribution which one of the great arts can make to the worship of God. It has dealt mainly with ideals, in the belief that music, like all other of man's activities, must spring from his highest aspirations and engage his fullest powers.

GOD AND MY NEIGHBOUR

By St. John Ervine, LL.D., D.Litt.

THE idea of the good neighbour, like the idea of progress, is comparatively recent in origin. The Greeks knew little or nothing of either idea, and would have been greatly surprised to hear that men, and even women, may improve in time. It was their inability to be good neighbours, even in Greece, that ruined them. They could not co-operate. 'The general view of Greek Philosophers,' says Bury in his *Idea of Progress*, 'was that they were living in a period of inevitable degeneration and decay—inevitable because it was prescribed by the nature of the universe'; a clear proof, if any were needed, that our general behaviour results from our conception of life and its purpose. Obstacles to the development of the idea of progress did not begin to be removed until the sixteenth century, and those who undertook to remove them did so at the risk of their lives. We had reached the eighteenth century before it had become part of the general creed. Darwin, following the industrial revolutionists, gave it such a violent push forward that the Victorians thought, as some people still think, that progress is inevitable. Between the two World Wars, it will be remembered, the late Mr. Coué taught us to chant:

'Every day, and in every way,
We get better and better.'

But we are learning rapidly that progress is made only by those who both desire and seek it.

The idea of neighbourliness, which is, of course, an essential part of progress, is at least as old as Christianity, a definite and declared part of the two great laws laid down by our Lord. But as a working reality of everyday life it is still remote from many minds. A false view of our faith made its early adoption impossible. In the sixteenth century, for example, Puritans in Massachusetts, preparing to steal the property of Amerindians, met in solemn religious assembly and resolved:

(*a*) That the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof;
(*b*) That the Lord hath given the inheritance of the earth unto His saints; and
(*c*) That we are the saints.

It was this sort of misplaced piety which caused Mark Twain, when told that the Pilgrim Fathers had landed on Plymouth Rock, to wish that Plymouth Rock had landed on the Pilgrim Fathers. An American poet, Stephen Vincent Benét, in his epic, *John Brown's Body*, makes the captain of a slaver tap his Bible as he

tells the mate that it contains his 'sailing-orders from the Lord.'

> 'And it's down there, Mister,
> Down there in black and white — the sons of Ham —
> Bondservants — sweat of their brow.' His voice trailed off
> Into texts. 'I tell you, Mister,' he said fiercely,
> 'The pay's good, but it's the Lord's work, too.
> We're spreading the Lord's seed — spreading his seed.'

It was not unnatural for people to wonder whether the seed would have been spread so enthusiastically if the pay had not been good. To counterbalance such devotees as this, there were, of course, the neighbourly men, such as Wilberforce, who sought to liberate the slaves, although Wilberforce, so oddly are emotions mixed, could not feel for industrialized infants in England the sympathy he felt for enslaved Negroes in America. The neighbourly idea, however, was seeding and, in spite of droughts and careless attention and attempts to uproot it, was growing sturdily. It is true that Americans a century ago fought a long and bloody Civil War which was succeeded by a vindictive peace, but one outcome of that war was the abolition of slavery in the United States. Unneighbourliness is still bloodily prevalent among us. Less than twenty-five years ago, Eireans were slaying each other over a point so obscure that even now no one knows what it was. Have twelve months passed since Greek met Greek in fierce affray? People in the town where I live are stigmatized as 'foreigners' by those who live in a village a mile and a half away; and this reproach is not an academic insult, but a means, at times, of preventing a man from obtaining employment. We have seen the whole of Europe, and a large part of Asia, wrecked by unneighbourly doctrinaires.

Nevertheless, the neighbourly idea grew throughout the nineteenth century, though the relations between religion and rationality fluctuated disturbingly. The wrath of Carlyle, animating Dickens, stirred the social conscience, and enabled the Earl of Shaftesbury — that handsome, melancholy-looking man who is so incongruously commemorated by the statue of Eros in Piccadilly Circus — to obtain his factory laws. We will do well to remember that it was two Evangelicals, Wilberforce and Shaftesbury, who did great service to the world in promoting neighbourly laws, and to mortify ourselves by the reflection that Dr. Pusey was prominent among those who derided such activities. These efforts at neighbourliness, however, were heavily hampered by philosophical and scientific theories and discoveries, by the beliefs of Bentham and Malthus and the Utilitarians in general. The first effect of the Darwinian theory was to startle and dismay sensitive minds. Tennyson reeled when he saw Nature red in tooth and claw, and was tempted to regard the universe as nothing 'but a trouble of ants in the gleam of a million million suns.' His dream

vas

'. . . that good shall fall
At last — far off — at last, to all,
And every winter change to spring';

ut his reality was different:

'So runs my dream; but what am I?
An infant crying in the night:
An infant crying for the light:
And with no language but a cry.'

Nevertheless, the neighbourly idea grew and developed. The entimental illusion of many devout people was that a world ithout a religious belief must become debauched; but the facts f the nineteenth century did not support this belief. It was posible to be godless and good, and conceivable that a world which ad abandoned its faith in God might become materially much nore comfortable than one inhabited by people who felt indifferent o their condition on earth so long as they felt assured of their life ereafter. The growth of secular opinions and the preoccupation f secularists with social reform seemed for a while to cloud the act that the conscience of pious people was still at work. The hristian Socialists were active, and not in the least ineffectual. ut there was a period during the second half of the nineteenth, nd the first quarter of the present, century when the cult of eighbourly spirit seemed to be the prerogative of those who were ither indifferent or hostile to religion.

Those were the days when the vague idealism of Ruskin and ne more robust and romantic idealism of William Morris were egining to wane before the rising bureaucratic beliefs of Sidney nd Beatrice Webb, two hearts that beat as a single metronome; eliefs which were, most surprisingly, supported by a highly indilidualistic relic of the eighteenth century, called Bernard Shaw. fficiency, a word first put into general circulation by the Earl of osebery, who confused slogans with sapience, and thought that e had devised a policy when he had only coined a phrase, became catchword; and religion was subordinated to social science. The ood citizen was now neat, tidy, dependable and willing to be egistered. Metaphysics could not be filed and indexed: thumbrints could.

The passion for reform was religious in its fervour; and young ladies were as ardent about it as their grandmothers had been bout catechising infants in Sunday Schools. Mrs. Mary Agnes Hamilton, in her agreeable reminiscences *Remembering my Good Friends*, recalls her astonishment at the indifference to religion hich she found at Cambridge when she went up to Newnham in 905; and tells her readers how her friend, Miss Dorothy Jebb, on ecoming engaged to be married to Mr. Charles Roden Buxton,

felt deeply distressed by a difference of opinion which had developed, almost passionately, between her and him. Knowing that Miss Jebb was 'a convinced, and even militant, materialist,' and that Buxton was 'a deeply sincere and reverent Christian,' Mrs. Hamilton had expected to hear that the quarrel was over religion. 'But, no; the bone of contention was Old Age Pensions. Charles, to her distress, was in favour of a non-contributory scheme.' 'Even at that time,' Mrs. Hamilton remarks, 'it struck me as odd that the other difference simply did not occur to her.' This, however, was not so new as Mrs. Hamilton seems to think. Earnest young women in the previous generation were equally indifferent to religion, and were addicted to ostentatious reading of Mrs. Humphry Ward and daring disbelief in physical fires hereafter. Even Sue Bridehead, the most indecisive woman in all literature, was antagonistic when Jude Fawley suggested that they should visit Melchester Cathedral. 'I'd rather sit in the railway station,' she said. 'That's the centre of life now. The Cathedral has had its day.'

The chief conflict of opinion among persons of advanced views was between those who held that workmen were heroic figures in a fresco by Walter Crane and those who held that they were raw material for statisticians. Those who believed that a workman, like other people, was primarily an immortal soul, were not, for the time being, in favour. Ruskin inveigled undergraduates here in Oxford into repairing roads to demonstrate the dignity of toil, and among them was that ardent lover of manual labour, Oscar Wilde, who wielded a pickaxe as if it were an improper remark. The work was done very nobly and very badly, and a number of navvies, impious and derisive, were employed to do it less nobly, but much better. Such methods did not commend themselves to the Webbs, who preferred statistics to poetry and were convinced that man's salvation depended on proper registration. They were even more distasteful to H. G. Wells, angry, shrill and full of Cockney complaints, who came trailing, not clouds of glory, but a collection of wrecked utopias. The funeral bakemeats of one Wellsian paradise did coldly furnish forth the nuptials of the next; and in each utopia the first rebel against it was its author, who was invariably carried out kicking. From this medley of contending and usually very cross reformers emerged the menacing figure of Lloyd George, uttering in the name of humanity the degrading cry, 'Ninepence for fourpence!' which was soon to be changed for 'All for Nothing: We want Rights, not Responsibilities.'

Throughout the nineteenth century this question of neighbourliness had been asked, sometimes loudly, sometimes in a

whisper. Who was our neighbour? The man next door, our fellow-countryman, or anybody? What right, and how much, had we to interfere in his affairs? Was his plight his fault? When His disciples asked our Lord, 'Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?' Jesus answered, 'Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents,' a reply that would not, I fear, satisfy the Bishop of Birmingham; and He added that the man's blindness was caused so 'that the works of God might be made manifest in him.' I trust that I shall not seem irreverent if I say that this reply has always daunted me nearly as much as I felt when I first read the *Book of Job* and discovered that Satan was allowed to torment that patient man merely to gratify his devilish curiosity, a curiosity which does not appear to have been sustained throughout the ordeal. Why should Job have been tormented at all? God knew that he was faithful. Was an upright and loyal servant to be cruelly treated for no other purpose than to satisfy the idle interest of an evil spirit? If we are the victims of our environment, afflicted by heredity from which we cannot escape, and made, by God, to suffer pains and penalties which sometimes seem to be capricious, then indeed are we pitiable, then indeed we deserve no censure. But if we still have judgment here, as Macbeth asserted while he was meditating the murder of Duncan, then we have some responsibility for our lives. Here is the fundamental matter. I am not entitled to criticize or condemn my neighbour until I have ascertained how far he is to blame for his state. Carlyle put the point with force in his Essay on Burns when he said, 'Granted' that 'the ship comes into harbour with shrouds and tackle damaged, the pilot is blameworthy; he has not been all-wise and all-powerful; but to know how blameworthy, tell us first whether his voyage has been round the globe or only to Ramsgate and the Isle of Dogs.' The Village Wife, in Tennyson's poem, when her daughter died of a fever at fall, 'thowt 'twur the will o' the Lord, but Miss Annie said it wur draäins': but no thanks did Miss Annie receive for her sensible opinion.

> '. . . but Miss Annie, the heldest, I niver not took to she,
> Fur she hedn't naw coomfut in 'er, an' arn'd naw thanks fur 'er paäins.'

This was a common conflict between reason and romance: the uninformed and ignorant went empty away from the reasoners and cold reformers to seek what consolation was obtainable from the misty-minded sentimentalists. Tennyson had called attention to the cheerless character of the well-intentioned reformers whose bleak and black-leaded good sense sent shudders down the spines of those whom they sought to enlighten. His poem, *In a Children's Hospital*, expresses the antipathy felt by the warm-hearted, but ignorant, for the cold-blooded, but informed. A hospital nurse

tells how a surgeon, efficient and unemotional, comes to operate on a lad who has been badly mangled in a mill:

> He handled him gently enough; but his voice and his face were not kind,
> And it was but a hopeless case, he had seen it and made up his mind,
> And he said to me roughly, 'The lad will need little more of your care.'
> 'All the more need,' I told him, 'to seek the Lord Jesus in prayer;
> They are all his children here, and I pray for them all as my own.'
> But he turned to me, 'Ay, good woman, can prayer set a broken bone?'
> Then he muttered half to himself, but I know that I heard him say,
> 'All very well — but the good Lord Jesus has had his day.'

To which the nurse, passionately proclaiming her simple and sufficing creed, replies:

> 'Had? Has it come? It has only dawn'd. It will come by and by.
> O how could I serve in the wards if the hope of the world were a lie?
> How could I bear with the sights and loathsome smells of disease
> But that He said, "Ye do it to me, when ye do it to these"?'

The surgeon, if he had been an alert stoic, might have answered that his will to do well was greater than hers, since he was eager to heal the sick in spite of his disbelief in her hope, and that she was less of a Christian than he was since she could not serve in the wards without her assurance of Christ's approval and her heavenly reward. These two, the believing nurse and the disbelieving doctor, failed to settle their dispute, and their patient died while they were in argument. It was a problem which has puzzled multitudes in the past, puzzles them now in the present, and will continue to puzzle them in the future. Tess of the D'Urbervilles put it to Angel Clare when she said that she 'wouldn't mind learning why the sun do shine on the just and the unjust alike.' Her bewilderment would have been increased had she been persuaded to believe that life has neither meaning nor purpose, that we end for ever on the day we die, and that all life will one day vanish, leaving not a wrack behind to show that it ever existed.

If that be true, then myriads of men and women have been swindled by life. The peasant who suffered in wars he did not cause or understand, of which, indeed, he was ignorant until the troops came trampling across his corn, could, had he been deprived of his hope of eternal life, believe himself defrauded. If religion is, as some have said, no more than dope, at least it assuages pain. Remove the dope, and only pain is left. Who will compensate the misused masses, afflicted, injured, impoverished, oppressed and insulted, if there be no God? If the soul is perishable stuff, will man immediately give up all effort to improve himself and take to debauch, or will he seek to make the best of an existence which has somehow been imposed upon him without either his knowledge or consent, attempting to rearrange the terms of human society so that he may obtain a fair share of the comfort and happiness that are available?

Here we reach a point which puzzles and appals many people. If it were proved beyond a peradventure that immortality is a myth, that we are done with when we die, how would men behave? Those who believe in God's existence, even if they are bewildered by His intention, have no difficulty in accounting for their lives, and are able to state a purpose which they believe, not unreasonably, to be God's. But those who do not believe in the existence of God are abandoned or wrecked things, flung up by the tide and left stranded on a desolate beach. The simple assertion that morals and manners would decline and disappear is manifestly false. There is no ground for the belief that a world bereft of God would instantly or ultimately die of debauch or that men would behave less sanely and unselfishly than men certain of immortality. All the miseries and sins that men can endure and commit have been endured and committed in ages when belief in eternal life was universal and unquestioned. There is nothing we can do to each other that is worse than what we have done already.

But our acceptance of this fact will not prevent us from believing that a world without hope of immortality must feel less certain of itself than a world which is filled with this hope, and less able, therefore, to maintain itself alive. Thomas Hardy, in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, refers to that 'chronic melancholy which is taking hold of civilized races with the decline of belief in a beneficent Power,' a melancholy which, he makes Jude the Obscure remark, is a sign of 'the beginning of the coming universal wish not to live.' It is the will, rather than the instinct, to live which distinguishes an age bereft of God from an age possessed of God. It is this deliberate desire to live, and to live more abundantly, which denominates the believer in divinity, and especially the Christian believer in divinity. Without it, man must perish, for it is reasonable to suppose that people who see no point in existence are less likely to seek its perpetuation than those who feel that it has a point of immense magnitude. What hope of victory would a general have if, on the eve of battle, he were to address his troops thus: 'Men, you are about to meet an enemy who is superior to you in every respect. You are out-numbered, out-gunned and out-generalled. The rations are short, and will be shorter. There is scarcely any ammunition left, and what there is, is useless. You haven't a dog's chance of winning, and by this time to-morrow you will either be dead or wounded or prisoners. In any case, defeated. As for me, I shall retire to the rear as rapidly as possible, leaving you to it. Quit you, therefore, like men, remembering that it is for your country you die. Good-bye and good luck, if there is any!'

I am not suggesting that we should pretend to believe in God's existence in the hope of cheering ourselves up and persuading us

to try to survive. But what I am suggesting is that a world which ceases to believe in divinity and man's participation in it must soon cease to believe in goodness and justice and effort, and will die of inanition of the soul. The mere desire to make the best of a bad job, to get what comfort and convenience he can out of an earth which he believes will soon be a whirling cinder in an empty universe, will not suffice; for what answer with conviction can we make to the man who, sooner or later, will ask why he should bother about his neighbour's necessities and general welfare when he can best secure his own by looking after them alone? If I am deterred from stealing my neighbour's goods only by the fear of imprisonment, and am no longer animated by the belief that it is wrong to steal, how long will it be before I start to balance the value of what I steal against the punishment I may receive *if* I am caught. A time may come, indeed, when, as in Sparta, stealing is publicly taught, and punishment is given, not for theft, but for detection. Hardy, in his Apology to *Late Lyrics and Earlier*, hoped for 'an alliance between religion, which must be retained unless the world is to perish, and complete rationality, which must also come, unless also the world is to perish,' an alliance which, he says, will result from 'the interfusing effect of poetry.' In this Apology he professes his faith that the Church of England is the single society in this country which is capable of keeping 'the shreds of morality together.'

We come, then, to the core of our belief: that God exists and is just and good; and out of this belief emerges a clearer understanding of our Lord's injunction that we should love our neighbour as ourselves. A favourite maxim of St. Vincent de Paul was 'Let us see our Lord in others, that we may kindle in our hearts love for them.' This is a simpler instruction than the Saviour's, and easier to follow, for it is not our neighbour that we love when we obey the saint's injunction, but our Lord. The Saviour's command is unqualified and difficult to follow. The prime test of our faith is not the kindness we show to people we love, but the kindness we show to people we loathe. It is easy to be kind to those we like: it is exceedingly hard to be kind to those we dislike. But it is a kindness that our creed demands. I shall not now try to discuss kindness, and shall ask you only to believe that it includes justice, and that justice does not mean indulgence. A Christian is under no obligation to tolerate evil. His obligation is to fight it. But he has also the duty to try to discover how much of a man's evil is native to him, and how much of it has been imposed.

We may believe that every man is a temple of the Holy Ghost, and, at the same time, acknowledge that the Holy Ghost frequents some temples more often than others—temples, too, that are,

perhaps, the least impressive. We may believe that some of the Paraclete's visits are brief and perfunctory, that there are men, such as Iago, who receive no visits, either because they have closed the doors of their temple and excluded the Spirit, or because they are so remote from goodness that even the Holy Ghost fears the contagion of their evil. It is hard to believe that the trumpet sounded on the other side for Hitler. But men as evil as Hitler are rare in the world. Goodness prevails in the majority of men. They could not have lasted this long if it were submerged by wickedness. And it is the task of Christian people to increase the general goodness and to remove those obstacles to its increase which can be removed. Our task is to create in men a mood which will make wilful wickedness abhorrent to them, and will urge them to rectify the wrong they inadvertently commit. We must decline belief in the devilish doctrine that minorities must suffer, and insist on relief when we find that a general benefit inflicts injury on some unoffending individual or little group. If Neville Chamberlain had excused himself from aiding the Czechs because it was impossible for us to help them, no one could have condemned him for his behaviour at Munich, but when he wondered why we should trouble ourselves about a small and almost unknown nation a long way off, he committed the sin for which our Lord reproached the Levite: averted his eyes from suffering and wrong.

And here I come to a point which needs emphasis to-day more than ever before. The Christian, broadly speaking, cannot tolerate the monstrous argument that the State may commit with impunity acts for which individuals would be hanged or imprisoned. There are decisions, such as declarations of war, which the community alone must make. The morality of the State must, therefore, differ in some degree from that of the private person, but it ought not to be lower: it ought to be higher. If the State, without question or reproach, may persecute, suppress, lie, steal or commit murder, then we cannot expect that its members will long continue to be worth the trouble of preserving. What sort of society will it be whose citizens place their personal security first, refusing responsibilities and demanding only rights; who are ill-informed and spiritless, afraid to oppose authority when authority is wrong, and incapable of initiating change either because they have lost the power through lack of exercise or feel afraid of the consequences? The State should remember that the prime law of life is diversity, not uniformity, that all progress starts in the mind of a single person who feels dissatisfied, and that where there is no disagreement, there is no development. The pool of Bethesda had no healing until after the angel had troubled the waters. The single place in

any society where there is undisturbed agreement is the grave.

All that I have said, and am trying to say, is that an essential part of the Christian creed is the infinite and immeasurable value of individual men. The Shepherd went out to seek the single lost sheep. He did not content Himself with the ninety-and-nine who were safely in the fold. Our Lord was not a generalization: He was a particular thing to a particular person. He did not advise every man to sell all that he had and give to the poor: He counselled one person whose besetting sin was love of possessions to get rid of them. He told over-cautious people to take no thought for the morrow, but commended the wise virgins to the foolish. If the wise virgins were alive to-day, they would probably be put in prison for hoarding petrol and their lamps would be confiscated and given to the foolish. A steward who hid his talent in the earth was heavily condemned, while a steward who had put his out to profit was praised. Our faith turns on this focal point, a constant and vigilant care for individuals, a refusal to believe that any wrong may be done to few, provided that there is some advantage to many. We say that a thousand souls are not more important than one soul, that a statement does not become true when it is accepted by millions or false when it is held only by two or three. It is not true that God is on the side of the big battalions. He has overthrown too many of them for us to believe that monstrous lie. But neither is He on the side of the few who will not fight. He demands that we shall put on the whole of His armour and fight the good fight. The world needs dynamic Christianity, Christianity that is aggressive against evil and violently prejudiced in favour of virtue. We have, therefore, the task of raising a better people, just and good in every respect. The mansions in our Father's house may be numerous and diverse, but they must also be well-found and well-built. The temple may not be occupied by the Holy Ghost, but it must be fit for occupation. Do not condemn Caliban for aspiring to Miranda. It is only by such upward looks and aspirations after betterment and beauty that man emerges from his slime. We know what are the essential needs of men and women: food, shelter, clothing, education and play suitable to their character and capacity. We must ensure these essentials. We must be well-born, well-bred, well-instructed and well-found.

I do not see how such a community is to be established firmly and securely unless it is animated by a profound and passionate belief in immortality and God's good and just existence. A world inhabited exclusively by John Stuart Mills, George Eliots and Thomas Henry Huxleys, benign and earnest people, assiduously seeking the welfare and improvement of others, must finally fail if mankind has no conviction that life will last or is anything more

than a stoical endurance of something unsought, unnecessary and better ended. Konrad Heiden, in *Der Führer*, asserts that Hitler came to power because he satisfied the longing of the German people for a meaning of existence which they had failed to find in religion. The result was calamity and disaster. But why did they fail to find that meaning in religion? Failure may be the fault of the seeker rather than the fault of the sought; and it is idle to complain that you cannot find what you want in religion if what you want is alien to it and something you ought not to want. Unneighbourly men cannot expect to find satisfaction in the Christian faith. It condemns their ways. If Mussolini had loved the Abyssinians as if they were Italians, could he have poison-gassed them? If a conviction of our blood relationship with all men were inherent in us and we regarded them as our brethren, would we not cry out in pain and protest when the least of them was malformed and marred by remediable conditions? We have to solve a hard problem: how to secure men in the good life without robbing them of their responsibility and their self-respect. But that is a problem that a Christian, more perhaps than any other person, is qualified to solve. Mankind is good stuff, and worth saving, and the Christian feels that he can save it, but only if he remembers and fulfils his Lord's injunction to be a good neighbour. That, in itself, is sufficient.

At the end of his great epic, *The Dynasts*, Thomas Hardy makes the Chorus reply to the plaintive enquiries of the perturbed Spirits who speculate on human existence:

> 'But — a stirring thrills the air
> Like to sounds of joyance there,
> That the rages
> Of the ages
> Shall be cancelled, and deliverance offered from the darts that were,
> Consciousness the Will informing, till It fashions all things fair.'

This is the unquenchable hope in the Christian's heart, that we shall fulfil the good intention and live for ever in the felicity of God's grace. If man is to fulfil his hope of enrichment and improvement, he must fit himself for the felicity of eternal life: making himself a good soldier of God by increasing his personal worth and securing the worth of his neighbour. It is incredible that God can wish to see us crawling into heaven on our hands and knees. He must wish to see us entering it upright men, our heads erect and high: men able to look their Lord in the face and deserve His commendation, Well done, thou good and faithful servant. It is the Christian's privilege and task to teach them to fulfil this hope which has never left their hearts, that they may not only live, but be fit to live, for ever.

REVERENCE FOR HUMAN PERSONALITY

By Rev. E. J. Strover, Chaplain, R.A.F.

IN 1920/21, owing to the shortage of senior officers in the Indian Army, I commanded the 3/23rd Sikh Infantry for a year, as a Captain.

I studied the Sikh religion, attended some of the Sikh services, saluted the Sikh *Granth* (Bible) when it was carried at the head of the regiment, and insisted on every Sikh recruit taking the Sikh oath in front of the regiment. This does not mean that I became a Sikh! or neglected to go to my own church; but I learnt to respect the Sikh religion which has purity and simplicity and is a fighting faith. The Sikh recruit, who has an iron bracelet welded round his wrist and is given the title of *Singh* (lion-hearted), swears never to give way in battle.

In 1921 I took the regiment to Iraq, and they never faltered before superior numbers or the heat and thirst of the desert. In 1935 I was commanding a regiment of Sikhs, Punjab Mohammedans and Hindus in the Khaibar Pass. Our job was to protect the Pass against Pathans, who are turbulent and fierce tribesmen.

When King George V died, the senior Indian officer suggested to me that we should hold a combined memorial service. I consulted the Sikh *Grunthi* (Priest), the Mohammedan *Moulvi* (Priest) and the Hindu Priest, and we each read the memorial service. I translated the Lord's Prayer into simple Hindustani, and both the Priests and also the Indian officers said how much they liked it.

I give these instances, not because I think that my experiences are any greater than others, but just to show my view-point.

In discussing religion with Sikh, Mohammedan, Hindu and Buddhist priests, as I frequently did, I found that they all agreed to the Commandments:

(1) To love and worship God.

(2) To love one's neighbour as one's self.

Mohammedans limited their brotherhood to Mohammedans. Hindus limited their brotherhood to their caste. Both Mohammedans and Hindus regarded women as inferior creatures. Sikhs were more tolerant but did not extend their friendship beyond Sikhs. Similarly with Buddhists.

I have met many Hindu and Buddhist priests who were very spiritual. No shadow of anger, distress or worry was ever allowed to appear on their brows. But they did not lift a finger to alleviate

ne want, the unemployment, the crowded housing and the feeling f inferiority and of misery which was destroying the personalities round them. As we all know this is not limited to Hindus and Buddhists.

It was born home to me more and more that the essential differnce between Christianity and other great religions is the reverence or human personality. In studying the life of Jesus I find that in His standard of values, personal character had an absolute supremacy. Many intelligent Hindus (and many are very intelectual) understand this. They respect a man who shows a reverence for human personality and they call him a Christ-like man.

When they wanted a name for Gandhi (who is a Hindu) which would pay him the greatest compliment, they called him a Christ-like man. To them a Christ-like man is a man whose worship of God results in a reverence for human personality.

And now, to support this contention from fact. It is well-known hat the more superficial elements of orthodox Christianity can be paralleled in non-Christian Faiths. If the Bible is an inspired book o Christians, so is the Koran to Mohammedans, or the *Rig Veda* o Hindus or the *Granth* to Sikhs. In the methods of interpretaion employed upon them, one finds re-duplicated all the characteristic ideas and practices associated with the Bible. The same kind of miracles such as raising the dead, transforming water into wine, walking on the sea, and feeding multitudes with a small mount of food are found familiarly among the records of the other great religions. The idea of miraculous birth appears in reference o Buddha, Zoroaster, Lao-tze, Mahavira and Shri Krishra Church.

The disaster of this war is creating a recrudescence of primitive millennialism. Belief in the second coming of Christ is regarded by many as a necessary article of Christian faith. The Shi'ah of Persia await the return of Muhammed, son of Hasan-l-Askari, who has been about to appear since the third Islamic century. Buddhists are expecting Maitreya, the next Buddha: already he is waiting in heaven for the divine moment to descend o earth and restore the law.

When one plunges deeper and thinks of vital matters such as prayer and philanthropic love, Christianity has no monopoly. If Jesus said, 'When thou prayest, enter into thine inner chamber nd, having shut the door, pray to thy Father who is in secret,' Epictetus said, 'When you have shut your doors and darkened your room, remember never to say that you are alone, for you are not alone, but God is within.' If the Christian Scriptures say, 'Love your enemies and do them good and lend,' the Buddhist Scriptures say, 'By calmness let a man overcome wrath and

let him overcome evil by good. The miser let him subdue by liberality, and the liar by truth.'

Nevertheless the study of the distinctive elements in religion is at least as important as emphasis on their unities. If we wish to select the special contribution which Jesus of Nazareth has made and *is making* to man's thought, we could not do better than to call Him the champion of human personality. He laid hold on that, lifted it up, conceived it in all its appearances in child, in woman, peasant or king as infinitely valuable.

That is the uniqueness of the message of Jesus. Whether one is a Christian or not does not primarily depend on the acceptance or rejection of the orthodoxies of official Church or creed. Give new names to many of these creedal conceptions and ecclesiastical practices and one may be a Buddhist, a Sikh, a Mohammedan or a Hindu. Whether one is a Christian or not depends on whether one accepts or rejects Jesus' attitude towards personality.

Here I must digress to deal with Humanism. Humanism is a new term, and an unfortunate one, for Victorian Agnosticism; but Humanism wears its rue with a difference. The Victorian agnostic was sorry to be an agnostic, but the humanist of to-day rejoices to be a humanist. It gives him a sense of liberation and provides him with a gospel of unrestricted self-realization as the aim of life. Any Chaplain to the Forces who is in touch with his men, will tell you that Humanism is widespread among officers and men of the Army and Royal Air Force. In the Royal Navy there is less Humanism. This is probably because the sailor knows how much depends upon a power outside himself. The Humanism which is prevalent in the Forces is dangerous because we are forced to admire it and because it is doing work which Christianity stands for.

Men and women, without creed or Church and with no belief in God, are actively protecting personality, giving personality opportunities to grow which the Church has never given. Doctors are banishing epidemics, Psychiatrists are giving men mental health, Educationalists are giving opportunities to the nation's youth. And now Statesmen are co-operating on a world-wide scale to get rid of the insanity of war.

Humanists who are enthusiastic to give personalities every opportunity to develop, are also anxious to get as far away from ecclesiasticism as possible. Their dislike of anything to do with the Church makes our task extremely difficult, and it is all the more formidable because there is so much to be admired in modern Humanists. No doubt their revolt against the religious repressions of the Victorian age has caused them to go too far in the opposite direction.

We want to make humanism Christian, but, when our Church attacks Humanism, as we are doing now, we are neither wise nor charitable. In a recent report *Towards the conversion of England*, produced by an important commission of the Church Assembly, a violent attack is made on Humanism. It is called the 'age-long lie.' Its record is branded as one of 'consistent failure': its promises are 'invariably unfulfilled.' If Christians are to play their part in post-war reconstruction, we *must* co-operate with all those men of goodwill who are actively engaged in helping their fellow-men in public affairs. It is difficult to see how this is going to be done by telling them that they are the children of an 'age-long lie,' and that their record is one of consistent failure. It is often considered clever for many in our Church, who have never done any social service, to condemn everyone who does not worship in church, although they may have fought disease, pioneered research and given personality opportunity to grow. It is certainly a tragedy when men do not recognize God. But behind that is a deeper tragedy still — people who believe in God and worship God, but who have thoughts of God so narrowly ecclesiastic that they do not perceive His presence, acknowledged or unacknowledged, in all the goodness and beauty and truth in the universe.

A Chaplain to the Forces nowadays is often also the Welfare Officer. In welfare he has to work with officers, N.C.O.'s and men who are humanists. To work with humanists it is essential to realize that God works in men who do not recognize Him. God comes in like the sun through every nook and crevice where He can fine a way of entrance. He does not wait to be welcomed. He does not insist on being consciously recognized before He enters a man's life. It is by working with humanists that we can give them the spiritual life which they lack.

Humanists often try to follow the example of our Lord without the inspiration which initiated His actions. They are practical rather than inspired. How often a man has said to me, 'My religion is to do to others as I would that they should do to me.' With the man who really tries to do to others as he would that they should do to him, I have the utmost sympathy. He takes his philosophy from the Good Samaritan and really tries to carry it out. We would, I am sure, agree that our Lord would say to him, 'Inasmuch as you did it unto one of the least of these you did it unto Me.' I find them to be men whom I can easily love and respect. They are usually intelligent and generous minded. If they can be led to God they make splendid Christians; and humanists of this kind, sooner or later, find the need of God. Dogmas and Creeds are an obstruction to them, but the original

religion of Jesus, which so many have never known, comes as a revelation to them. In the R.A.F. we hold moral leadership courses for the laity. At first these courses taught theology and had a great deal of worship. But they did not attract the right kind of man. We must have natural leaders. To-day Divine Services are purely voluntary and Christianity of the most simple and practical type is taught. I pick out officers and N.C.O.s who work with me in welfare. They usually say, 'Shall I have to go to church every day?'; and I can now answer, 'Not unless you want to.' But they do take part in Divine worship when they get there and they realize the great truth that no man can be a spiritual leader without regular worship. Being natural leaders they are a great help to us when they return.

When we have faced the darker elements in the situation, it is impossible not to find abiding ground for hope in the revelation of human nature among our men. Placed suddenly in the terrible and abnormal conditions of modern war, with so poor an outfit of education and spiritual knowledge as our country has been able to give most of them, coming in the main from economic conditions which were fitted to depress and discourage the best in their personalities and foster the evil, what an imperishable witness they have given to the good that is in man, to the heroic in the commonplace, to the deep founts of courage, loyalty and sacrifice and affection. And if the manhood of the nation can get so far with a vague and meagre gospel, to what heights might it not rise if it were fully won for the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ and for the service of His world-wide kingdom.

Think of the great tide of youthful life and vigour that would pass through all the shrunken channels of the life of the Church, if the energy, the initiative, the comradeship, the gaiety, the devotion of these men were won for God.

May I suggest three ways by which I have had some success in leading men in the Forces to Divine worship.

Men are influenced more through their hearts than through their heads. Most men to-day get married very young. They love their families and their homes. When a man speaks to me alone he usually brings out a photograph of his children. They are genuinely worried by the great increase in divorce. I always tell every man that there is one simple way to maintain the success of his marriage, and that is by he and his wife and children kneeling down in simple prayer every morning. Many have tried it and have been astonished at the result. The young women will not begin it. It is the man—the husband and father—who must take

ontrol of his family and insist on family prayers.

The second way is by epilogues and non-liturgical services aken from the platform of public halls and cinemas at the conusion of a performance.

The third way is by showing our interest in and reverence for ie personalities of men and women who never come to church. When they see that we are insisting on the removal of evils which re repressing personality, such as an unjust economic system and ational selfishness, they are far more ready to support the Church hich they see is doing something practical. The late Archbishop Villiam Temple was more trusted and admired than any other eligious teacher because he so obviously loved and reverenced ersonality and tried to remove everything that was destroying it.

The fact is that there never have been many Christians. There ave been millions of believers in the semi-pagan accretions which cclesiastical Christianity has held in common with other faiths— ut Christians who shared the reverence of Jesus for human peronality have been few and far between. That is the real challenge us. What have sectarian divisions to do with reverence for uman personality? What have theological wrangles in common ith the cause that Jesus of Nazareth had at heart?

What if the Churches could be made to see that our primary usiness is the championship of the rights and duties of human ersonality! What if the enrichment of human personality by ivine worship, by better schools, by a juster economic system and y a warless world could become our great enthusiasm!

Such a perception of what Christianity is might achieve as lutary a reformation as ever has re-created the Churches. It ight even make Christianity Christian!

RELIGION IN A GRAMMAR SCHOOL

By M. S. Gotch, M.A., Headmaster of the Bentley School.

I AM the headmaster of a small mixed Grammar School in a small West-country town. Apart from a handful of exceptions, girls and boys come to the school from their primary schools at about the age of eleven. Their parents are under agreement to keep them at school until the end of the school year after they become sixteen, and in point of fact some ten per cent. stay on in the VIth Form to the age of eighteen or even nineteen. This brief introduction will serve to explain both the fragile authority on which my opinions are likely to rest and the limitations which will dog me in submitting them.

I will begin by quoting two passages from a memorandum on Religious Education drafted, and unanimously accepted, by the Heads of County Secondary (now Grammar) Schools in Wiltshire. This is the first :

> 'While the school may strive to be, and may sometimes succeed in being, a Christian community, that is, a community which is accustomed to think in Christian categories and whose way of life is based on Christian ethics, it cannot, of its nature, be a community of Christians, nor is its function, except indirectly, to train professing Christians.'

The second passage is this :

> 'Religiously the school community must be one ; there is no room in the school for those unhappy divisions and controversies which disfigure religious life in the outside world.'

The first passage takes into account that members of staff are appointed, in County Grammar Schools, without reference to their religious beliefs; that children enter the school at eleven without reference to creed, and may even profess religions other than Christianity; that the children of parents who profess Christianity may have been taught the tenets of any one of a variety of Christian sects, and will have shown reactions varying from complete acceptance to resentful disbelief. The second passage states that the school must be a religious unity. Can the two passages be reconciled? The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possibility; but before proceeding it will be well to contemplate the full difficulty of the position. Note that the law allows children whose parents wish it to be withdrawn from School Prayers and from Scripture lessons : from all those activities, in fact, succinctly known to the Ministry of Education as Religious Instruction. Your ideal is nothing less than a unity; at the outset your two most promising weapons, daily worship and the Bible, are struck from your hands. Withdrawals may be few; but so far as official Religious Instruction is concerned the unity has gone.

It makes the problem sound a little more difficult to add that I believe, and the belief has been accorded wide official lip-service, that Religion should underlie the whole of a school's activities.

Asked many years ago what I considered to be the purpose of education, I replied, without originality but with complete conviction, 'To teach its disciples to distinguish good from bad and choose the good.' In every phase of school life, trivial or important, you can consult the definition and it applies. It occurred to me later that had I been asked the purpose of Religion I could, without violence to my own beliefs, have given the same answer. To both questions the answer is an over-simplification; nor, if the answer be accepted to both questions, does it equate education to religion. Each will connote its distinctive revelations, its appropriate institutions and techniques; but both will denote, to borrow Plato, 'the science of good and evil.' Belief in this community of purpose has been to me a sheet-anchor, and I know what a sheet-anchor is. If you have in mind storm and drift, anxiety and danger, with a single stabilizing factor amidst the successive buffets of aggression, then our mental pictures are sensibly alike. A sheet-anchor is a hope, but not a certainty. A clear understanding of this commands your continual vigilance. With certainty hope gives way to expectation, and vigilance is dismissed: certainty goes to its cabin, but hope stays on deck. When, in the realm of speculation, men profess certainty they may be right, but I grow afraid; nothing frightens me so much as the potentiality of confident error. I would have men listen eternally to Cromwell's plea: 'I beseech you in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken.' Professor Gilbert Murray says about religion:

> 'We must always remember two things about it: first, that the liability to error is enormous, indeed almost infinite; and second, that the results of confident error are terrible.' [1]

Contrast with this statement two passages from M. Jacques Maritain's *True Humanism*. Speaking of the future of Christianity in Soviet Russia, he says that we can believe in the possibilities of a Christian renaissance there 'if only its protagonists are sufficiently enlightened and open-minded on all things *except God*.' [2] Again, he says that it is normal

> 'that the coercive force of the State should come into play to protect the faith and the community against disintegrating influences; and this is not the least surprising when the consciousness of the community is vitally impregnated with *the same unanimous certitude*. It may even happen that the intervention of the State in such matters will moderate and curb the excesses of popular reaction; what more natural impulse to the crowd than to lynch the heretic.' [3]

[1] *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 8.
[2] *loc. cit.*, p. 62.
[3] *ibid.*, p. 173.

It is clear that we are fishing in troubled waters. For my own part I reject certainty and cling to hope.

'To distinguish good from bad and choose the good': I have said that this is an over-simplification; and it seems clear that any serious attempt to justify it will require nothing less ambitious than an outline of a philosophy of human activity. This activity it may be helpful to consider in a series of aspects, the first of which may be called the work-a-day world.

We are born into a community following, with minor divergences, typical pursuits by typical methods, offering a choice of satisfactions and imposing a variety of inhibitions, the whole conforming to a recognizable pattern. Into the fabric of this pattern is woven a Way of Life: a code of ethics, a system of morals, a form of religion, to which we accord a measure of acceptance high in word, not quite so high in deed. Ours happens to be a Christian community. But this work-a-day world requires here no detailed analysis; we are all familiar enough with the outward scene, and can pass on to another aspect of human activity. But we must hearken first to one clear note of warning: this is the world, or so it seems, in which things really happen, and is in consequence of prime importance. We forsake this world not so much at our own peril as at the peril of others.

In 1928 I was asked by the Editor of the *Climbers' Club Journal* to review Mr. Geoffrey Winthrop Young's book *On High Hills*. In the course of my survey I considered whether Mr. Young had vindicated the pursuit of mountaineering. I will quote a passage from my review:

> 'There have been many attempts to make out a case for mountaineering. Counsel endeavour to outweigh a *quid* of bodily discomfort and danger by a *quo* of comradeship, physical fitness, exercise of nerve and judgement, enjoyment of beautiful scenery, satisfaction of legitimate ambition, and what not; but to no avail. The appeal to reason is useless. Not a Portia, not a Daniel, could secure the acquittal of Mountaineering at the Bar of Commonsense. Mountaineering is not a matter of common sense; nor is the "Ode to a Nightingale," nor "Tristan und Isolde," nor a belief in immortality.
>
> 'Every man is the unwilling gaoler of a winged self, but most of us are fortunate enough to find some key with which we may release the prisoner on brief happy journeys. The key is often a humble instrument in itself. It may be books or music, golf or stamp-collecting; but by its aid we are able to open to the spirit a region where it may stretch its wings and re-create itself against the next period of incarceration. We all know these phases of release and revelation, when we would not exchange our draught of life for the mead-horn in Valhalla or nectar upon Olympus. For converts to our creed the key is love of mountains.'[1]

At that time I had not seen the implications of what I was saying. I begin to see them dimly now. It is not my purpose to

[1] *C.C.J.*, 1928, p. 227.

nalyse the sensations and emotions, to distinguish between them r even to consider whether they are distinguishable. Research pon the endocrine system suggests that every emotion is accom- anied by an appropriate physical modification. A ghost appears, ıe adrenal bodies secrete adrenaline into the blood-stream, you o pale and bolt with a velocity raised above the normal by the imulus of the adrenaline. But whether the order is ghost— hysical reaction—fright, or ghost—fright—physical reaction, is matter for the psychologists. For my purposes it is immaterial hether I cry because I am sad, or am sad because I cry; laugh ecause I am amused, or am amused because I laugh. The point that some interaction of the senses and emotions results in an esthetic experience, and it is to the world of aesthetic experience ıat I want to draw your attention, for in it all our satisfactions lie. oung and old, intelligent and unintelligent, we seek it with all ıe force of our purpose, and in it we dwell intermittently through- ut our lives. Our experiences there may be trivial or important: is the world in which we appreciate an ice-cream or César ranck's *Symphony in D minor*, in which we react with annoyance o a pin-prick or bitterest grief to a bereavement. Needless to say e seek only those experiences which we believe will afford us leasure or happiness—I need not distinguish or define—but for ıese we are unremitting in our search. The arts have since earliest mes been recognized as giving entry to this world; in the passage hich I quoted from the *Climbers' Club Journal* I ventured to ggest that sports, pastimes, and hobbies find their justification in esthetic experience. I had in mind aesthetic experience at a high evel. What I had then failed to perceive was the universality of ıis world: that the low-level experience of an ice-cream and the igh-level experience of a Symphony are of the same category. Of ecent weeks, with the preparation of this paper in my mind, I ave been particularly on the alert to notice the occurrence and uality of references to this world. It will serve my purpose to ive some examples; and had I not conscientiously limited myself o the books which happen to have been by my bedside in the last ew weeks I could have found apter examples. The point of this mitation is to suggest from the random nature of the books the niversality of awareness of aesthetic experience, and the similarity f the language which authors use to describe such experience.

Mr. H. D. Renner says of alcoholic drinks:

> 'The northern and eastern peoples have to thank the lack of sunlight in their climate . . . for the effort they have to make to build up a dream-world of pleasure and delight on the grounds of such drinks as their climate does allow them.'[5]

[5] *The Origin of Food Habits*, p. 150.

Mr. John Masefield's *New Chum*, a description of his experiences as a new cadet on H.M.S. Conway, would seem another unlikely hunting-ground; but in speaking of their love of dancing lessons, 'Surely,' he says, 'all the generosities of the soul come from the arts; and they alone bring life.'[6]

> 'At its best, it (music) enlarges the imagination of the soul; it leads to the border of the infinite and bids us gaze into it.'

This quotation is nearly a paraphrase of Plato, but actually occurs in a Foreword to Dr. F. J. Horwood's *Listening to Music*, and the words are those of Dr. H. J. Cody, President of the University of Toronto.[7]

In his essay on 'Swinburne as a Poet,' Mr. T. S. Eliot quotes from 'Atalanta' as follows:

> 'Before the beginning of years
> There came to the making of man
> Time with a gift of tears;
> Grief with a glass that ran. . . .'

He goes on to say: 'This is not merely "music"; it is effective because it appears to be a tremendous statement, like statements made in our dreams. . . .'[8]

Mr. W. S. Maugham's *The Razor's Edge* is a fascinating study of a man in quest of Reality. It is full of matter which would serve me, but three examples will be enough. In all three Laurence Darrell, the man in quest, is speaking:

> 'You can't imagine what a thrill it is to read the *Odyssey* in the original. It makes you feel as if you had only to get on tip-toe and stretch out your hands to touch the stars.'[9]

He describes the experience of a view at sunrise:

> 'The sun rose. I have no descriptive talent to paint a picture; I can't tell you, so as to make you see it, how grand the sight was that was displayed before me as the day broke in its splendour. Those mountains with their deep jungle, the mist still entangled in the tree-tops, and the bottomless lake far below me. The sun caught the lake through a cleft in the heights and it shone like burnished steel. I was ravished with the beauty of the world. I'd never known such exaltation and such transcendent joy. . . . I felt as though I were suddenly released from my body, and as pure spirit partook of a loveliness I had never conceived.'[10]

He and another character have been discussing the blessedness of union with God:

> 'It was all new to me,' he says, 'and I was confused and exalted. It was like someone who's lain awake in a darkened room and suddenly a chink of light shoots through the curtains and he knows he has only to draw them and there the country will be spread before him in the glory of the dawn.'[11]

[6] *loc. cit.*, p. 176.
[7] *loc. cit.*, p. viii.
[8] *Selected Essays* (1917-1932), p. 326.
[9] *loc. cit.*, p. 60.
[10] *ibid.*, p. 248.
[11] *ibid.*, p. 94.

Aldous Huxley, in *Grey Eminence*, discusses *The Cloud of Unknowing*, which he describes as 'a book for those already well advanced on the road of mystical education.' Explaining the unknown author's teaching, he says:

> 'If God is to be experienced as he is in himself, he must be loved with a pure act of will, unmitigated by discursive reasoning. There must be no vain and distractive attempt to comprehend what is in its nature incomprehensible. The work of the contemplative is to train himself in abstraction from all creatures, above all from his own feelings, wishes, memories and thoughts. He must "tread them under the cloud of forgetting," and, having done so, must beat "with a naked intent," a "blind stirring of love" upon "the dark cloud of unknowing" within which God as he is in himself is for ever wrapped from human sight.' [12]

All these passages have been references in language to sthetic experience. It is a long journey from the experience duced by alcoholic drinks to religious experience and the *via ystica*; but, low-level or highest-level, all are experiences in the me category, and this category is neither that of reason nor of nguage — the handmaid of reason. So far as the authors quoted tempt a description of aesthetic experience they employ the inruments of metaphor and analogy. No other instruments are ailable to them. We are all properly distrustful of sustained etaphor or pressed analogy; we even disdain them a little; and t it seems to have been overlooked that language can only undertke any important description of aesthetic experience by sustaing metaphors and pressing analogies. Is it fair to define metaphor describing one experience in terms of another? If so, it is as asonable to expect to get a description of music in terms of nguage as in terms of painting. If I were to hand pallette and ushes to a group of painters who had just listened to the Hallejah Chorus and ask them to paint their emotions they would all able to produce pictures and all of them would be different. heir pictures would be sheer metaphor, and their differences initable. In the same way, when we attempt to describe any sthetic experience in words our descriptions will be different, ey will be sheer metaphor, and the differences will be inevitable. nd yet nothing has more power to make us hurt and angry with ch other than these inevitable differences between our linguistic escriptions of aesthetic experience. At this point my meaning ust be nakedly clear: when you describe emotions in words you e smelling sights and hearing tastes. All these things can be luably done in metaphor, but never forget that it is metaphor.

Let me accept once more the accidental limitations of the same ooks and authors, and illustrate again:

> 'No whisky manufacturer can express in words what exactly the pro-

[12] *loc. cit.*, p. 54.

perties of his products are,' says Mr. Renner.[13]

'A God that can be understood is no God. Who can explain the Infinite in words?' says Mr. Somerset Maugham.[14]

'Ultimate Reality,' says Mr. Aldous Huxley, 'is incommensurable with our illusoriness and imperfection, therefore it cannot be understood by means of intellectual operations; for intellectual operations depend upon language, and our vocabulary and syntax were evolved for the purpose of dealing precisely with that imperfection and illusoriness, with which God is incommensurable.'[15]

I have proceeded again from low level to high level. Let it not be thought that this juxtaposition of the ridiculous and sublime belittles the sublime. They simply happen to belong in the same category. The errand-boy might say, 'I like to whistle while I work; it keeps me cheerful.' Of the Hallelujah Chorus, Handel exclaimed, 'I did think I did see all Heaven before me and the great God Himself.' Both are accounts in metaphor, one at low one at high level, of aesthetic experience. The errand-boy's whistle in no way detracts from the Hallelujah Chorus.

Let us remind ourselves of the relevant characteristics of this world of aesthetic experience that we have been examining. First: in it all our satisfactions lie. Secondly: experience may be from the lowest to the highest level. Thirdly: it is *sui generis*, and its category is not that of language. It remains to add three further characteristics. Fourthly: in it nothing ever happens; this is self-evident. Fifthly: it can as easily furnish evil as good experiences. Sixthly: it can profoundly affect the Way of Life and exercises tremendous driving force in the work-a-day world.

The fifth and sixth charactersitics can be illustrated jointly, and two examples will suffice. They are intended to be conceivable accounts, but do not pretend to be objective commentary upon history.

Hitler discovers that power, even in its contemplation, induces high-level aesthetic experience. This he gradually crystallizes in the category of language. He, and later his followers, are probably many of them genuinely unaware that they are mistaking metaphor for objective fact. A *farrago* of nonsense results: Germany personified; the Master Race; Aryan racial purity; Nietszche the Apostle of ethics-upside-down; Hitler the Führer, the Master of Destiny, the Vicar of God; Might is Right, and the World our footstool. Harnessed to the chariot are Oratory, Ceremonial, Music, Art and Architecture, all capable of inducing high-level aesthetic experience. Men and women, young and old, are gradually swept into the vortex; the mixture is terribly potent; frenzy of aesthetic experience succeeds frenzy, as the people are drawn into an ever-widening communion of fanatical intoxication. Stadium,

[13] *Origin of Food Habits*, p. 149. [14] *The Razor's Edge*, p. 236.
[15] *Grey Eminence*, p. 51.

anners, goose-stepping cohorts, bands blaring, the rhythm of eiteration, the Amplified Voice, and, in the limelights, the pale ace with the sweep of black hair. Heil Hitler! Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! Here is the Revelation of Revelations, the Ultimate Reality o die for which is to achieve Immortality; and so, in a welter of eeds of unnameable bestiality, and incredible intrinsic bravery, Germany dashes herself upon death and drags the world with her. I wonder what Germans make of it all now; now that the Walpurgis ight is done, and in the cold dawn they awake to the Great Hang-ver.

My second example I need not detail. It is this: you and I ave shared a great religious experience. We have recorded it in words and mistaken metaphor for fact. The records differ, but ach of us stands by his record to the death. I have the might, and ou are burning at the stake.

It is clear that high-level aesthetic experience has every bit as nuch power for evil as for good. How then can we curb the evil nd foster the good? If reason and language are not available as neasures — and I cannot over-stress that they are not — by what ard-stick can we measure? I suggest that we must turn to the Way of Life and the work-a-day world. We must agree what onduct is good and what is evil in the Way of Life, and note whether the aesthetic experience issues in good or evil. 'It matters ot what a man *does*,' said Martin Luther; 'it is what a man *elieves* that matters.' To me this is nonsense, and evil nonsense t that. If I speak of Faith and Works, by definition Faith issues n Works and Works proceed from Faith: the one is immanent n the other; but I can only know a man's Faith by his Works. 'In fact,' says Canon Streeter,

> 'the personality of the religious man is the only real expression of religion. The higher the religion the more stress it lays on an inward orientation of life of which the supreme external test is found in conduct. For Christ the essence of religion is to love God and to love one's neighbour; and of the genuineness of that love the test is, "by their fruits ye shall know them."'[16]

Once again my meaning must be nakedly clear: Faith is an out-ome of aesthetic experience, but in that realm reason and anguage have no writ that runs. To appraise Faith you must turn o Works; Works and Works alone can measure Faith — the rest s empty phrase-making. I do not seek to propound, let alone verride, any canon of aesthetic criticism. If enjoyment of jazz nusic debases the behaviour of its devotees, curb it; but curb it as ad morals, not bad art. If it is merely bad art, let the musical ritics see to it — a specialist's job.

[16] *Reality*, p. 40.

But how, you may ask, are we to judge between good and evil in the Way of Life? This introduces a third aspect of human activity: censorship, criticism, conscience. This is the world of reason and knowledge: science, history, geography, philosophy, languages, travel, and conversation are some of the contributors. All that goes to make up the informed and adjusted man or woman is grist to the mill. Amongst such men and women a very high measure of agreement can be reached: compare the teachings of the great religions. Such people are the collective conscience; but they are made up of individual consciences. Is conscience, then, the synthetic product of heredity and environment? I think not.

There comes a time when in spite of all I have been taught and read, in spite of all that has gone to my make-up, in spite of my certainty that I shall grieve my parents and distress my friends, something tells me that I must take some course other than they confidently expect of me. We all know the Voice: Inner or Outer, Immanent or Transcendent, or both — I do not know. These are metaphors. Mr. T. S. Eliot derides the Inner Voice as Whiggery, the right to do in vanity, fear, and lust exactly what we want to do.[17] Not so. It tells us to take with shrinking and apprehension the lonely road, the road we do not want to take. If any materialist or hedonist account of the Universe is true, you and I lose interest: the sooner done the better. I assert the power to choose, and to choose the course I do not want to take. In the last resort I am cut off from my kind; but not alone. I am left in blessed union with the In-Dweller. *Synderesis*, spark of individuality, God; does it matter? All are metaphors. But with the In-Dweller I can take counsel and return strengthened: to him I can make petition and be answered; feel towards him awe and worship; accord him thanksgiving and love. Proofs ontological, cosmological, teleological, these are interesting, but not necessary. To me the proof is direct apprehension — not in the work-a-day world of fact, but in the realm of spiritual experience. God is not of the category of scientific language; only metaphor can distantly approach that intimation of the Absolute. I hope that I would suffer all things to follow the persuasion of the In-Dweller. I would not suffer one twinge for a metaphor considered as a scientific statement.

Way of Life, aesthetic experience, conscience: this is the whole pattern that I call Religion.

But what has this to say about religion in a Secondary School? Just this: that here is the reconciliation I set out to seek, in this the unity that must be found. Can it be taught in a school? It is not so difficult as it may sound. But one suggestion first: never destroy a belief outright, however primitive; should you do this

[17] Vide *Selected Essays, The Function of Criticism*, pp. 29, 27.

en discord and disillusion follow. Let a new belief grow in ature to oust the old.

Once pointed out, all children accept aesthetic experience as n unembarrassing commonplace. They easily recognize its power the world around them, and the consequent urgency of judging hether it is good or bad. The rest is the business of fortifying nscience, and nothing taught in school seems to be wasted. It all lps. Examinations, the need for a good and useful career, the mmon currency of pedagogic goings-on, all fall quietly, and in ıe proportion, into place. A unity can be found, and the children emselves are the chief architects.

For me it happens to be natural to find the progressive pre-aration and its culmination in the Bible. Thought, example, aching, will derive thence, and often in its words. Study in cripture lessons, re-dedication at the daily service, are shared by e great majority; but even without them the unity remains, the ttern is not broken. I have yet to know the child who could not ear the Inner Voice or find a friend in Jesus.

Has this pattern a wider application? Way of Life; aesthetic perience; conscience: can mankind find high agreement? I g you to re-read Canon Major's *Basic Christianity*, from which would not subtract a single word.

A CHRISTIAN *NOVUM ORGANUM*

By the Rev. H. C. Snape, M.A., Rector of Skelton, Cumberland.

THE title selected for this paper is 'The Presentation of the Christian Religion.' It is, however, the intellectual presentation with which this paper is concerned, the claim which every religion makes for itself that it is no escape from reality which may in other counts give spiritual satisfaction, no myth which stimulates moral effort, but that it proclaims the truth about man, the world and God and lays hold upon reality.

The words truth and reality at once lead us to lofty heights of philosophic speculation where we should soon be befogged by nebulous phrases and ambiguous jargon. It is sufficient for the purpose of this paper to note that for the past fifteen hundred years the Christian religion has been presented as true on the assumption that every statement has a rigid meaning independent of the intention of the person who makes it and can be judged without considering its context or its relevance. Hence, it has been supposed, the Christian religion can be presented as a series of

statements formally bound together and embodying in precise form once and for all its eternal truths. Dogmas and creeds are conceived of as preserving the living religion of the spirit in a static form, like the dessicated specimens of the botanist or the mummies of Egypt. The business of the theologian is that of the curator of a museum. He must display his specimens to the gaze of his admirers and the curiosity of his pupils.

But the traditional conception of the part played by the intellect in the acceptance of any religion has been discredited (1) by understanding afresh how we actually do reason in human life and (2) by the success of the scientific method, which after all is only a refined form of the processes of everyday thought. No psychologist believes to-day that our mental processes are the outcome of the operations of a number of separate faculties such as will, intellect, feeling, emotion, desire. In our conscious states all these predispositions exist together with one or other of them predominant, so that we can sometimes be said to be reasoning rather than willing and at other willing rather than reasoning. The whole self is always active as much in thinking as in willing. In thinking we make assumptions, postulates, and hypotheses in the faith that observation and experiment will show them to be true, *i.e.* can be trusted. That our resulting formulae will always be true is a further act of faith. As Dr. Tennant says,

> 'Inductive science is founded on an act of faith, and belief in its deliverance has a subjective cause.'

Furthermore all real knowing is devoted to a purpose and satisfies a need. It seeks an answer to a real question born out of some one's life.

Life provides primarily the data for knowing; but life is made up of far more than our sense-impressions. There are desires, fears, ideals, purposes, emotions and sentiments, to name only a few of life's other ingredients. Out of these comes religion. For the purpose of my argument I will take the religious question for each of us as it was defined in F. C. S. Schiller's last published book, *Must Philosophers Disagree?*

> 'In what belief shall I find the overbelief, the supplementation and transfiguration of my workaday beliefs, which will interpret my experience for me and set my soul at rest?' (p. 310).

That overbelief is an act of faith, a postulate so far as it is a demand upon life, a hypothesis so far as it is a starting-point. It also is verified by experience, but by experience in the spiritual field, *i.e.* by the control which it exercises over the actions and passions of men, by its power to unify the self and to conquer all spiritual frustration.

Thus Dr. Tennant again says, and others have said before him,

> 'There is nothing unique in religious faith if it be such as described in the *Epistle to the Hebrews*: religious faith is psychologically of the same nature as that which underlies inductive science, and the only difference lies in the objects to which the faith refers' (p. 71).

th the sciences and religion begin with acts of faith and issue in ths which are established by trial and experience. The fundaental difference lies in the realms in which they work. All real nking has an ultimate reference to the world of our sense-pressions, but religion is concerned with the whole man, heart, l and mind, and in nothing less than life in all its fulness do we d our overbeliefs to be true or false, good or evil. Religion has intellectual aspect just because the world of sense-impressions ays such a large part in our lives.

If knowing is what an analysis of the scientific method shows to be, then it involves a revolution in the presentation of the ristian religion. No longer shall we seek to present a system of rmal truths sanctified by tradition, authorized by a book or a urch and therefore due to be accepted as the true doctrine. We all know that it is futile to revive ancient systems or to startle th paradoxical contrasts. Neither shall we seek to commend our igion solely on the ground of our own feelings of assurance that is true. The atmosphere created by emotional sermons and the citement of revivals may prove favourable to the transmission belief as a personal assurance, but without any logical proof it ll evaporate as soon as the spiritual atmosphere descends to the rmal temperature of ordinary life. On the contrary, that hypoesis which we make our own after cool reflection as it becomes creasingly verified by experience we warmly cherish. But 'It has t pleased the Lord to save men by dialectic,' said St. Ambrose. his was certainly true of the arid formalism of the Aristotelian gic; it is irrelevant to the apologetic which recognizes that the ellect never functions by itself in a vacuum.

Men accept the scientific method as true because it has brought rth such abundant fruit. The harvest indeed has been so rich at it is commonly thought that the only reality is what is 'sensed' d the only power available is control over material. Our primary peal should follow the same direction. Albert Schweitzer first red the native and then told him how the spirit of Jesus had ought him to Africa to do so. We must show that the fruit of r faith is found in power after its kind no less real than that oduced by the scientific method in the realm of matter. We rink from doing so because the spiritual harvest recorded by the story of Christendom is so lean compared with the claims which aristianity makes. For, to quote from Bishop Henson's Gifford

Lectures, *Christian Morality: Natural, Developing, Final*:

> 'If, indeed, the actual conduct of Christians be contrasted with their theoretical character, and the measure of their moral attainment be set against the Divine assistances to which they have claimed access, the spectacle presented by Christianity in every age, not excepting the first, must be allowed to be deeply disappointing. . . . The postulate of the Incarnation at one end of Christian history, and the current morality of Christendom at the other, suggests perhaps the gravest difficulty to faith which Christians have to reckon with.'

Nevertheless if the Christian apologist bears in mind the nature of the overbeliefs held by the greater part of mankind he can still, I think, confidently appeal to Christian fruits as a witness to Christian truth. For overbeliefs are for the most part at best debatable beliefs, *i.e.* not so far beyond question that they are as implicitly acted upon as explicity professed; often they are dishonest beliefs, *i.e.* formally professed and as formal professions vigorously defended, but in no wise colouring the habits and actions of their professors. Hypocrisy ever lurks in the sacred courts of religion. But where a belief has become so implicit and woven into the texture of a man's personality that no trial can destroy it, there we can observe its fruits and on them ask men to judge the belief. On that account, while we can justifiably discount the many grave discrepancies between profession and deed which the history of Christendom records, yet we may exhibit the visible fruits of our religion in the roll of Christian saints, martyrs and missionaries gathered out of all nations and of every age, to which the present contributes no less than the past. It is perhaps significant that in the entertaining argument by correspondence which Professor Joad and Mr. Lunn have conducted concerning the truth of Christianity, the latter scored one notable victory by Professor Joad's readiness to revise his estimate of the contribution of Christian works to European civilization.

But the lives of the saints are not the only fruits of religion. A religion, because it generates faith and hope, generates and augments life. It makes the self whole and conquers frustration. Wherever and whenever the Christian faith has been sincerely embraced it justifies the claim of its Founder, 'I came that they might have life and have it abundantly.' It regenerated Europe when the classical civilization was dying through the failure of its primitive polytheism to command respect and academic philosophies to provide faith and hope. It has proved a moral force and a new dynamic in Asia and Africa. In contrast, I think we could well indicate that it is just that faith in life given by religion which to-day our Western civilization so grievously lacks, with the consequent lack of concentration and ineffectual aimlessness which so often our political and social life betrays.

But of course to present the fruits of belief is not final but primary and basic. The sciences yield truth after their kind; but as we have learnt at great cost, they are morally and spiritually neutral. In contrary fashion our overbeliefs may yield fruits apparently luscious but ultimately poisonous, either because they are found to be morally evil, *e.g.* Nazism, or they prove inconsistent with the truths of the sciences which have been established independently by cognitive operations upon the data belonging to their own field of enquiry. The sciences act as purgatives to our overbeliefs. They do not of themselves give the verdict in the conflict between optimism and pessimism, between theism and atheism. But they do tell the atheist that the world is not utter chaos; they tell the theist that God does not govern the world by random interference. The sciences limit the nature of our overbeliefs, but within those limits they leave us free to choose.

Our choice depends upon the demands and cravings of our spiritual selves. Mankind has always asked for the help of a power favourably disposed to himself, sufficiently powerful that His good purpose for man will be realized against all opposition. That demand the Christian hypothesis meets in all its fullness, and neither disparity between profession and performance nor the most arid pedantry have been able to destroy the richness of its response. For Christianity proclaims that God helps and redeems with power, that God shares the sufferings of men, bears His responsibility for men's trials and woes and conquers with them. Its symbol is the Cross and the centre of its faith the Resurrection. Furthermore, its Incarnate Lord is not like the Buddha, a prince who renounced his throne, but the son of man from a humble home. That is the appeal of Bethlehem. Christians claim that God has revealed these things and done them through a historical personage, Jesus of Nazareth. Emmanuel is one of the dominant themes of the New Testament. This claim for Christianity was made in the third century by Tertullian in his treatise *De Testimonio Animae*, where he argued that the human soul in its ready response to the claims of the Gospel bears witness to the Gospel's truth. Bishop Butler repeated the claim fifteen hundred years later by calling Christianity a republication of natural religion.

It will be asked how can the Christian religion claim to be accepted as the true and final religion, when other religions may be consistent with the conclusions of the sciences and also may provide an answer to the spiritual cravings of men. I think that the answer is twofold: (1) that the scientific method itself is nothing less than the Christian attitude towards life applied in the cognitive sphere; (2) that religions themselves, when treated as facts for scientific study by the science of Comparative Religion, justify the

claims of the religion of Christ to be final and supreme.

(1) It is often assumed that the tolerant atmosphere of Europe in the latter part of the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth centuries, which proved so favourable for the growth of the sciences, issued from a lethargy resulting from the religious wars and sectarian fanaticism of the previous age. But the fever of intellectual activity for which those ages are distinguished needed something more than fatigue to stimulate it. The discoverers of the time were not only scientists but also professing Christians.

> 'The Christian religion itself' (to quote again from Bishop Henson's Gifford lectures) 'requires its professors to regard nature with reverence as the instrument of its Creator's self-revelation. At the same time, its sublime assumption that man is essentially akin to his Maker, that the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord . . . has wonderfully stimulated the higher human faculties and predisposed men to accept the revelations of science.'

It provided the belief that the world of the senses is favourable to control by the intellect of man. The marriage of Hellenic culture to Hebrew faith generated the scientific spirit by destroying the formalism of Greek philosophy, which yet at the same time provided a form for the intensely emotional dynamic of the Hebrew faith. Professor Raven has shown how it was the Christian faith which gave the scientists of the eighteenth century the stimulus and support for their quest. To the many young men and women who have learnt to accept the fabric of the natural sciences as the embodiment of all truth, the Christian apologist may persuasively point out that the beliefs of the sciences themselves are derived from the Christian belief concerning man and the world, and that, if these beliefs are accepted as true, there is a presumption that the overbelief which inspired them in its own sphere is also true.

(2) The science of religions is still in its infancy but it has made sufficient progress to show (*a*) that religion is an irreducible factor in the human soul; he who calls it an illusion has no reason to show why all the other activities of the spirit should escape the same condemnation; (*b*) that religions cannot be classified as true and false. All after their way are attempts to satisfy the same spiritual cravings. But they vary in the satisfaction they give, their power to augment our instinctive animal faith. They may be classified on that account as higher and lower. As Dr. Streeter pointed out in his Bampton Lectures, the only world religions are Buddhism, Mohammedanism and Christianity, and that the last is a synthesis of the richer elements of the other two.

To sum up, we begin by showing forth the fruits of our religion in the business of living when that religion is implicitly embraced; we go on to show its power to satisfy our deepest needs and spiritual cravings, and at the same time its reasonableness and

robability as an explanation of the world presented to us by the cientists. We proclaim her as the mother of the sciences and the ulfilment of the religions of mankind. This presentation is not o novel as we might imagine. At the very time when it might have een expected that the religion of Christ would be fossilized into code or a book, the spirit of Christ seemed to St. John to say,

> 'I have yet many things to say unto you but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when he the Spirit of Truth is come he will guide you into all truth.' 'If any man will do God's will, he shall know of the doctrine.'

he spirit of Christ ever calls us to fresh horizons; spiritual truth s discovered by the continuing experience of mankind. It is no ew thing for the Christian religion to need a change in its mode f affirmation. As Dr. Rashdall pointed out, Thomas Aquinas by is *Summa* turned the philosophy of Aristotle, which on its arrival n Paris in Arabic dress was regarded as a foe of the Christian aith, into its ally. In the same way we would make the scientific nethod the ally and support of our religion. To quote Dr. Rashall's own words:

> 'The work which Aquinas did for the Church of his day — the fusion of the highest speculative thought of the time with its profoundest spiritual convictions, the reconciliation of the new truths of the present with the kernel of truth embodied in a traditional creed — is a task which will have to be done again and again as the human mind continues progressive and religion remains a vital force with it. It will have to be done in a different spirit, by different methods and with very different results from those of the *Summa*.'

ristotle, once an ally, must not be allowed to remain a tyrant ho has made the argument for the richly human religion of Christ n arid and repelling formula. We would show our religion as omething very attractive and very precious, a faith which, as Dr. acks once wittily remarked, defends us rather than needs to be efended. Words and arguments alone cannot do that. Too often ne answer we receive to them is, 'Thou *almost* persuadest me to e a Christian.' Only ourselves, our characters and our lives, the eakest weapons in our armoury, can do that. As one of the most racious champions of liberalism, Alfred Fawkes, wrote:

> '"I am wiser than my teachers," says the Psalmist, because in spiritual things "there is neither speech nor language"; they are discerned spiritually — God manifests himself not to sight and hearing but inwardly to the conscience and the heart. That is why attacks on and apologies for religion, as a rule, miss the mark; it is neither injured by the one nor protected by the other. Produce them as you will, they do not come into contact with it; it is on another plane than theirs.'

EUGENICS AND CHRISTIANITY

By the Rev. J. P. Hinton, M.A., Vicar of Westbury, Wilts,
co-author of *Sterilization — A Christian Approach.*

Uncontrolled Eugenics

NINE plagues failed to stir the Egyptian people and government, but when their family life was affected by the removal of the first-born, they took stock of the situation and released the Hebrews from bondage. The darkness of unemployment, the thunder and lightning of war and the various economic pestilences of the last few generations, unlike the original plagues, have affected family life, and while in many cases the first-born has been removed, in others the first-born never appears at all. The situation has caused people furiously to think, and even the Government to take action. Often the Church is moving along the road in the opposite direction to the stream of refugees and is criticized for hindering the mass flight to Utopia. On this question of family life and eugenics, it would appear from a superficial glance that the Church is running with the crowd and there is a danger that what it has to say may be received without much criticism. All the more reason, therefore, that we should search our attitude on this problem with very great care. We shall in fact find that the Christian outlook varies in degree from, and is in some respects contrary to, general opinion.

In popular thought, eugenics is linked with conception control and little else; it may be more accurately described as the science of the production of fine offspring. To-day that is reflected in the concern about the decrease in the size of families and population, coupled with a general desire for the well-being of children. Christians have a direct concern with the latter point, but the desirability in many countries of increases of population and decreases of population is a relative one conditioned by the different circumstances in each country. There is no specific Christian reason why the Church should take up the cry for a larger population here, but there may be moral reasons partly accounting for a decrease which the Church should examine and explain.

This is an age of planning, and it is an undoubted fact that births are being planned in the majority of families. The Church can welcome planning in every sphere, for the only alternative to planning is not to plan: but she must examine the end to which the planning is directed and the motives which inspire it. Until

recently, population figures have been unevenly regulated by factors over which man has hitherto had little control — disease, poverty, war and undeveloped medical services. Technical developments have brought about a large-scale decline in the death-rate and 'stretched out' the population so as to mask the decline, not only in the birth-rate but, more important, the fertility rate. The greatest efficient cause for the declining birth-rate is another technical development, scientific contraception. It is true that the discovery of something new creates the desire for it, but this does not wholly account for the situation. For the moment we may accept the fact that scientific contraception is an efficient instrument, used by many people under the influence of tendencies of which they are often unconscious and which we must examine. Eugenics is an operative but uncontrolled factor in modern life; it has world-wide significance, but at present its design for living is no bigger than the individuals who plan their families according to their own whims.

Until fairly recently the Church has emerged from her Renaissance shell to express an opinion only when secular tendencies have already crystallized into accepted ways of life. Eugenics has so great a scope, is fraught with such important results and touches so closely much that is a primary concern of Christians, that the Church ought to speak clearly on the subject and assist in shaping the eugenic plan which is most certainly being shaped now by expediency. So far eugenics has been almost entirely negative, whereas it should emphasize a planned parenthood, whereby children are born and brought up in a relationship of love which is firm-founded and enduring, wherein they are nurtured in truth and are likely to develop into spiritually cultured, mentally alert and physically fit adults. This would mean preventing births in conditions where these qualities are unlikely to be fulfilled. There is no eugenic plan at present which even attempts to work on these lines; what might be good stock is unborn, while people less fitted for parenthood on eugenic lines are not capable of planning their families and the less good stock therefore multiplies. In a declining population this is bad from any point of view. All men, whatever their deficiencies, are the children of God; but in holding fast to this truth the Church must not, by its uncertainty about eugenics, be forced into the untenable position of having to defend the falsity that it is God's will that only some people should be born deficient. 'To be alive unto God' was an early Christian definition of human personality; life, in its most abundant form, is God's will for all. A scientific method which enables eugenics to work towards this end must not be denounced by the Church simply because it is new or capable of being misused.

Sex and Self

Contraception, emancipation of women, late marriages, financial strain, housing and other factors are thought to be reasons for married couplies having their private eugenic plan. No doubt all these factors have a bearing, but there are profound social tendencies which contribute to a population decrease as well as to other disturbances in the social organism.

The Freudian school and its following was unbalanced because it interpreted too much in terms of sex. A stratum of Christianity, influenced by Hellenism, also identified sensuality with sin, whereas the classical line of Christian development regarded sensuality as a consequence of sin. When people no longer determine the meaning of life by reference to God, they attempt to find what they believe to be the true fulfilment of themselves in the pursuit of pleasure and power. Instead of losing their lives in the Source and End of their being, they attempt to save their lives by enthroning the self, which becomes dominant. Man 'worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator' and 'God gave them up unto vile passions.' The deified self then uses God-given instincts for its own ends, and this misuse by sinful man does not bring satisfaction. He attempts, partly at least, to lose himself in the love, worship or service of other-than-self. Man's disconnection from God, the true centre of his worship, reinforces his urge to self-love and, at the same time, the worship of other-than-self. This alternating rhythm manifests itself in many activities of human experience but finds a most vivid expression through sex. Sex is not, *per se*, sinful, but man, in attempting to escape from the contradictions of his nature, caused by his separation from God, brings sin into his sexual life, as he is liable to bring it into all his other activities, economic, scientific and personal relationships. The supposed modern consciousness of sex is not really modern. Many sexual aberrations are better understood if approached from this view-point of the frustrated self seeking escape from the broken harmony of a sinful personality. Scientific contraception, therefore, is simply a discovery which can be misused like other inventions, and with the same barren results.

The Family

The family is not an isolated unit standing outside the social fabric; it is subject to the social forces of which it is part and which swirl around it. Technical progress is always liable to be accompanied by moral blindness, and technical success has freed man from some moral scruples and given his inherent self-love freer rein. The explosive energy of the Renaissance and the ensuing

scientific successes were due to man's recognition of, and obedience to, a pattern of nature; as Francis Bacon put it, 'Nature can only be controlled by being obeyed.' But man's failure to use his successes is due to his failure to recognize a profounder pattern, which frames all his thought and activity. The difference between the Christian and the secular way of life is absolute. The Christian's personal relationships are guided by his relationship with God, to Whose judgement he subjects his character and motives. The Christian's struggle is with his own nature, in co-operation both with his fellows in the worshipping community and, where possible, with those outside it. Secular man, on the other hand, has few moral restraints, therefore the existence or otherwise of God makes to him no difference to the laws of nature. Rendering the meaning of life in terms of the pursuit of pleasure and power he thinks that the world is for his exploitation, and to this end the perfecting of his technique takes precedence over any questionings of his own character or aims. His struggle is with a vague, impersonal thing called 'life' and with any of his fellows who impede his progress; he co-operates with his fellows in so far as it is necessary or advantageous. He is puzzled and resentful when his travail falls on his own head.

Many generations have been progressively imbued with this 'utility' attitude to life, which is further strengthened by another tendency. The objectivity of science has invaded the sphere of personal relationships. Persons have become individuals to be observed and studied; they are expected to yield predictable and measured results, if the proper social, economic, scientific and industrial manipulations are correctly applied. This disparagement of personality has also weakened those natural groupings of persons which have hitherto played the most important part in the moulding of personal character and outlook. The companionship of people, simply for the reason that their association was a natural, gladdening and satisfying thing, is now suspect, unless a more tangible and profitable result is evident. High in the list of casualties here is the association of the family. The result of all this is that two great landmarks stand out in modern life, the State and the Individual. Between these two, ranges a vast no-man's-land wherein people spend the greater part of their lives, still retaining a ghost of their personality and attempting to find a meaning in life from the old, ruined landmarks of family and cultural association which still remain there.

For many people, family life no longer offers the rich, satisfying content which it is capable of yielding. In no-man's-land the sense of neighbourliness is slipping away, although some show that they are conscious of their emptiness by snatching at the

straws of 'togetherness' which the Services or Civil Defence have offered. The family is in miniature what the community is in large, and the family finds iself in no-man's-land through the influences mentioned above, and partly from other factors which we have not time to examine. The break-up of the pattern which has hitherto contributed so largely to the preservation and development of personality is not properly realized because most people still consciously aim to live the good, full, personal life. Character and outlook, however, as the late Dr. Temple stressed, are formulated, not so much by conscious aims, but by the general atmosphere of thought in which we live, move and have our being. The natural associations of persons, including the family, which have now disintegrated in various degrees, generated this atmosphere and there is little else to take their place except mass-society.

The tenor of life for many people is set by the pressure of social ideas and circumstances, which operate upon them without conscious check, so that, for instance, their attitude to family life, and its part in the community, is something they drift into. A eugenic plan which is to be worthy of Christian consideration must, of necessity, first take into account these important points. A survey which deals with the drudgery of home, the emancipation of women, movements of industrial population, divorce, housing, unemployment and education is a little too near the surface. Each factor, however, is a contributory, and their relative importance needs to be weighed, although we cannot do it here.

So far we have seen that man is not so much an over-sexed person as a self-ridden individual who, because of his sinfulness, can corrupt any of his activities. Man falsely believes that his technical achievements justify his pride — they certainly feed his self-love — but in fact they mask his true condition and his finiteness. With the simulation that God is dead, anyhow that His ways are past finding out, egoistic man, whatever his expressed aims, is free to exploit a very material world. Without God, however, persons can easily be de-valued into 'things' only distinguishable from the multitude of other things in the universe by the power of human knowledge In spite of his trumpeted greatness, man is uneasily aware of his personal insignificance. Precariously poised between two concepts, the State and the Individual, he can find no ultimate concept worthy of his allegiance, while the natural grouping of persons, which supplied satisfying content to his forefathers' lives, is going dead on his hands, unless he can infuse new life into it.

Bred in this atmosphere, man is inclined to adopt, not merely a negative attitude to life, but an anti-social attitude. 'Each for all and all for each,' as the elephant cried when he danced among

the chickens. And everybody else seems to be the elephant. The spiritual associations and sanctions which are the essence of family groupings have been weakened by the temper of the age, so that the family cannot effectively withstand disrupting influences and may even become an un-social institution.

Marriages based on mutual admiration only, endure so long as mutual satisfaction remains. A private eugenic plan can scarcely be called a plan at all where contraception is accepted without a thought. In a self-seeking age ambition all too often decides that children are an encumbrance; later, if security is achieved, the desire for children is often frustrated because fertility has declined. That is not eugenics. To achieve or maintain a higher standard of living generally means limiting the number of children. The man who has a quiverful is rather expected to explain himself than to be congratulated. When children are decided on, their spacing and number are apt to be determined, not by the basic needs of the family, but by the competition of social position and the accepted and uncriticized necessity that their education must be better than that of their neighbours' children. These embellishments have assumed so great an importance that their relative value in promoting happiness is overlooked. Higher economic standards of life do not necessarily advance true moral well-being. There is a danger that the family shall be regarded, not so much as part of the social fabric, but as a self-contained unit which shall carry itself to greater heights on the shoulders of the community. The detachment of families from the context of neighbourhood and social life which they ought to nourish, and by which they in their turn are nourished, is illustrated in *Theology* (August, 1945; Rev. R. C. Thompson):

> 'The modern citizen may be in business in Lombard Street, have his home (where he sleeps) in Highgate, spend a good deal of his leisure at the firm's sports ground at Chingford, and most of his week-ends with his girl friend at her home in Ealing. At the end, after they have lived and brought up a family in various suburbs, none of which differs from another suburb in glory or anything else, they will be laid to rest in the vast anonymity of a bright new municipal cemetery.'

This makes a dark picture; admittedly the shadows are deeper and the outlines more clear-cut than is commonly discerned to-day, but it would be false to deny that such a picture is being drawn.

The State

We have considered some of the effects of the Individualism of our age; our survey would be incomplete if we ignored the State's attitude. Man's self-love expresses itself through his misuse of property, personality and sex: the effective action of the State is to attempt to regulate such disorders. The State does

not necessarily act on moral grounds, although its actions may be moral. For instance, extra-marital intercourse is discountenanced because the consequent increase of venereal disease is prejudicial to the general good, while an anti-social attitude which depresses the poplation rate is dealt with because it may weaken the State in the future. A position has now arisen when the State feels that the poulation must be increased, or at least stabilized, and its efforts to this end *might* be called a eugenic policy; if it is, it is a very rough and ready plan. There is direct and indirect legislation designed to conserve and increase the child population. Ante- and post-natal clinics, extended medical and health services, home-helps, greater education facilities, school meals and milk, housing and family allowances, all serve their part in this connection.

From the nature of the situation, the State will achieve less than, and in some respects the opposite of, what it intends. It is not simply a question that children cannot be born and reared as a duty, whatever the incentives, but that for the most part State legislation only expresses the prevailing outlook of the people. Moreover, however good and wise the legislation may be, there is always the possibility than man by his sinfulness will stultify enactments made for the good of the community by using them to his own advantage. It is noteworthy that while social legislation for the general good is on the increase, individuals are less tolerant of the needs and the good of their fellows. To say that social legislation weakens personal and family responsibility may be a true statement of fact, but that is not necessarily a sound reason for decrying it. It may be not the legislation which is at fault but the people for whom it is made. Beneficent social legislation should be welcomed, but the fact is that the nourishment thus supplied by the State feeds the disease rather than the patient. Spiritual disorders cannot be dealt with by laws, even if they are very good laws.

The State itself suffers from some of the disabilities which it seeks to cure. In many measures the family is theoretically the social unit, but in practice there is often a failure to act on this sound principle. Not enough co-operation is sought from parents. That is sometimes the parents' fault, but oftentimes denotes the failure of social service administrators to evoke the sympathetic response of the families with which they deal. Notoriously, in the days of the Means Test, the State fostered an anti-social attitude and the break-up of families. Parental authority declines as national and industrial controls range more widely over the lives of young people, as for instance in the higher school-leaving age and organizations for spare-time activities. Furthermore, the ability of the family unit to give a satisfying content and meaning

to life and to provide a training ground for personal relationships depreciates still further. The inability of the State to insulate itself from the temper of the time is revealed in its attitude. It has been observed that one of the characteristics of to-day is to treat people so objectively that they are regarded as 'things' which can be manipulated to gain the desired end. The State exhibits this trait when it makes enactments designed to increase the population. The 'things,' whose habits have been under observation, after due manipulation are expected to produce the desired result. The outlook for a eugenic policy run on these lines is not hopeful.

The truth is that a new social purpose and consciousness are required, and administration by itself cannot bring this into being. Ultimately they can only be created by persons and groups of persons who are fired with a purpose which, although it embraces it, is far greater than the immediate end in view. The State's position, however, is by no means negligible. It cannot bring about a fundamental change in the lives of people, but it can make or mar the conditions which may be the decisive factor whether the change is long delayed or not.

The Way of Fulfilment

The Church's survey of eugenics is necessarily far-flung, for she has a deep insight into the age-long needs and maladies of man. Parenthood is often decided by issues of health, finance, housing and various other factors, and the remedial measures for these must be supplied by the respective agencies, including the State. These remedies, however wisely ordered, cannot be fully operative until there is a radical change in outlook regarding family life and children. This is a task for which the Church alone is peculiarly fitted. In planning for the welfare of future generations, for that is what eugenics really amounts to, the Church would have to baptize with the Spirit of God manifold areas of modern life. In so doing the Church's activity would be to the benefit of the State, but a eugenic policy would not be formulated for this reason. The Church's witness and obedience is to God, and she is truly effective in all earthly work because she transcends human society. 'My kingdom is not of this world.' Thus, the Church emphasizes that children should be born in love because they are really desired; in consequence, she also needs to stress that every effort should be made to ensure that whole and healthy children and not unfit ones are born, from the motive that that is God's will for all His children, and not because fit children are a greater asset to the State. Also the Church counsels that children should normally be planned in every marriage, because the desire for and delight in children is a natural characteristic of our God-

given human nature; 'it is implanted by God.' The population might increase as a result, but the Church has not the State's concern about that. Again, the Church enjoins fidelity in marriage, not to preserve the morals of the country, but because marriage is a sacramental union and 'becoming one flesh' is a spiritual reality which necessitates an exclusive and abiding union. Obviously where the spiritual reality is not observed the necessity seems unnecessary. Hereby artificial insemination stands condemned; it is artificial, it has no spiritual background or reality.

The great hope in the present situation is that the Church stands in no-man's-land with all other voluntary associations, but, unlike them, she is filled with a purpose greater than herself. She unites things earthly and heavenly in herself and does not confuse means with ends; she is, therefore, able to do what the State cannot do, gather the 'things' which modern society turns out and, by the power of God, redeem them to their proper status as persons, fitted for communion and fellowship with God, and for real personal relationships with one another. In this Divine purpose the family is an essential part, and the Church must not therefore shirk the corollary of her task; she must affirm that a eugenic policy needs Christian guidance and she must give it. Only the Church can be the absolute safeguard that the means which modern technical society evolves shall be used for a true end, the birth and development of persons who shall be enabled to reach their eternal destiny, 'to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever.'

If a eugenic policy develops without the guidance of the Church the result is likely to be disastrous. Stockbreeders breed cattle on eugenic lines. They have an end in view; they can define a good cow and they plan accordingly. Is the ideal man to be planned for humanity while the Christian Church stands aside and says nothing? A sick humanity is in no condition to define 'the good man.' In a materialistic and egoistic age, the Church must stress that 'behind the ebb and flow of things temporal stand the eternal realities.' The Church must stipulate the conditions which are necessary in family and social life. Thereby the prevailing ideas which unconsciously influence people's assumptions, and the current opinions which shape their decisions, shall be such that they grow ever more sensitive to the moral and spiritual realities necessary for the development of any soul to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.

Such an analysis stresses the dark side. We know that many homes are good and that there are many hopeful factors, but we have not dwelt on them. That is precisely what happens in conversation and newspapers. When two or three are gathered together they talk about the latest family casualty. The public are aware of

he existence of good, well-established homes, but they almost xclusively publicize the bad ones. It is one of those seemingly mall things which play a big part in moulding outlook. The good hings that are taken for granted need stressing now. It is not anciful to suggest a whispering campaign, so that we train our- elves in ordinary conversation and thought to have the good home, he good person, the good life as the matter which is uppermost n our minds. A new social awareness, a renewed sensitiveness to he things of the spirit, a new appreciation of the things that are ood, can only come about when we determine that people shall ecognize the bad, not because it is pointed out to them, but be- ause they know the good and have a standard of comparison. Moreover, the families that are 'good' should spread the infec- ion. In all families there is needed a clearer realization that they ave a duty to the community. Some Christian families could do uiet and very effective work in their locality among the newly- arried couples and young mothers. An informal, personal elationship between families would be better than organizing for is specific purpose, and the Church should facilitate such ontacts.

Furthermore, the Church needs to think and speak more ecisively regarding scientific contraception. As the Bishop of outhwell writes :

> 'If we compel sincere men and women to import shame, evasion and subterfuge into their most intimate relationships, how can we hope to Christianize home life, or to construct a Christian social order from its foundations in the home upwards ?' (*Relevance of the Church*, p. 167).

terilization has also been the subject of a Government report; he prejudice of a minority and the ignorance of the majority of eople on the subject have left the enlightened proposals of the rock Committee unexamined by most people. Scientific contra- eption has been compared with the discovery of the printing ress : such a powerful new factor in society, which is available o almost everyone, needs to be used with the greatest sense of sponsibility and with a far greater reverence for life and person- ity than at present. The Churches have admitted the principle, hich needs implementing with the wisest guidance.

Compared with the catholicity of the Church, modern society ears a decided air of provincial nationalism. Eugenics cannot e a plan for western civilization alone. The Church must speak gorously for all the races of mankind. The time has come when ey must be included in this discussion.

The Church deals with the two great realities of human exist- nce, God and mankind. She may often be able to foresee the ilures which result from human plans and organizations, but she

has no right to stand aside and pervade the air with scepticism. She must bring the power of God into the affairs of men. Her thought and activity often have to be carried on at a deeper level than a given problem sometimes indicates. That is why the usual topics included in a survey of the Church's task, such as marriage preparation, education of children, instruction groups, we have not touched on. They are all spheres of action, as, on a different plane, are the State's remedial measures. The fact presented is that present-day eugenics is operating in a negative direction: it is one feature of man's technical advance, but is simply working on a private utility basis, serving the self-centredness of man, from which the State also is not free. As a new science, it has great potentialities which can be used for the good life when we recognize clearly that the issue raised is a spiritual one. Eugenics is concerned with the well-being of God's children, but only the miracle of redemption can recreate man in the image of God. At the same time there is no science, no knowledge, no sphere of activity of man which cannot be used for the purpose of God. They are all ways of fulfilment, which must be so used that ultimately they bring the families of men to kneel in the family of God.

CHRISTIAN UNITY: ITS NATURE AND METHOD

By C. J. Wright, B.D., Ph.D.

THE driving-force behind a truly Christian movement towards Unity is not the desire for theological or dogmatic finality; nor is it the quest for ecclesiastical aggrandizement, or even efficiency; nor is it the compulsion inherent in peril and difficulty; nor is it the love of a compromise based on expediency. It is the highest and deepest service of the whole nation in a day of urgent need and beckoning opportunity. The revived moral and spiritual life of the nation is essential to the continuance of its vitality and to its enlarging contribution to mankind. And if history teaches us anything it is that a revived Church is necessary for a revived nation. This means, as far as the issue before us now is concerned, that a truly and Christianly re-united Church is demanded, both for the essential harmony of our people and for its increasing ministry of Unity to humanity at large. The quest for Unity in the Church is the manifestation — and at its deepest level — of the whole quest for Unity of our age.

Much of our theological and ecclesiastical endeavour after Unity in the period between the two phases of the one world-war, while inspired by deep and anxious concern and instinct with charitable sentiment, has led nowhere. As Kellogg pacts could not solve the political problems of the world, so neither could our Lausanne and Edinburgh Conferences with their united affirmations heal the divisions of the Church. Both the international and the ecclesiastical endeavours were sincere : and both failed because they stopped short of action. In other words, they were instruments of comfort and not of truth, of self-escape not of self-healing. Both belonged to that sad and tragic era when we felt but did not see, when we thought but could not act, an era when the Church faithfully reflected the disordered soul of the nation. No doubt, however, in the over-ruling Providence of God, such Reunion Conferences helped to open our eyes and have assisted the decisions soon to be taken. A short time ago I saw a cat pursuing its tail. No sooner was the tail found than lost; and eventually, dizzy with the circular pursuit, the cat rested awhile and looked round for a more fruitful occupation. I leave the application to the truthful and the generous. . . . If we can but *lose ourselves* as members of Christ's Church in the service of the world we shall progressively achieve the right solution of those perplexing and vexing problems belonging to the Faith and Order of the Universal Community of all Christian people. 'For he that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it.' Or, as in our Lord's Johannine beatitude, 'If ye know these things blessed are ye if ye *do* them.'

It is well here to recall that fateful Friday morning, September 1, 1939, when the Girton Conference was brought to an untimely end by the German attack upon Poland and we were hurtled away to new and more urgent duties. It then seemed to some that our common endeavour to promote a fuller and more Christian understanding of the whole situation confronting the Church had been summarily interdicted, if not indeed thwarted. I will not now recall *the act* by which the Conference expressed faith in Christian Unity — a Unity, necessarily, both in Word and Sacrament. I must, however, recall the prophetic word — alas, it could not be spoken — of the then Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich: for until that Conference no such forthright statement from one in such a position of teaching and administrative responsibility had come within my ken.

> 'The essential common element among Christians is the possession of a common ideal, the effort to possess it and to grow in the possession of it, the effort to make that ideal prevail — the ideal of the Christian life and the possession of the Christian spirit. These are the essential things that unite Christians. A Comprehensive Church must consist of all who

> profess and call themselves Christians. In the face of our opponents and in the face of our great need, how small must seem the insistence on points of difference in order, in type of ministry, of the character of our services and of our theological position — tithing mint and rue and cummin rather than the weightier matters of the love of God and of the Spirit of Jesus and of the brotherhood, the eternal things that really matter.'

The Bishop then went on to plead that

> 'the most important step towards unity that can be taken is the full recognition of one another's ministries as legitimate ministries in the Church of Christ, and the Sacraments administered by such a ministry perfectly valid, the consequence of such a recognition intercommunion whenever it may be desired.'

I. The Problems.

From that point where are we now? Six years of unprecedented war are behind us — a war which means, above all else in the Divine over-ruling of history, that *God wills Unity*. The 'problems' of Christian Unity remain the same, for wars do not solve these, but only teach us to feel them more deeply so that we may confront them with 'truth in the inward parts.' Thus this problem of Unity has increased to the point of a categorical imperative. It springs out of our whole inheritance; and, being involved in the very constitution of personal life, is intellectual, emotional and volitional — three inseparables and indivisibles. The problem, however, is magnified into the kind of 'impossibility' written of in the Gospels by its vast institutional solidifications and embodiments. This is a 'mountain' that 'faith' — and 'faith' only — can remove. For without 'faith' these so solid walls are too much for us: this so rapid stream bears us away and laughs at our puny efforts to pull against it: this so intransigent heart of man mocks all our endeavours after reconciliation, and — like the Nazis — would rather commit suicide than abate its proud pretentions.

I do not, I think, underestimate the *theological* nature of the problem when I express the conviction — made irresistible during our 'ecumenical' quest of the last two decades — that 'intellectual' obstacles to Unity are like a long-prepared Siegfried line of pill-boxes, tank-barriers, and booby-traps. These barriers to present progress were constructed by those who felt themselves called to defend some dear fatherland of the speculative mind and the spiritual abode, as they believed, of needy and perplexed people committed to their protection from the assaults of a doubting world. Before there can be any real advance towards Unity in essential mind these intellectual defences will either have to be voluntarily removed or circumvented by new weapons of the Spirit. The removal is unlikely, and probably undesirable. The circumvention — or, I would rather say, the transcendence — of

theological barriers only awaits our spiritual insight, and is an expectation completely consonant with all we know of the movements of human history. For the Spirit of God is not dead, nor is He asleep. In unanalysable and unpredictable ways He is operating in the mysterious depths of human personalities as well as of corporate societies.

I cannot here trace, even cursorily, the Unity movement of the last twenty-five years. It is sufficient to say that the famous and valuable Lambeth declarations of 1920 have so far issued in no practical scheme for manifesting the organic Unity then and there proclaimed to exist. Much has since been helpfully written and said; such a Council as the British Council of Churches—itself a branch of the World Council of Churches—has been formed. But all this is not enough, at least for those who at Lambeth declared:

> 'We acknowledge all those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, and have been baptized into the Name of the Holy Trinity, as sharing with us membership in the universal Church of Christ which is His Body.'

It is not enough, for the very obvious reason that some disciples of Christ will not *pray* with others, while *Holy Communion* is still both the centre and the perpetuation of our divisions. No more is it enough than was the famous *Colloquium Charitativum* of 1645 at Thorn in Poland, with members of different denominations praying fervently in different rooms.

During those years of collapse, years when healing and constructive action were interdicted by our terribly enfeebled spirits, we looked everywhere for light except from a disinterested study of the New Testament and from a courageous application of its principles to the present situation. Some rationalized their enfeeblement into 'a refusal to impair the Apostolic Faith and Order,' others into 'a refusal to sell the denominational pass,' still others into a 'love for theology' (that is, the theology of the cloister, or the debating chamber, or the study). How difficult and now painful it is to awake to the fact that we have loved too much the wrong things! How difficult to recognize that much denominationalism and sectarianism is Mammon in disguise! How painful to acknowledge in the heart that much 'theology' is scepticism with a self-deceiving cloak! No one likes to be robbed of his clothes. And the padded-cell is easy, the mountain track is hard. Much of our ecumenical reporting during those years was ecclesiastical and theological evasion. We didn't really want to do anything about our disunity. We were tortured by an inner conflict between the receding vision of a truly Christian Unity and our inherited loyalties. Thus we allowed ourselves to be bogged in discussions which we knew in our hearts were really irrelevant, and to be under the spell of Circumlocution Conferences of

fraternity which drowned the voice of conscience as it insistently kept saying that *doing* is the test of *believing*.

Thus the basic problem of Unity in the Church is the problem of unity within our own personalities. We are divided within, and so cannot heal the disunities we have inherited and have sought to perpetuate. The situation defeats us because we ourselves are inwardly defeated. If we are 'theologians' we have for so long been intimidated by Gospels of Despair that we cannot sound the authentic note of Christian Hope. We cannot make up our minds what we ought to do because we cannot decide what we really believe. The true and the false in our emotions remain indistinguishable. The warring constituents of our minds forbid the integration of dynamic faith. The times call, but we cannot or will not answer — or we look up old text-books for answers. Progress will remain impossible unless the poverty, the lethargy, the determined dogmatism which belong to our inmost souls is overcome. For our troubles are too deep-seated to be cured any longer by incantations. 'Ye cannot serve God *and* Mammon.'

Thus we are bound, bound by loyalties to sectional heritages, and bound by less worthy fetters. We refuse to adventure into a national Unity which, we fear, will imperil our fetters. The highest and deepest qualities of this dear old nation are kept in chains — its sane and balanced spirituality; its wise and tolerant comprehensiveness where superstition is not involved; its experimental, if not always firmly integrated, philosophy of life; its intuitive feeling for the meaning and movement of history; its commonsense devotion to *action* both as the real criterion of a person's belief and as the only way by which progress in any realm is possible.

In the over-ruling Providence of God, in spite of our separations, nay in consequence of them, we are where we now are. With the era of the Puritan and the Methodist separations we emerged into the nineteenth century when, whatever its deficiencies, the national Church renounced the delusive freedom of yet further separations. The Oxford Movement of the 'forties created acute problems but was not allowed to sunder yet further our national inheritance. For that we thank God. And while the new knowledge — of the universe, of the Bible, and of the history of the Church's dogmatic and institutional life — which poured upon our nineteenth century fathers occasioned bewilderment and often deep distress, the main decisions of the national Church did not interdict inquiry but rather pointed forward to the coming era of healing and integration.

Noblesse oblige: which, being interpreted, means the impulsive power of a noble heritage which is deeper than we fully understand.

I. The Task and the Steps before us, and the Indispensable Convictions.

What then is the task before us, and what the practicable steps? To no one living in time is it given to see clearly the whole form or institutional shape of the future re-united Church, yet our insight into our task and our immediate duty springs from a few basic convictions. What are they?

First, that *God wills Unity*. The inadequate expression of the mediæval conviction that 'Theology is the Queen of the Sciences' must be renewed and revived in a modern and worthier setting. For God is Source, Inspirer and Goal of all our human values, ideals and endeavours. 'In the beginning God'; 'I am the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord.' The only 'humanism' which will inspire us to endure in the service of brotherhood is that which is seen to be rooted and grounded in Eternity. Without such a vision our endeavours will defeat themselves: for they will run counter to the constitution of the universe itself, which is neither self-created, nor self-directed, nor even self-annihilating. Metaphysics are unavoidable to those who really think: and, as was said of John Fiske by a positivist, you cannot make the slightest concession to metaphysics without ending in belief in God and Immortality.

I must begin there. There is nowhere else possible — as every Hebrew Biblical writer knew, from the author of *Genesis* i to the Johannine evangelist who consummated that Hebraic scriptural heritage. We cannot think of Unity without thinking of God, any more than we can think of Brotherhood without thinking of Fatherhood. Either our vision will slay our disunity, or our disunity will banish our vision. Nor can we move towards a goal unless we rise above the sterile aimlessness of merely clever analysis: as a Lancashire business man said in conversation the other day to a friend of mine (speaking about the Nazis and their conduct of their war), 'They were too clever, and that's where God *tricked* them.' A basic, if hidden, atheism is revealed in all self-centred cleverness: it is blind and leads to the pit: it repudiates the *moral* basis of all true thinking as of all true action, and so the heavens themselves laugh with a great, though compassionate, derision.

Every impulse toward Unity will disintegrate into factious and sectarian argument, or into spurious agreement, unless it is inspired and controlled by the vision of the Living God, Self-revealed in Jesus Christ as the One Divine Father of all the children of men, and ever-operative by His Spirit in the movements of history and of all truly human aspiration and achievement. Since Unity has its Source, Inspiration and Goal in the Nature and Purpose of God, His Church, called to incarnate that

Nature and Purpose, must guide and inspire humanity by her own Unity to the haven where we would be.

Second, that *this Unity cannot be imposed*: it must be *seen*, and first, probably, by those who will inspire others also to see. That is, it is not a totalitarian dictatorship. It is a Unity indwelt by what the philosopher calls 'the principle of personality.'

Our vision of the Living God necessarily includes *a vision of man* — man made in the image of God, called to be, in spite of his finite frailty and disobedience, a sharer in the Nature of God and in the service of His Eternal Kingdom. Without this vision, the zeal of the natural man — both in State and in Church, both in the things of Caesar and the things of God — for exploiting the frailties of his weaker brethren to mundane ends will achieve, not Fellowship in the Spirit, but Stagnation and Death in the Flesh: not the adventurous quest of a school, but the sordid ease of a prison: not the recuperating rest of a caravanserai, but the false security of a fortress — with the mighty and the clever in the seats of authority, worshipping Evil Power in their hearts.

Third, that *the Visible Church must be more worthy of Her Eternal Mission.* No institution in time and place, however Divinely called, can ever be more than an approximation to, a stepping-stone towards, an instrument and a channel of, the Eternal Kingdom. Without this vision, we shall fight the wrong battles and acclaim the wrong victories. Our zeal for the finality of what we call 'Faith' and 'Order' will be, at best, but an inversion of our love of the things which are seen, and, at worst, a disguise for our pride. And the final blasphemy is to stifle the spirit of man which is the candle of the Lord.

> 'Archbishop Fénélon once brought back to an old Huguenot woman a cow that had strayed from her field. Seeking to bring her back also to the true fold, he asked her: "Where was your church 200 years ago?" She answered: "Monseigneur, in hearts like yours."'

Fourth, that *Unity must not hastily obliterate, nor yet perpetuate, theological diversities on issues where no human mind can give final answers.* For is there a true 'religious agnosticism': and the final mark of the religious intellect is the ability to discern where to say 'We know,' and where 'We know in part,' and where 'We know not.'

During the next few generations theological changes demanded by a fuller and more reverent knowledge of the ways of God in Nature and in History will have to be made to guide and inspire the intellectual life of the Church. This is the real task of our theological ecumenical commissions: it is much deeper than the exploration and attempted synthesizing of our diverse inheritances transmitted to us from the credal battles of long ago. Such a task

—few are more difficult, and few more urgent—demands, before all else, a vision of Spiritual Truth transcending all theological expression. It is the vision which inspired the Biblical prophets and which has been mediated to us in its crowning and creative form in our Lord Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word of God to mankind. Without this vision we shall continue to be bogged in the old sloughs of theological desponds; continue to fight dogmatic shadows where none knows for long whether he strikes at friend or foe; assail with the fervour of hidden doubt our undogmatic friends of the freedom and progress of the spirit of man; mistake the form for the Spirit that informs. For 'Dogmatic Theology' is like Jeanne d'Arc's 'reasons' (as put into her mouth by Shaw): 'The Voices come first, and I find the reasons after.'

Here I would remind you of a very relevant word of that eighteenth century striver for the true spiritual Unity of the Church, Count Zinzendorf, at once a Lutheran and the reviver of the Czech *Unitas Fratrum*, itself so indebted to our English Wycliffe, as also so profoundly influential over the mind of the English Church's great itinerant evangelist, John Wesley. In his discussion with Cardinal de Noailles, Archbishop of Paris, he wrote:

> 'What, Monseigneur, would you say to me if instead of quoting Protestant controversial writings, I offered you in all simplicity the Church, Universal and Catholic, as the bond of our brotherhood? You would say, "Good," and retire into the bosom of the Roman Church, your mother, as it was that of your ancestors. To which I reply, "No," that far from falling into sectarianism, I have rescued myself from it, perceiving that the Kingdom is neither here nor there, but quite the contrary, it is within us. I appoint as your *rendezvous* the heart of our Saviour, and, for guide, His holy life' (on Sept. 24, 1723).

Thus, if I may adapt a pregnant word of Hort,

the lesson book of Dogma and Theology is not a Law but a History.

God speaks to men more in the whole history of thought than in formal declarations. To be able to understand this history calls for qualities other than those of the scholar or of the discursive thinker: for qualities, indeed, which are the fruits of the Spirit of God Himself—purity of heart, sensitiveness of soul, consecration of will. If, by the grace of God, we be dowered by these heavenly qualities we shall be delivered from false worship at the monuments of past thinkers or at such as have been erected over their graves. We shall learn, not just from what was, but from what is: and, supremely, not from a Code but from a Person; for this Person incarnates history's final meaning and leads to its final goal.

Theology is important, but all theologies are letters dated and signed and addressed. It is well to be able to say with the mind and the heart, 'I believe in God': it is better to be able to recog-

nize Him when and where He reveals Himself. That is why every true theology prepares the way for its own dissolution: like the corn of wheat, it dies to live again in fuller and more fruitful form. The only finally worthy Unity for the Church is one which is inspired and indwelt by the conditioned certainty of a dynamic faith. For by such a faith alone can man respond to the ever-new promptings of the Living God.

It belongs, I believe, to the Divine over-ruling that all the Communions native to this island are in fundamental agreement that *the Scriptures are the primary rule of faith.* This agreement stands written on Anglican and Free Church formularies, and is basic. To my own mind the ultimate value of this agreement is here: by it all our Christian Communions acknowledge themselves to have *a primal loyalty to that dynamic faith in the Living God to which the Scriptures bear essential witness.* Let us see to it that we do not deny or impoverish that dynamic faith by our dogmatic finalities. The Spirit of God is, with true insight, likened to the wind, for it itself is motion and it moves the unanchored ship.

Fifth, that *this Unity must express, and must not obliterate, cultural national diversities.* These represent the many-sided qualities and aspirations of peoples, and—like the 'perpetual curate'—perpetuate the untithed gains of history.

The *religious* way of expressing this is the Pauline: 'diversities of gifts but the same Spirit.' These gifts have, in the Divine over-ruling of the world's history, resulted in certain general, if not too precise, *national* characteristics. Nations—if I may amend a dictum of Bagehot—touch both at their foundations and at their summits. But they remain different in shape and in place: nor do I envisage an early future when they will be wholly merged: nor, indeed, ought we to strive for the obliteration of such inheritances as national languages and the corresponding modes of thought and worship. Here, however, I do not embark on the stormy seas of 'nationalism.'

What I wish to suggest is that the way of advance, both in respect to nations and to Church, is along the line of *real national unities.* The world can never become truly One World till each nation becomes truly One Nation. Unity begins at home: if it does not begin there it cannot begin at all. So with the Church. Are we not called to make our contribution to the 'ecumenical' Church by first healing the divisions at home? These divisions have in days past expressed the variety of insights which God has given to our people, with the clashes derived from a lower source. Thus we have inherited 'consecrated obstructions.'

Here, in our service of the Church as God would have it be, there must ever be a tension between the Ideal Goal and the Practicable Task. The situation is almost infinitely complicated

by our 'pan-Anglicanism,' our 'pan-Presbyterianism,' our 'pan-Methodism,' and so on. Yet, as I am able to understand the situation, it is along the line of *national unities* that we must move towards a *world unity*.

And just as the British Commonwealth of Nations is the nearest and best approximation to a World Commonwealth of Nations, so there is demanded a Commonwealth Christian Communion as a further step on the same road. I desist now from pursuing this inviting prospect; except to suggest for consideration that such would be our Anglo-Saxon contribution to, and harbinger of, the One World Church that is to be. I regard such a task as inherent in our history. Thus our British Christianity would conform both to ancient tradition and to the principle that prevails in the Orthodox Church of the East: 'ecclesiastical things are wont to be transformed with political things.'

And just as some of the most inspiring words to our Commonwealth have come from the Dominions, so the most hopeful and healing message to the Church has come from South India. Here we should be willing to learn from our children, and not only from our 'Fathers.' 'Wisdom is justified in her children.' And it is surely in the Divine over-ruling that this call has come to us from the land whose spiritual traditions are both deep and ancient—where, indeed, are the children of our own forbears in Central Asia (if we may trust the judgments of ethnologists).

I need not here seek to expound the proposed Scheme of Union for South India. Amid the tensions of conflicting loyalties and of beckoning practical responsibilities, for the first time in history a workable scheme conserving Episcopal, Presbyteral and Independent principles and polities has been put on paper by Christians of vision and courage. 'The Historic Episcopate'—without the imposition of any one theory about it—belongs to its structure: and so a governmental method, correspondent to the genius of our people and one to which the non-Anglican Churches had been driven in their own denominational histories—and in despite of these—is more adequately, more 'constitutionally,' conserved within the age-long Episcopate. When the Scheme is consummated the time will be fully ripe to confront its implications and to actualize its applications for our own country and Commonwealth. It is the hope of many that the next Lambeth Conference will be able to direct and inspire the aspirations of our people at home and overseas towards a fuller and deeper harmony based on the moral and spiritual principles of our religion.

It is impossible for me to discuss here the whole stumbling-block question of 're-ordination.' I am convinced, however, that its divisive nature has arisen out of unduly proud resentments caused by unduly grandiose claims. Now that South India has

raised the question to the higher level of the practical fulfilment of our Christian mission and the mutual enrichment of our diverse inheritances it is to be hoped that the old dogmatic demands, with their accompanying intransigent refusals, will be transcended in the larger vision. I myself—if I may speak here from personal experience—found this issue the most grievous and divisive within my own spirit; and old friends continue to quote my former utterances as if these were infallible. I myself have never so regarded them, or, indeed, *any* utterances which restrict Divine Grace either to specific institutional channels or to their absence, or would forbid methods of practical advance and reform. The remark of Archbishop Benson has always seemed to me to have an application wider than that to Africa:

> 'Where every petty city of Africa had its bishop, and where the doctrine of episcopacy was strongest, episcopacy was at its lowest.'

With that I may couple the remark of John Wesley:

> 'I dare not omit doing what good I can while I live, for fear of evils that may follow when I am dead.'

(Space forbids my discussing the highly relevant context of this utterance.)

Sixth, that *the way of advance is by prophetic action, in the situation in which we are placed*. Action is both fruit and enlargement of dynamic conviction.

It is the peculiar glory of our people's spiritual heritage that they have, by a kind of unrationalized but basic intuition and conviction, found in each challenging situation the way of advance by the method of *practical reform*. And history teaches, in spite of the complaints of myopic speculators and consistent logicians, that this method has both required and inspired sympathetic understanding for the views of others: as it has delivered us from embittering and, in the end, thwarting revolutions. I believe that it was in accord with this basic spiritual constitution of our people that, under God, the Evangelical Movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries began: for this movement at one and the same time recalled the nation to its spiritual foundations and inspired reforms in legislation for social betterment. We were thus delivered from two types of spurious contentment: contentment with the world as it is, and contentment with some future positivist paradise. I know very well that it is this quality and emphasis of mind which arouses suspicion: some see in it only soothing syrup. Yet, our basic convictions being what they are, we cannot do other than we do, however difficult the tension and however open to misconstruction our method.

This is the 'middle way' method, and it is chosen not because it is easy but because intuitive understanding of all the factors in the situation show it to be right. It is this quality of mind which

ecided the Elizabethan compromise at the time of the Reformaon. It is possible that if the Council of Trent had given its rength to practical reforms instead of to a dogmatic symposium ie story of western Christianity would have taken a less contenous road than that which history unrolled. I desist, however, om these historical speculations.

It belongs, I believe, to the underlying unity of this nation in ie truest moments of her history that thought has been wedded to, hd expressed in, action. This applies to her characteristic philoophers, to her deepest theologians, to her apostles and seers. hese last have sought primarily to spread 'Scriptural holiness,' ot 'dogma,' throughout the land: for they did not flinch from ie fact that we can be as orthodox as the devil and as wicked. uch an insight belongs to the central message of the Scriptures, oth Hebrew and Greek. It found its incisive and culminating xpression in our Lord's life and teaching. 'Not everyone that *ith* unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of eaven, but he that *doeth* the will of my Father who is in heaven.'

> 'What avails it,' asked Comenius, the Czech prophet of Unity, 'what avails it to contend about the Gospel and to live contrary to the Gospel? One builds up with one hand and destroys with two.'

Action is needed if divisions are to be healed, as action was eeded in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries if reform was to be ade possible. What was then done has not to be undone, but to e re-done in a new context of thought within a new situation of allenge and opportunity. Such actions will have to be done by dividuals who will be the channels of the life of the Spirit of od to the society of men. As the sixteenth century change was ade possible by the action of men like Wycliffe and Tyndale, so is coming century of revival and reform has been prepared for y anticipatory acts of all sorts and conditions of men during the venteenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. New *actions* are emanded to fulfil these anticipatory acts. Of verbal beliefs in inity we have had enough, and more than enough. For such elief, without action, denies God and serves Mammon. Or, as Villiam Blake said, 'He who desires but acts not breeds pestince' (O.Q. 31); and, again, 'Sooner murder an infant in its adle than nurse unacted desires.' It is not for me now to suggest ecific actions: some of these may be made clear in subsequent scussion.

Into the labours of the past we have entered. To fulfil its tasks e have been called. May we be worthy of our calling! Can the hristian Communions in this country arise in faith, courage, and ergy for the creative adventure of Truth and Unity to which the pirit of God is insistently calling?

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION: A WEST AFRICAN'S EXPERIENCE

By Samuel Cookey, B.A. (London), formerly of Achimota College, West Africa.

THIS paper is not going to be a learned discourse on 'The Religion the World Needs,' for the simple reason that I am not learned. When I was invited to contribute this paper I was asked to make my talk personal and biographical, and so it is going to be.

The need for religion is recognized by everybody here. Man is essentially a religious animal. Deep down in him he realizes that he owes his very life to that Infinite Power in Whom we live and move and have our being. We do injustice to the atheist when we say he does not believe in God. Often we confound the atheist with the agnostic. Some atheists do believe in God. What he does not believe in is God as presented to him by the different organized religions. In the early days of Christianity, Christians were called atheists because they would not worship the Roman Emperor. We all acknowledge a power above us, no matter by what name we call it. Man is also gregarious. He likes to feel that he belongs to a group, and there are many groups which provide what man seeks. The Christian Church is one such group, with its sub-divisions into denominations. Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, and the other religions of the world serve (for those parts of the world in which they flourish) the same ends that the Christian Church serves in Christendom. The purpose of this Conference is not so much to convince its members of the need for religion as to consider what kind of religion is nearest the true religion, what kind of religion a man stands in need of to-day.

Many people would consider the theme of the conference superfluous, for they would maintain that the only religion which the world needs is the Christian religion. This bold assertion might have been considered sufficient and satisfactory a hundred years ago, but it is no longer so to-day, and we know it. We cannot escape the fact that there is a general apathy to-day towards Christianity. People simply cannot be bothered about Christianity and its claims. This fact becomes very obvious to me as I travel about in the country. I am afraid the clergy do not know the real state of affairs. They think that things are going on well, and that most people are really interested in the Church. I am afraid this op-

imism is not justified. I do not know much about the older folk, ut I have moved much among the youth of this country and I hink I know their views on religion. Not long ago I spoke to a outh Rally of nearly two thousand and later had an opportunity f discussing religion informally with some of them. How I wished hen that some representative of the official Churches were there o hear the frank admissions and confessions of those young minds. n the past three weeks I have been to three Student Christian Movement Summer Conferences, one of which was for boys and irls about to leave school, a most disquieting conference for the eaders and speakers who had to face a devastating barrage of unxpected questions from such younsters.

Missionaries exult in the so-called progress of Christianity in he Younger Churches. The Churches are increasing, they tell us, nd thousands of volunteers are needed for the missionary fields. f you analyse the various needs for missionaries you will find that Education, Health and Social Services claim nearly all the availble openings. The significance of this is that the average African here I am speaking particularly of that part of Africa where I ome from, West Africa) — the average West African looks upon Christianity not as the best religion, *qua* religion, but as a means f getting better education, better health, and better homes. People ushed to Christianity because of the material blessings it offered. he poor, disease-ridden native looks upon the comparative health nd well-being of his Christian neighbour and decides to go to hurch the following Sunday in the hope that his lot will be betered. Why, has not the evangelist told him in the streets that if e and his family became Christians they would have better houses nd better dresses, and that his children would receive education? hat was the popular appeal. I know, because I have taken part n village to village evangelism when I was teaching in a Missionary Training College at home. The Missions have been the ioneers in the fields of education and health in West Africa, and ave therefore been regarded as the only source of social progress. ut times have changed. One could now get educated without elonging to a Church. All the attractions of material well-being hich seemed to be the monopoly of Christians can now, thanks o the Government, be obtained without troubling to be baptized nto a Church. Mission schools are still being patronized because ney are cheaper — thanks to poorly-paid Mission teachers. The hurch is welcomed, not for its own sake, but for what material enefits it can offer.

What about the educated classes in West Africa? To them hristianity makes a very small appeal. They regard it as a relion for the superstitious country people who do not know better.

In the towns and cities you hardly get the leading Africans attending the church services except on special occasions. Those who take any interest in religion do so beause Christianity is now a fashion. They are afraid of being regarded as uncivilized if they are not Christians, so they attach themselves to one Church or another and make gallant efforts to show their interest. And the missionaries are deceived into thinking that Christianity has taken a hold of the educated classes. It is unfortunate that clergymen, because of their position, are never able to gauge correctly what people are really thinking about religion. Those Africans who have come to this country and seen Christianity at work seldom trouble themselves about it when they go back. Most of the Colonial students in this country I have spoken with on matters concerning religion would have nothing to do with orthodox Christianity. It is interesting to note that in many of the S.C.M. Bible Study Schools recently held and in Bible Groups of Summer Conferences, Africans in those groups have been most difficult to satisfy about the claims of Christianity. Nay, even more, some educated Africans are definitely anti-Christian. They have come to regard Christianity as a bar in the way of the African's progress. To them it is a subtle tool of the Government to weaken any claims or resistance that may be put up by Africans. Our educated men no longer consider ordination. Those already in Holy Orders would get out if they could. It was one of them whom I know very well who advised us in a packed meeting never to yoke ourselves with the white man's round collar, if we wish to be of service to our country. This sounds strange, but it is true. Some educated Africans take it as an insult to be asked to forsake their religion for what they call 'the white man's superstition.' An African has recently published a book on African theology. Even in Africa people are beginning to think, and traditional Christianity is becoming less and less accepted as the best form of religion.

In spite of this indifference to the Christian religion the need for religion persists. Here in Britain there are scores of Movements and Associations and Cells. I made a collection of the names of several such Movements and their aims and bases. The majority aim at making religion real by dispensing with the unnecessary requirements which drive many away from orthodox Christianity. Some base their teaching on the ethical principles of Christianity, while they repudiate its fantastic claims. Others would do away with all forms of rites and ceremonies, emphasizing the need for the religion of the spirit. In spite of the diversity of the names and aims of these Movements one thing stands clear—the yearning for a religion that is at once reasonable and satisfying. In the search for such a religion, men are constrained to try

but everything that sounds attractive — Spiritualism, Christian Science, Holism, and many other substitutes for religion. Psychology has a great attraction for the seeker after truth. Some people are making it their religion. Here I am thinking of Practical Psychology or the New Psychology, popularized by publications such as the *Psychology Magazine*. Some clergymen decry Psychology as dangerous. But unfortunately some people make it a point to read whatever is condemned by the clergy, for such readers think the clergy regard as dangerous whatever challenges the elaborate magic they have built up.

In order to keep Christianity going in a critical and even hostile world, Christian leaders have had to make endless concessions and compromises. Some Christian doctrines have been adapted to suit the modern man and gradually, albeit reluctantly, even diehard orthodox theologians are giving up their entrenched positions. Some Churchmen have resorted to clever interpretations of difficult passages in the Bible, twisting the meaning of words here and there in order to make certain doctrines acceptable. The Church welcomes with relief and gratitude any layman who can juggle with words and make people accept as reasonable what really is nothing but nonsense.

I have been asked to make my paper personal and autobiographical. I wish I had time to recount my spiritual wanderings in search of a satisfying religion. I was brought up in a Christian home, my parents and grandparents being Christian. I have always been interested in religion, and this is perhaps why my father insisted that I should take Holy Orders. I made up my mind long ago to enter the Church, and consequently have refused to enter the Civil Service, with its attractions of big pay. Meanwhile, I read History in order to broaden my mind. When the offer was made to me to come to this country, first to read Theology with a view to ordination, and then to train as a Travelling Secretary for the Student Christian Movement in West Africa, I eagerly accepted it. I must confess that even before I came to a theological college here I had some theological doubts about religion. But my chaplain at my last college in West Africa assured me that those doubts would vanish when I began to read theology. But alas! the more I read Theology, the more my spirit revolted against the teaching of orthodoxy. The books recommended by my tutor at college were quite orthodox, but I had other books, too, some of them liberal in interpretation, others definitely heretical. If we honestly set out to seek for truth, we cannot confine our attention to 'safe' sources and authors. In terms I studied New Testament Criticism, the History and Development of Christian Doctrines, and the early history of the

Church. I wonder how my tutor must have felt listening to some of my heretical essays! However, after three terms at a theological college I decided that I could not honestly and sincerely enter the Ministry. How could I preach to people what I myself do not believe? At any rate I would never pass the General Ordination Examination, not in the papers on Doctrine, to be sure! Perhaps my choice of a theological college was unfortunate. I did not know until it was too late that there was in Oxford a theological college where saner Theology was taught. I had heard of Ripon Hall from Dr. R. Simpson of Achimota College, who gave me a letter of introduction to Dr. Major. But I thought Ripon Hall was simply only another theological college. This view was changed when I visited Dr. Major and had a long talk with him on religion. How I regretted that I did not go to Ripon Hall!

But to go on. After long and careful thought I decided that I could not remain a convinced member of the Church of England. I was born into it. I had no say in that. But when I found that I could not accept some of the official teachings and creeds of the Church, I decided to quit. If I must belong to a religious body, it must be to a body which satisfies my reason and my spiritual yearning. I reject the argument that the uniqueness of Christianity demands that it should be accepted with a blind faith and not be intellectually criticized. I have studied Quaker principles and practice, and they satisfy me. This is why I have joined the Society of Friends. My study of History, Comparative Religion, Psychology and Theology, points to Quakerism as the religion I need.

Several friends have told me that Liberal Theology is going out of fashion, and that orthodoxy is coming into its own again. I shall make no comment on this. But I should like to say this, that there is hardly any future for lukewarm liberalism whether in politics or in religion. Unless we strike out boldly and decisively, unless we become radical liberals or even socialists in religion, Liberal Theology is in danger of going the way the political Liberal Party went in the recent Election. We cannot go back to conservative orthodoxy and survive. The half-way house of liberalism is inadequate. We must go forward, or perish.

Christian education is the only way to meet the religious needs of the world to-day. And here I use the term Christian to apply to the teachings of Jesus, not to the many accretions that have during the centuries accumulated and flourished under that beautiful name. A naval chaplain once complained to me that he found that almost all he learnt in his theological college had hardly any bearing on his job outside. Some of our colleges carry on teaching the same old stuff that was taught in the nineteenth century. They

arry on as if no new knowledge has come into the world since the lays of St. Paul and the Early Church Fathers. This is why the Churches fail to draw the people. The Churches have resorted to he use of Church Club dances and socials to entice people to take ny interest in religion! We must have better educated clergy. By this I mean clergy who are acquainted with the fundamental eachings of Jesus, reinforced with knowledge of the recent findngs of the sciences, especially Psychology and the social sciences. As a clergyman put it in one of his books, the tide of psychological nd scientific truths is coming up the religious beaches, and Theoogy cannot always play the Canute. We cannot be ostriches. The Church has failed to realize her responsibility in the educaion of its candidates for the ministry. This is evident in the urricula of her theological colleges. I may be wrong, but it is ny impression that some of our clergy, especially the younger mong them, study theology with a view to confuting arguments rom clergymen holding views different from their own. They nuster up all that Origen or Tertullian would have said on any iven point, reinforce these with gleanings from leading modern heologians, and have them ready to fire at their opponents when ecessary. They delight in such theological dialectics. Most ectures in Doctrine are devoted to hunting out heresies and conuting them. Students in theological colleges have their minds urned inwards, and narrowed by the kind of teaching they reeive. They know very little about what is happening in the very vorld where they are going to minister. At breakfast, at dinner, t supper, everywhere, every time, the conversation never varies. Infant Baptism, Arianism, the problem of Ezra and Nehemiah, he Typology of the Old Testament, and so on, *ad infinitum*. You do not see them taking much interest in the ordinary clubs of heir University; they do not hear famous speakers unless they are Christians and safe to listen to. Can the clergy so trained be said o be well equipped for the work of supplying the world with the eligion it needs? I doubt it.

I must again remind you that I am being personal. I am telling ou how the whole question of religion strikes me. If you ask me hat religion I think the world needs, I will answer unhesitatingly —Basic Christianity. Dr. Major has stated the problem with haracteristic fairness and frankness and honesty, and with boldess and conviction has supplied the answer. Basic Christianity s the religion that I can embrace with sincerity. It is the religion hat most people outside the Church to-day would claim with ferour. My African friends whom I have persuaded to read the book ave nothing but praise for it. We need basic Christianity—the eachings of Jesus; His simple, clear message about the Kingdom

of God; His concern for the welfare of the ordinary man; His unshaken faith in the inherent divinity of each individual human being; His emphasis on love and service as the true religion. This is the religion the world needs. This is the religion Christian education should lead up to. If I were wealthy enough to do it, I would make a cheap reprint of Dr. Major's book *Basic Christianity* and distribute it to all who would care to read it but cannot afford a copy, or who would not buy it because they are afraid it would be 'the same old stuff.' George Bernard Shaw put the matter splendidly in his book *The Quest of an African Girl in Search of God*: we ought to throw away our dirty water as soon as we have got clean water. Orthodox Christianity has persisted in mixing the dirty with the clean.

The choice to-day is between Basic Christianity and Traditional Christianity. There is no half-way. We must either utilize the knowledge we have acquired, and reorientate our religious outlook, and have the people back again in the churches ready to serve the living God in spirit and in truth;) or stick to the traditional superstitions which we have come to worship as truth. If we make the second choice I fear that we shall have the pain of watching our churches degenerate into mere architectural and historical remains, for the pleasure and instruction of tourists and antiquarians. I rejoice to note that the Modern Churchmen's Union is not making the second choice, but is leading the way to establishing the religion that the world needs. May success attend the efforts of its members. You are the people giving us real Christian education. I pray that the members of this Union may have the courage to go forward:

> On through the cynic's scorning,
> On through the coward's warning,
> On through the cheat's suborning.

And with Pfleiderer let us realize that all our knowledge and experiences

> 'show us how we ought to let history point the way above history to the eternal and omnipresent God, who is a God of the living and not of the dead. They warn us to free ourselves from the fatal ban of historicism, which seeks God's revelation only in the records of a dead past and thus loses the power of finding it in the living present. "Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here. He is risen! . . ." We are to behold the living Christ Spirit, this ever indwelling divine principle of mankind, everywhere where the souls of men open themselves to the knowledge of every truth, where hearts glow with enthusiasm for all that is good and beautiful; where love fulfils its daily offering of self-sacrifice for the good of the community; where there is conflict and suffering for the cause of justice and righteousness in society; where there is faith in the continual coming of God's Kingdom among us, and where in this faith the world is overcome.'

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT *

By the Very Rev. Dr. W. R. Inge, K.C.V.O., F.B.A.

'Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him. But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God.' (*I Cor.* ii, 9-10.)

A VERY old man, who is invited once more to address you, casts his eye back upon the vicissitudes of Liberal Christianity s he has watched them since his ordination nearly sixty years ago.)ur lot is not fallen to us in a fair ground; we have struck a bad atch in history. This world has its nights, says St. Bernard, and ıey are not few. *Habet mundus noctes suas et non paucas.* We :e often told that civilization is passing through a zone of cosmic listurbance. The Renaissance, the birthday of the modern world,)hen it seemed good to be alive, when Europe stood on the top of olden hours, has spent its force. We see not our tokens; there is ot one prophet more — or there are too many who do not seem to rophesy truly. We know more and more about less and less; we nd that we know nothing of what we most want to know. We ave lost confidence in the intellect, which has won so many iumphs. There is anarchy everywhere, in the realms of science, rt, and morals.

In the last century men believed in an ineluctable law of progress, but by any reasonable standard we are going fast downhill. Those who could view with equanimity the loss of faith in God, annot face the loss of faith in man. We believed in freedom, hich is now derided as a bourgeois ideal; in democracy, which early all our neighbours have discarded for one-man rule; in umanitarianism, which has been submerged in an orgy of cruelty. bove all we believed in science, which has so far lost confidence at it appeals to faith for support. It is uncertain about its oundations. Relativity and the quantum theory do not harmonize. he ether, which forty years ago was 'the fundamental principle f physics,' does not even appear in the index of a more recent andbook. Matter has been defecated into a transparency. The npenetrable hard little billiard balls are now said to be merely ectrical charges. Space and Time have become Gnostic aeons, nited incomprehensibly in a mystic marriage. Causality and eterminism are discredited; chance, or something like it, is re-

* A sermon delivered to the Conference of Modern Churchmen in the Chapel of Somerville College, Oxford, August 17, 1945.

habilitated. Vortex, as Aristophanes says, reigns, and has dethroned Zeus.

I do not see things quite in this way. We are well rid of the law of progress, a windy superstition born of extravagant hopes in an era of expansion. It has never been a Christian doctrine. But we are not rid of the fact of progress, which has been real, wonderful, and beneficent, though one-sided, and for the western nations necessarily only an episode in world history. The repudiation of liberty is the result of aggressive militarism on one side and of well-founded fear on the other. There has been no permanent change in what human beings desire. Except in Germany, Russia and Spain, I do not think there has been a recrudescence of cruelty, and in those countries there are special causes which will not always be operative.

The arts are certainly in a bad way. We are tired of imitating the old masters, but perhaps we may improve on the productions of West African primitives. Poetry which neither scans nor makes sense at any rate does not challenge comparison with Milton or Tennyson.

In what sense is it true that science has lost faith in itself? There are unsolved problems, and probably always will be, for an abstract study can hardly achieve a closed system. There is a crack in all that God has made, says Emerson. The crack is probably in our minds. There is the distinction between evolution in its proper sense, a mechanical unpacking or what was there in germ from the first, and what Kant called epigenesis, which admits the introduction of new factors. I suspect that the blessed word emergence is sometimes used to obscure this vital difference. There is the protest of biology and psychology against attempting to explain their problems by mechanical or mathematical symbols. There is the mystery of irreversible change, which seems to ring the knell of the material universe, though mathematics knows of no irreversible processes, and though the beginning in time of the one-way movement to annihilation is hardly conceivable. These and other problems await solution; but I do not think that our scientists have lost faith in the methods which have gained such a marvellous increase in our knowledge of nature.

I do moreover doubt whether these new discoveries have the philosophical and religious importance which is often attached to them. Take for instance the problem of time, the hardest of all philosophical problems. Do the new doctrines touch the nature of space and time in themselves? Are they not improved methods of detecting the ultimate composition, and measuring the movements, of objects in space and time? The confusion of space and time with our awareness of them, and with the things measured by space

nd time, has led, I think, to much false reasoning. Space and me are the warp and woof of the canvas on which we have to raw most of our pictures of the world. In themselves they have o qualities, and can hardly be ultimately real.

As for the argument that the dissolution of the atom has re-uted materialism, it seems to me childish, and on a level with the d theory that spirit is matter in an ultra-gaseous condition.

But in another sense science has lost faith, not in itself, but in e poor philosophy which the Victorians built upon it. It is not ways realized that nineteenth century materialism was based on naïvely realistic view of nature, the view of the plain man who inks that seeing is believing. It is a long way from this crude ceptance of the evidence of our senses to Eddington's 'pointer eadings' and Jeans' divine mathematician. We know how the ictorian scientists, or some of them, dismissed all the 'imponder-oles,' as Bismarck called them, as mere epiphenomena, floating npotently above the world of realities. They did not like to be alled materialists, but they did all their thinking on a materialistic ypothesis. Their successors, except a few hard-boiled survivors, ill have none of it. Some of them are coquetting with an out-ioded Berkelyan idealism.

Philosophy, while respecting natural science as a fruitful study f the ponderables, must find room for the world of values, which, we may trust ourselves, is quite as real as the visible universe. ome values are merely instrumental and relative; others are ltimate, standing in their own right, not to be explained by any-ning outside themselves, nor by their usefulness to men living in ociety. Secular philosophy enumerates three of these ultimate alues—Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. But may we not translate ese, as St. John does, into another triad — God is Light, God is ife, God is Love? For us, these are the three attributes of God hich He has revealed to us. They are not relative, not useful ids in the art of living, as the pragmatists do vainly talk. They re the most real things in our experience.

I have often thought that St. Thomas Aquinas and his modern isciples made a great mistake in rejecting the ontological argu-ent. We all know that Kant stated it in a ridiculous form, and nen demolished his man of straw. But the ontological argument s an act of faith in the inner light, in the testimony of the Holy pirit. Are we to trust this experience, or is the nature of things conspiracy to mock us? To suppose this is, in Lotze's phrase, intolerable.' Even Bradley says, 'I could not rest in a truth if were compelled to regard it as hateful.' Surely he is right. Let s think as objectively as we can, but we come to a point where a an must trust himself. We may accept Plato's brave assurance,

'What is fully real is fully knowable.' Not fully known, but fully knowable. There is no impassable barrier between the human mind and the vision of God.

I return to the controversies in the days of my youth. Dogmatic materialism was pitted against its sister, materialistic dogmatism. Both were infected by the same error. It seems plain to us now that to make our faith stand or fall by the factual truth of suspensions of the laws of nature was to give religious symbols just that value which would deprive them of any religious significance. Unrepeated insulated facts, says Lessing, can least of all testify of the untransitory and ever-living. This was not plain to either side in the wearisome conflict between religion and science. On one side science was fighting to protect its own legitimate frontiers against the theory of occasional interference with its laws, which would reduce science, as a study of those laws, to chaos. On the other side religion was fighting to defend the reality of its own values, represented by symbols unconsciously and quite naturally created by faith. To envisage the spiritual as the supernatural is a normal action of the mind.

The two sides now understand each other better. But cannot we appreciate the witty words of Jeremy Taylor: 'He that proves a certain truth from an uncertain argument is like him that wears a wooden leg when he has two sound ones already'?

Have we and those who think like us receded from the Liberal Protestantism of Harnack's famous lectures? I think we have, if we ever held it. Harnack distrusted Hellenism, that is to say Platonism and mysticism. He draws for our devotion a modernized Jesus, a great teacher and a great example. This he was, and more. But the object of the Church's worship is not exactly the prophet of Nazareth in Galilee, but the living and ever-present Spirit of him who liveth and was dead, and behold he is alive for evermore. It is this glorified Christ who was invested by the Church with every honorific attribute. We can never be quite sure how far the Gospel portrait of the earthly Christ is complete; it needs to be supplemented by the testimony of the saints, who could say with St. Paul, 'I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.' We are not bidden to worship a dead Christ, but one who is with us always, even to the end of the world.

This kind of faith undoubtedly tends to substitute the spiritual for the supernatural. I like what Wordsworth says about religious symbols:

> 'The religious man values what he sees chiefly as an imperfect shadowing forth of what he is incapable of seeing. The concerns of religion refer to indefinite objects, and are too weighty for the mind to support them without resting a great part of the burden on words and symbols, by a process whereby much is represented in little, and the infinite Being

accommodates himself to a finite capacity. In all this may be perceived the affinity between poetry and religion.'

ut the fact is that most of us need bridges to take us across from ie seen to the unseen, from appearance to reality, from time to ternity, express it how we will. A good bridge is one that takes s across, and this is the function of dogma, myth, and cultus. Or e may picture religious teachers as opticians, whose task it is to rovide, for eyes of every degree of capacity, spectacles to help iem to see the invisible. There can be no standardized orthodoxy. Ve must be very chary of such words as heretic and obscurantist. nd if we are climbing hopefully up the hill of the Lord, we must e careful not to kick down stones on those who are climbing ehind us.

As regards our practical teaching, it seems to me that the hurch has been handicapped from the first by two unfortunate gacies. One is the uncritical acceptance, as an inspired book, of ie sacred literature of the Hebrews. Of course there is much in e Old Testament for which we cannot be too grateful, but I con- ss that very many of the first lessons which we have to read in iurch are to me excruciating. To say that they are sub-Christian to put it too mildly. I believe they do harm, and I heartily wish at we were allowed to read extracts from some Christian de- otional books instead. We can at any rate warn our people not put the Old Testament on the same level as the New.

The other—it is a rather delicate subject—is the doctrine of ture reward and punishment. I know that the traditional aching may be justified from the Gospels. But did not our Lord, pecially in his parables, accept and use the traditional Jewish nguage about Hades, Gehenna, and Paradise? Did he ever aim to know more than other men about the conditions of future e? I think it is a fair question how such things could be revealed, en to him, unless we are prepared to accept authority as such, thout questioning. St. Thomas Aquinas would have preferred to lieve that the universe had no beginning, but he was compelled accept creation in time, because it is revealed. How could it be vealed?

I think our Lord's only argument for human immortality is his swer to the Sadducees. 'God is not the God of the dead but of e living, for all live unto him.' St. Augustine uses this argument very beautiful words, *Quod Deo non perit sibi non perit.* It is te the words of Plotinus, 'Nothing that really *is* can ever perish,' d Robert Browning's 'All that is at all lasts ever past recall.' e cannot emphasize too strongly that the belief in God is central, e belief in our immortality is peripheral and consequential. It s nothing to do with ghosts and spooks. The traditional teach-

ing, we must say plainly, represents our heavenly Father as a terribly cruel Being, neither just nor merciful; and it gives some plausibility to the taunt that the Christian expects to be repaid 'a thousand-fold' for his investments in good works here below. How far is plain speaking on this subject possible in our churches? I do not know; but it is not good that men's consciences should revolt against what they are taught to believe about God.

To conclude, and to go back to what I said at the beginning of my sermon. We have not passed this way heretofore. We have a steep hill before us, and we shall have much to suffer. But it will not be 'a new world,' as our apocalyptists suppose. For us Liberal Churchmen there will be a temptation to withdraw into our ivory tower and let the world stew in its own juice. This will not do. Fugitive and cloistered virtue thinks itself disinterested, when it is really uninterested. The truths which we have not thought out for ourselves lie bedridden in some dormitory of our souls until they are translated into action. 'Conscience,' says Amiel, 'saves us from the sorceries of *Maya*, and dissipates the narcotic vapours, the opium-like hallucinations, the placid vapour of contemplative indifference. It drives us into contact with the terrible wheels within wheels of human suffering and human responsibility; it is the bugle-call, the cockcrow, which puts the phantoms to flight, the archangel who chases men from an artificial paradise.'

Yes, to all of us who are still able to work comes the call, louder perhaps than ever before. 'Seeing that we are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses'—the brave boys who have died for us, and whom we may now fancy to be sitting on the spectators' seats watching how we acquit ourselves, 'let us lay aside every weight, and the sin that doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus, the author and finisher of our faith, who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God.'